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Synopsis 
 
This dissertation studies pricing and market behaviour around corporate acts and information 
releases. The issues examined within this thesis are a fundamental part of the functioning of 
secondary markets and the broader integrity of the financial system. The three essays in this 
dissertation examine factors related to the efficiency of price adjustment on equity markets in 
response to new information and the influence of third party certification on initial public 
offering process. In particular, the speed by which the information contained in corporate 
earnings announcements is incorporated into equity prices; the behaviour of algorithmic 
traders around such announcements; and the insights that venture capitalist backing of newly 
listing companies has for third party investors are comprehensively examined. The outcomes 
of these studies provide new insights into how equity markets function and, therefore, the 
findings are relevant for market practitioners, policy makers and the academic community.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1   Purpose of the Dissertation 
 
Ever since the early works of Fama (1965, 1970), Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver 
(1968), researchers have examined the way in which security prices react to the 
release of corporate information, in particular periodic earnings reports. It is broadly 
accepted that the speed with which securities prices fully respond to the availability of 
new information defines the level of informational efficiency of that exchange.1
 
 The 
timely adjustment of prices to the information contained in such announcements is an 
essential element in ensuring that an equity security’s current market value and 
intrinsic value are as closely aligned as possible. Significant divergence between the 
underlying value of the security and its traded price, caused by a delay in adjustment 
following the arrival of new information, leads to informational arbitrage. Should the 
existence of informational arbitrage become widespread this would have potentially 
very serious consequences for the perceived fairness of the equity market by 
uninformed (liquidity) traders. This could lead to the partial, or even full, withdrawal 
of liquidity traders from participation in that market. The consequence of such an 
outcome would be a dramatic decline in the provision of liquidity on the exchange. 
Therefore the question of whether the market is informational efficient is of 
significant importance to the investment community, market regulators, and the 
academic community.  
                                                 
1 Fama (1970) defined the speed and accuracy of the market’s reaction to public information such as 
periodic earnings reports as semi-strong market efficiency.  
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Considerable scholarly research has been undertaken to determine if equity markets 
are informationally efficient. One of the major types of information examined by 
previous researchers has been periodic corporate earnings announcements. Periodic 
earning announcements are seen as providing clues about the amount, timing and/or 
uncertainty of future cash flows of the firm. That information is then used by market 
participants to revise their previous expectations of the firm’s value, and hence, adjust 
the current security price. Nevertheless, there remain contradictions in the existing 
literature about the relationship between the timing of corporate earnings 
announcements, information content and speed of price adjustment. Furthermore, 
there remains a scarcity of literature examining how the phenomenal rise of 
algorithmic trading has impacted the adjustment process. The first part of this 
dissertation will add to this knowledge base by examining these issues around the 
release of preliminary final earnings reports by Australian companies.2
 
  
The second part of the dissertation examines the role of venture capitalists in initial 
public offering process on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). The price 
uncertainty that typically accompanies new offerings to the market has long been an 
area of interest to scholars. Many theories have been advanced as possible 
explanations of this phenomena; asymmetric information, institutional reasons (which 
create an incentive for investment banks to underprice), control considerations, and 
behavioural approaches.3
                                                 
2 The companies selected for this dissertation are all included in the S&P/ASX 200 index. This index 
comprises approximately 80% of the total market capitalisation of the Australian equities market. 
 Of these, the argument that underpricing is a rational 
response by potential investors to the inherent uncertainty about the fair value of the 
firm in a market characterised by informational asymmetry is the most firmly 
3 Ljungvist (2004) uses these broad categories to summarise the empirical evidence of IPO 
underpricing research. 
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established. This is essentially a problem of adverse selection by uninformed 
investors.  
 
The presence of a venture capitalist on the registry at the time of public offering adds 
an additional dimension to this problem. Whilst this has received good coverage in the 
existing literature that attention has been focused largely in the US market where the 
venture capital industry has long been established. However, there are important 
structural differences in both scale and investment focus between the Australian 
venture capital industry and its US counterpart that raise legitimate questions about 
whether those findings would apply here.4
 
 It is the scarcity of research into the role of 
venture capital participation in the initial public offering process in Australia that the 
final essay in this dissertation will address. 
1.2 Stock Returns around Corporate Earnings Announcements 
 
The first essay in this dissertation examines the relationship between timing of the 
release of corporate earnings announcements, information content and security price 
reaction. Beginning with Ball and Brown (1968), researchers have used event studies 
to test the efficient markets hypothesis by measuring the speed of adjustment to 
various types of public information. Using an event study, the researcher infers 
whether the event, such as an earnings announcement, conveys new information to 
market participants as reflected by changes in the level or variability of security prices 
                                                 
4 In 2009, Australian venture capital funds held A$2 billion under management (AVCAL, 2009) 
whereas in the same year US venture capital funds held US$179.4 billion under management (NVCA, 
2010). Furthermore, OECD (2007) figures show that the share of venture capital dedicated to high-
technology sectors in the US was 87.5% whereas in Australia it was significantly lower at 19.6% in 
2005. 
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or trading volume over a period of time around the event.5 Early work measured 
response time in monthly, or daily, intervals after the event date. This work gave rise 
to the post-earnings-announcement drift literature and long-window event literature, 
which demonstrates that abnormal returns persist for extended periods of time 
following earning announcements.6
 
  
Commencing with the work of Patell and Wolfson (1984), researchers have also been 
interested in exploring the intraday speed of adjustment to the information content of 
corporate earnings announcements. The use of intraday data has the significant 
advantage of allowing the researcher to more precisely determine the speed with 
which the information content of an announcement is impounded within the security 
price. Market microstructure research has shown that the intraday price adjustment 
process is affected by a diverse set of influences. The speed of adjustment following 
the release of a corporate earnings announcement on an intraday level may be affected 
by the inventory levels of the liquidity providers (Garman 1976; Stoll 1978; Amihud 
and Mendelson 1980), the degree of information asymmetry in the marketplace 
(Diamond and Verrecchia 1981; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Easley and O’Hara 
1987; Blume et al. 1994), the strategic trading behaviour by informed traders (Kyle 
1985; Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992), and actions of discretionary liquidity traders 
(Chordia et al. 2001; Chae 2005).   
 
Furthermore, a large body of research, beginning with Patell and Wolfson (1982), has 
examined the theory that managers strategically release information in order to effect 
                                                 
5 For a more detailed discussion of the event study methodology see Watts and Zimmerman (1986), 
Collins and Kothari (1989) and MacKinlay (1997) . 
6 Kothari (2001) states that post-earnings-announcement drift can last for up to one year after the 
announcement date. 
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the market reaction. The suggestion is that managers will release positive news during 
trading but hold negative news until after trading to minimise the potentially adverse 
price consequences. Francis et al (1992) specifically examine differences between the 
market’s reactions to overnight announcements and find no evidence of investors 
having impounded the value of the information in the opening price the next day but 
rather their results suggest that volumes and prices soon after the open reflect the 
value of the information. Greene and Watts (1996) examine the timing of 
announcements on the NYSE and NASDAQ and found evidence that the two markets 
respond differently to announcements suggesting that market mechanisms play a role 
in influencing the adjustment process.  
 
Existing empirical literature on the intraday adjustment to earnings announcements 
provides evidence of differences in speed of price response based upon the timing of 
the announcement (Patell and Wolfson 1984; Lee 1992; Francis et al. 1992; Greene 
and Watts 1996) and the type of trading systems used by the market (Francis et al. 
1992). The inconclusive nature of this evidence requires further investigation. The 
first essay in this dissertation examines the intraday returns around corporate final 
earnings announcements using data from the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). 
Unlike previous studies the ASX is a market which operates an open electronic 
central limit order book (CLOB), with exchange initiated trading halts for market 
sensitive announcements made during normal trading hours. Most previous studies 
have eliminated trading halts from the sample (Patell and Wolfson 1984), not 
specified how they were treated (Woodruff and Senchack 1988; Lee 1992; Francis et 
al. 1992; Lee and Park 2000), or identified them but been unable to draw general 
conclusions due to the small sample size (Greene and Watts 1996). 
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Therefore, the contribution of the first study is to examine the speed of adjustment for 
corporate earnings announcements in a different type of market from previous studies. 
This expands our understanding of this fundamental equity market activity. 
 
1.3 Algorithmic Trading around Corporate Earnings Announcements 
 
There is considerable interest in the role that Algorithmic Trading (AT) and its subset 
High-Frequency Trading (HFT) now plays in operational efficiency of stock 
exchanges around the world. This became especially true in the wake of the ‘flash 
crash’ on 6 May 2010 when the DJIA, already down around 300 points, dropped an 
additional 600 pts and before recovering most of that 600 point loss within 20 
minutes. The advance of technology in financial markets has meant all aspects of the 
trading process, from order placement through to back room processing, are now 
highly automated. In particular, market participants are able to utilise computer 
algorithms to determine the optimal price, timing, and quantity of an order, to 
minimise the market impact and risk or to generate a profit. This change, combined 
with constantly increasing computer capacity that can be acquired at ever decreasing 
costs, has meant that the volume of algorithmic trading has increased considerably in 
the previous decade. Figures from the US suggest that 73% of the volumes in US 
markets were the result of HFT in 2009.7 Recent figures from TABB Group also 
found that HFT accounts for 77% of transactions in the UK market.8
                                                 
7 “SEC runs eye over high-speed trading”, Financial Times, July 29 2009. 
 An Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) survey of brokers determined that the level of algorithmic 
8 “High-Frequency Trading is 77% of UK Market, Tabb Group says”, Bloomberg, 23 January 2011. 
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trading on the ASX was between 30-40% of total volumes traded, with HFT 
comprising around 10% of that figure.9
 
 However, Lepone and Mistry (2011) used a 
dataset from 2006 to 2009 to study HFT on the ASX and they found that whilst high 
frequency traders participated in around 35% of all dollar volume of trade in 2006 that 
figure had risen to around 80% towards the end of their sample period. These figures 
suggest that AT and HFT represent a very significant portion of the volume traded on 
global stock exchanges. 
The limited amount of academic literature on AT, and HFT, means that there is no 
firm consensus on precise definitions for each of these terms. However, there are 
some broad definitions that seem to have found a measure of acceptance in the 
existing research. Hendershott and Riordon (2011:2) broadly define algorithmic 
trading as “the use of algorithms to automatically make trading decisions, submit 
orders and manage those orders”. Brogaard (2010: 1) defines HFT as “a type of 
investment strategy whereby stocks are rapidly bought and sold by a computer 
algorithm and held for a very short periods, usually seconds or milliseconds”. Thus, 
HFT is a subset of AT.  
 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) identify two main types of algorithms used by algorithmic 
traders. The first are agency algorithms which were developed to minimise the market 
impact of large orders and thus reduce the cost of trading. Perhaps the most common 
of these is VWAP, which is designed to achieve, or better, the volume weighted 
average price of the day. The second are proprietary algorithms, which seek to profit 
from changes in data information and events. The ASX uses the terms execution 
                                                 
9 “Algorithmic Trading and Market Access Arrangements”, ASX Review, 8 February 2010. 
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algorithms and situational algorithms to describe agency and propriety algorithms 
respectively (ASX Review 2010). 
 
The effectiveness of AT (in particular HFT) strategies is determined by the level of 
latency that operates within the trading environment. Hasbrouck and Saar (2011:1) 
define latency as “the time it takes for information to reach the trader, the time it takes 
for the trader’s algorithms to analyse the information, and the time it takes for the 
generated action to reach the exchange and get implemented”.  Riordan and 
Storkenmaier (2011) use more narrow definition of latency; the time it takes for an 
investor to submit and receive feedback about an order. This is the element of latency 
that stock exchanges have recently devoted significant resources towards improving. 
Many exchanges around the world10
 
 now offer co-location facilities to market 
participants seeking to capture the trading opportunities available with millisecond 
transaction times. Co-location is the practice of locating the broker or client trading 
software and hardware in close proximity to the trading platform’s trading engine. 
The goal of co-location is to minimise the transmission latency. The Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) commenced offering co-location to its equity and options 
trading platforms in November 2008.  
A number of scholars have examined the influence of algorithmic trading and high-
frequency trading on financial markets. Existing research has focused upon exploring 
the general trading activities of algorithmic traders (Prix et al. 2007; Brogaard 2010), 
the impact algorithmic traders (or high frequency traders) have had upon market 
                                                 
10 For example, NYSE Euronext, NASDAQ, LSE, Deutsche Börse, TSE, SGX, TMX, and ASX all 
offer co-location services with many other exchanges planning on doing so in the near future. 
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quality (Brogaard 2010; Hendershott and Riordan 2011; Hendershott et al. 2011; 
Hasbrouck and Saar 2011), or the impact of technology on algorithmic trading 
(Hendershott and Moulton 2010; Riordan and Storkenmaier 2011). Other research has 
examined the impact of AT on execution costs (Engle et al 2007; Domowitz and 
Yegerman 2005) or the impact of AT in non-equity markets such as the foreign 
exchange market during 2006-2007 (Chaboud et al 2009).  
 
Lepone and Mistry (2011) is the only research to date to examine either AT or HFT in 
the Australian market. They examined a dataset consisting of ASX 200 companies 
over the period 2006-2009. They looked at the participation of high frequency traders 
on the ASX and tested the view that high frequency traders are liquidity takers. They 
found that high frequency traders are, on average, liquidity suppliers in the market 
rather than liquidity takers.  They also examined the market conditions that might be 
considered sufficiently favourable to trigger an algorithmic generated trade. Those 
factors were; when spreads are wider, when price volatility is lower, when total depth 
at the best price is lower and, when trade volumes are lower.   
 
Whilst the existing research demonstrates that algorithmic traders (and high frequency 
traders) appear to play an increasingly important role in influencing measures of 
market quality it does not address the question of how algorithmic traders respond to 
information shocks such as corporate earnings announcements. No research has 
examined whether algorithmic traders behave in a manner consistent the theoretical 
predictions of informed or uninformed traders. The second essay in this dissertation 
examines the behaviour of algorithmic traders around the release of final corporate 
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earnings releases on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and what impact the 
introduction of co-location has had upon this observed behaviour. This fundamental 
question had not previously been addressed in scholarly literature. 
 
1.4 Venture Capitalists and the Initial Public Offering Process 
 
The third essay of this dissertation examines the role of venture capitalists in the 
initial public offering (IPO) process in Australia. Venture capital (VC) typically refers 
to an equity, or equity type, investment in high growth potential small and medium-
sized unlisted enterprises (SME). With this type of investment the venture capitalist 
assumes a proportion of the business risk in return for the potential rewards associated 
with the rapid early stage growth. Venture capitalists provide financing, and expertise, 
to their portfolio firms, who by virtue of their small size and limited asset base, are 
typically unable to access public capital markets or bank finance. Once the company 
has grown sufficiently that these impediments are eliminated, or at least significantly 
reduced, the venture capitalist will seek to exit their investment in the firm. Often the 
preferred method of exit is via an IPO, since public capital markets are believed to 
offer higher prices than other exit methods such as trade sales (Bygrave and Timmons 
1992; Ruhnka et al. 1992; Wall and Smith 1997; Black and Gilson 1998; Brouwer and 
Hendrix 1998; Golis 1998; Mahur 1999; Neidorf 1999). Previous research on VC-
backed IPO’s has led to the development of two opposing models that attempt to 
explain the effects of VC participation in the IPO process; the certification/monitoring 
model (Megginson and Weiss 1991) and the adverse selection/grandstanding model 
(Amit et al. 1990; Gompers 1996). The certification/monitoring model suggests that 
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the participation of a VC in the IPO process serves to certify the quality of the issue. 
This should result in lower issuing costs and lower underpricing during the IPO and 
higher post-IPO performance.  Furthermore, as the VC withdraws their involvement 
in the portfolio company the higher post-IPO performance should decline to more 
'normal' levels. The adverse selection/grandstanding model, on the other hand, 
suggests that the participation of a VC in the IPO indicates that the company is 
'average', since companies that have strong prospects will be self-funded (adverse 
selection), or that the company is not yet 'ready' to go public since the VC has an 
incentive to bring the company to market prematurely (grandstanding). Thus, the 
second model implies the VC-backed company will exhibit higher IPO cost and 
higher underpricing and lower post-IPO performance compared with non-VC-backed 
companies. Previous research has proven to be contradictory with support found for 
both of these models. 
 
Most of the existing research carried out on the effects of VC participation in the IPO 
process has examined evidence from the United States and Europe. Only a limited 
amount of research has been carried out in markets that do not have such a well 
established VC industry.  Mamao et al. (2000) examined the underpricing of VC-
backed versus non-VC-backed IPOs in Japan (the largest VC market in Asia) and 
found deep underpricing on the venture capital-backed companies consistent with the 
adverse selection model. Wang et al. (2003) examined the certification/monitoring 
and adverse selection/grandstanding models in the Singapore and found support for 
the certification model in companies with at least two years of VC support but also 
inferior post-IPO performance consistent with adverse selection/grandstanding. 
Chiang and Lo (2007) used a microstructure approach to examine the effects of VC 
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participation in the Taiwanese market and found some evidence for supporting both 
the certification/monitoring model and adverse selection/grandstanding model. Wong 
and Wong (2008) found no support for the certification model but strong support for 
the adverse selection/grandstanding model in a study of the effects of VC 
participation in IPO’s in the Hong Kong market.  
 
The Australian venture capital industry differs from the more frequently examined 
markets, such as the United States, in terms of scale, investment focus and the skill 
sets of the venture capital managers. Whilst some venture capital existed in Australia 
in a very embryonic form from 1970 onwards, the industry in its current form did not 
begin to emerge until 1984 with the establishment of the Management Investment 
Companies (MIC) Program (AVCAL 2009). The US venture capital market, on the 
other hand, is commonly accepted to have begun with the founding of American 
Research and Development (ARD) by Ralph Flanders and Georges Doriot in 1946 
(Bygrave and Timmons 1992). This delayed development means that the Australian 
VC market remains very small compared to its better established overseas forebears. 
For example, according to AVCAL, Australian venture capitalists held over AUD 2 
billion in funds under management in 2009, compared to USD 179.4 billion under 
management by US venture capitalists in the same year (NVCA 2010). Australian VC 
firms have also exhibited differences in investment focus from their US counterparts. 
OECD figures report that almost 90 per cent of US venture capital investment activity 
occurs in the health, biotechnology, communications and information technology 
sectors whereas in Australia this figure is only around 20 per cent of investment 
activity (OECD 2007). Australian VCs also exhibit evidence of a different skill set 
from their US peers. Cornelius (2005) found evidence that Australian VC managers 
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are far more likely than US VC managers to come from financial management and 
consulting rather than relevant industry backgrounds. Cornelius argued that this lack 
of relevant industry experience was a contributing factor behind the higher 
concentration on later stage investments in Australian relative to the US. This implies 
that an examination of the VC participation in an Australian context is warranted. 
 
Limited academic research has been carried out on venture capitalist activities in the 
Australian market. Cumming et al (2005) examined the impact on venture capital 
fundraising of various value added activities and found that significantly more capital 
is allocated to venture capitalists that provide financial and strategic/management 
expertise to their portfolio companies than those venture capitalists that provide only 
marketing/administrative expertise. Suchard (2009) examined the participation of 
venture capitalists in the boards of their investment companies and found that whilst 
they tend to hold a lower number (percentage) of board seats than their US 
counterparts, their portfolio companies do exhibit a higher number (percentage) of 
independent directors, particularly those with relevant industry experience. These 
results are consistent with the view that venture capitalists add value to their portfolio 
companies through their involvement. This implies support for the certification 
model. However, da Silva Rosa et al (2003) examined IPO underpricing, and long-run 
performance for a period of 24 months after the IPO, of 38 venture capital-backed 
companies vs 295 non venture capital-backed companies in Australia. They found that 
the VC-backed companies exhibited higher underpricing than non-VC-backed 
companies although the differences were insignificant. Likewise, they found that VC-
backed companies exhibited a slightly lower long-run performance than non-VC 
backed companies but again the differences were insignificant. Thus, the authors were 
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unable to find support for the certification/monitoring model nor the adverse 
selection/grandstanding model. This still leaves open the question of whether venture 
capital participation is seen as having positive or negative consequences for the IPO 
of their portfolio companies. 
 
The third essay contributes to the body of knowledge on the role of venture capitalist 
participation in initial public offerings in the following ways. Firstly, the two main 
theoretical models explaining the effects of venture capital participation in initial 
public offers are explicitly examined in an Australian context. Secondly, an analysis 
of the differences between a matched sample of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs 
using measures of IPO pricing and post-IPO operating and market performance has 
been used. This enables more comprehensive conclusions than many previous studies 
have been able to achieve. 
 
1.5 Summary 
 
The three chapters that comprise this dissertation examine issues related to pricing 
and market behaviour around corporate acts and information releases. These activities 
represent some of the fundamental functions of an equity market and the studies in 
this dissertation are designed to enhance our understanding of these processes on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). This research has been motivated by a number 
of factors. These include the discordant nature of existing literature in these areas, the 
emphasis of existing research on markets which are substantially different in nature 
and characteristics from the Australian market, and the desire to focus attention on 
aspects of the financial sector that have important implications for economic 
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development and public policy. 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a 
detailed review of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the relevant 
fields. The hypotheses examined in the three essays are developed at the end of this 
chapter. Chapter 3 examines the stock return behaviour around corporate earnings 
announcements. Chapter 4 examines the behaviour of algorithmic traders around 
corporate earnings announcements. Chapter 5 examines the role of venture capitalists 
in the initial public offering process. Each chapter contains sections that describe the 
data, sample, research design, empirical results and robustness tests, and the 
conclusions drawn. Chapter 6 concludes by discussing the implications of the findings 
of this dissertation for academics, practitioners and regulators. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 described the purpose and objectives of this dissertation. This chapter will 
review the existing scholarly literature in the fields under examination in this thesis. 
This will be done to demonstrate how the dissertation fits within our current 
understanding of these fields. The significance of the contribution of this work will be 
established by critically evaluating the existing literature and identifying those areas 
that have received insufficient attention to date. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows; Section 2.2 examines the theoretical literature on 
investor behaviour around corporate information releases. This material has both 
normative and positivist elements to it. Section 2.3 focuses on the empirical literature 
examining the speed of reaction on the market and on the strategic timing of corporate 
information announcements. The focus of this section is whether this impacts upon 
the market’s ability to efficiently process the information content of those 
announcements. Section 2.4 provides a review of the scant literature existing on the 
impact of algorithmic trading (and high frequency trading) in security markets. 
Section 2.5 contains a review of the nature of venture capital investments and the 
existing literature examining the role of venture capitalists in the initial public 
offering process. Section 2.6 develops testable hypotheses based on the review of the 
literature contained in the previous sections that will be examined in the ensuing 
chapters. 
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2.2 Theoretical impact of corporate information releases on market 
behaviour 
 
This section examines the existing theoretical literature that seeks to explain market 
behaviour around corporate information releases. For the purposes of this review, this 
literature has been classified into two broad areas; (i) the efficient market hypothesis 
explanation of the market reaction to the release new information, and (ii) the various 
market microstructure models that seek to explain how the price discovery process 
functions in the marketplace. These later models help us to understand the 
determinants of the price reaction to corporate earnings announcements.  
 
2.2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
Whilst most of the work in the field of corporate information releases tends to be 
empirical in nature, much of the basis our current theoretical understanding of the 
efficiency by which security prices impound the information content of those releases 
stems from the work of Fama (1965, 1970). In the efficient markets hypothesis 
(EMH), which was developed from early empirical work on random walk and ‘fair 
game’ (martingale) models11
                                                 
11 Samuelson (1965) provided the first economic argument for efficient markets in a paper that focused 
on the concept of a martingale model. 
, Fama gave us a theoretical model to explain the 
relationship between security prices and information in a perfect capital market. Fama 
stated that a market was informationally efficient if security prices ‘fully reflect’ all 
available information. The basis of this theory is that market participants will 
impound the value of the information by revising (upwards or downwards depending 
upon the content of the information) expected future dividends (cash flows), required 
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rates of return and/or the expected future growth rate of dividends (cash flows). The 
present value of these changes will give rise to a new intrinsic value for the security 
and the process of trading on that value will establish a new equilibrium price.  
 
In its original form, EMH predicts that this process of establishing a new equilibrium 
price should occur ‘instantaneously’.12
 
 Fama (1970) defined the perfect capital 
market conditions in which prices would instantaneously fully reflect all available 
information; (i) there are no transaction costs in trading securities, (ii) all available 
information is available to all market participants without cost, (iii) all agree on the 
implications of current information for the current price and distributions of future 
prices of each security. Fama (1970) did point out though, that perfect capital market 
conditions are sufficient for market efficiency but not necessary.  
Other early theoretical models did take into account the impact of an imperfect capital 
market, in which the conditions stated previously are not satisfied, on the EMH. For 
instance, the Jensen (1978) version of market efficiency hypothesis says that prices 
reflect the information to the point where the margin benefits of acting on the 
information (that is the profit to be made) exceed the marginal costs. Hence outside 
the conditions of a perfect capital market, efficiency is judged on the basis of whether 
the theory is a reasonable approximation of actual market conditions. 
 
Following the initial work, Fama (1970) went on to further identify three levels of 
market efficiency based upon the type of information reflected in the security price: 
(i) weak form market efficiency in which prices reflect the information contained in 
                                                 
12 Although Fama (1965:94) acknowledged right from the outset that instantaneously means “among 
other things, that the actual price will initially overshoot the new intrinsic value as often as it will 
undershoot”. 
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historical prices13, (ii) semi-strong form market efficiency in which prices reflect the 
value of information that is publicly available and, (iii) strong form market efficiency 
in which prices reflect the information content of all available information, including 
private information.14
 
 Fama was careful to point out that in a semi-strong form 
efficient market, where prices respond to public information (such as corporate 
earnings announcements), large price changes tend to be followed by further large 
price changes. However, provided the initial adjustment of prices to the information is 
unbiased then this does not in itself invalidate the hypothesis.  
There are many contentious issues surrounding the application of EMH in empirical 
research. An often cited criticism of the EMH, acknowledged by Fama (1970), is that 
in order to test whether security prices ‘fully reflect’ the value of new information we 
must assume an equilibrium model that defines ‘normal’ security returns. Such 
models include simple methods such as the constant mean return model and the 
market model, together with economic models such as the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964; Linter 1965; Black 1972), the Arbitrage Pricing Model 
(APT) (Ross 1976) or the consumption-based model  (C-CAPM) (Rubinstein 1976; 
Lucas 1978; Breeden 1979). Therefore, any test of the EMH is both a test of market 
efficiency and the equilibrium model used to determine normal returns. This gives 
rise to the joint hypothesis problem in empirically testing EMH (Campbell et al. 1996; 
Lo and McKinlay 1999; Cuthbertson and Nitzsche 2005
                                                 
13 Fama (1970) acknowledged that the distinction between weak and strong form tests was first 
suggested by Harry Roberts. Fama (1991) suggested this area has expanded to cover other variables of 
potential return predictability such as dividend yields, earnings to price ratios and term-structure 
variables. 
).  
14 Fama acknowledged that the distinction between weak and strong form tests was first suggested by 
Roberts (1959). Fama (1991) suggested a change of title from semi-strong form to event studies and 
from strong form to tests for private information. He argued this better reflects the nature of the 
research in these fields. 
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Many of the concerns about the joint hypothesis originally arose from empirical 
evidence documenting the existence of financial market ‘anomalies’. Financial market 
anomalies are cross-sectional and time series patterns in security returns that are not 
predicted by a central paradigm or theory. Currently identified anomalies include (but 
are not limited to); that returns are negatively correlated with market capitalisation 
(Banz 1981; Reinganum 1981; Fama and French 1992), that stocks with high 
earnings-to-price ratios earn positive abnormal returns relative to the CAPM (Basu 
1977, 1983), that stocks on an upward (downward) trajectory over a period of 3 to 12 
months have a higher than expected probability of continuing on that upward 
(downward) trajectory over the subsequent 3 to 12 months (Jegadeesh and Titman 
1993; Carhart 1995; Lakonishok et al. 1994)15, that Monday returns are on average 
lower than returns on other days16
 
 (Cross 1973; French 1980; Gibbons and Hess 
1981), that returns are on average higher the day before a holiday (Ariel 1990), that 
returns are on average higher on the last day of the month (Ariel 1987), that returns in 
January tend to be higher than other months of the year (Keim 1983; Gultekin and 
Gultekin 1983; Blume and Stambaugh 1983; Reinganum 1983), and that stocks 
appear to exhibit seasonal intraday return patterns, with most of the average daily 
return coming at the beginning and end of each day (Harris 1986). Many of these 
anomalies were first identified in studies where the CAPM was used as the 
equilibrium model.  
                                                 
15 DeBondt and Thaler (1985) found the opposite, that past ‘loser’ (stocks which have lower than 
average returns over the past three to five years) have higher than average returns than past ‘winners’ 
(stocks with high returns in the past three to five years). Fama and French (1996) tested this 
‘contrarian’ strategy but found no estimates of abnormal returns that are reliably different from zero. 
16 In Australia, Korea, Japan and Singapore average returns on Tuesday are negative because of time 
zone differences relative to the U.S. and European markets. 
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However, Keim (1988) argues ‘seasonals’ in returns are anomalies in the sense that 
asset-pricing models do not predict them, but that they do not necessarily invalidate 
the EMH. For example, Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) demonstrate that Monday, 
holiday and end-of-the-month returns deviate from the normal average daily returns 
by less than the bid-ask spread of the average stock. Likewise, Roll (1983) found that 
the abnormal returns generated by small stocks in January are larger but not large 
relative to the bid-ask spreads of small stocks. Many of other concerns raised about 
cross-sectional and time-series patterns in stock prices have been addressed in the 
literature. Connolly (1989; 1991) argues that the day-of-the-week effect and weekend 
effects aren’t statistically significant when statistically significance is adjusted to 
reflect the large sample size used in previous studies. 
 
2.2.2 Market Microstructure Models 
 
Beyond the literature on EMH, the market microstructure literature has given us new 
insights into the behaviour of market prices. A central idea of the theory of market 
microstructure is that asset prices need not equal full-information expectations of 
value because the existence of frictions in the trading environment. One aspect of 
market microstructure is concerned with how various frictions and departures from 
symmetric information affect the trading process. Around the release of corporate 
earnings announcements the levels of information asymmetry are particularly high 
and, hence, microstructure theory allows us to better understand how the prices are 
established within the framework of functioning security markets. 
 
Early work in this area focused on the role of the market maker in the price formation 
process. Madhavan (2000:8) pointed out that “by virtue of their central position and 
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role as price setters, market makers are a logical starting point for an exploration of 
how prices are actually determined inside the ‘black box’ of a security market”. The 
starting point for this effort was an examination of the role of market maker as a 
provider of liquidity. Markets makers influence the price formation process through 
their quoted bid and ask prices; the bid-ask spread. Demsetz (1968) provided the first 
theoretical model examining the determinants of the bid-ask spread. Under the 
Demsetz framework, the average (percentage) bid-ask spread was modelled as a 
function of firm size, inverse of the price, volatility of past returns, trading volume. 
The simplifying assumption of the Demsetz model though, was that the market maker 
had a passive role, simply adjusting the bid-ask spread in response to changing 
conditions. 
 
Smidt (1971) argued that market makers are not simply passive providers of liquidity 
but rather that they actively adjust the spread in order to manage their inventory 
levels, and hence their risk exposure. In this case the market maker, whilst primarily 
being a provider of liquidity, nevertheless also functions as a price-setter primarily 
with the objective of achieving a rapid inventory turnover. The implication of this 
model is that the security price may depart for expectations of value if the dealer is 
long or short relative to their desired (target) inventory, giving rise to transitory price 
movements during the day and possibly over longer periods. Garman (1976) extended 
this work by modelling the relation between dealer quotes and inventory levels. In 
Garman’s model there is a single, monopolistic market maker who sets prices, 
receives all orders, and clears all trades. Garman’s model demonstrated that, where 
quoted prices are set at the beginning of the trading period, the market maker is 
constrained with limited capital, and inventory follows a random walk with zero drift; 
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over a finite time period (T) failure is certain. This is the classic Gambler’s Ruin 
problem. This means that market makers must actively adjust prices in relation to 
inventory, rather than simply adjusting spreads as in the Demsetz model. In this 
model, the spread arose, in part, because of the need to reduce failure probabilities.  
 
The Garman model is limited by some of the simplifying assumptions made. Under 
this model, the market maker is not permitted to borrow either stock or money, 
ensuring that their position at any point in time is a function of the order arrival rates. 
Furthermore, all variables other than order arrival rates are assumed to be exogenous 
to the market maker.  
 
A particular limitation of the Garman model is the fact that whilst inventory 
determines the market maker’s viability, it is not explicitly incorporated into the 
market maker’s decision problem due to the assumption that the market maker can 
only set prices at the beginning of the trading period. This restriction severely limits 
the applicability of the model in a trading environment in which prices continuously 
evolve. Amihud and Mendelson (1980) address this problem by explicitly 
incorporating inventory into the market maker’s pricing problem. They demonstrate 
that the market maker’s decision variable, their bid and ask prices, depend upon the 
level of current inventory and thus change over time as inventory levels fluctuate. The 
implications of this model are three fold. Firstly, as the market maker’s inventory 
increases, he lowers both bid and ask prices, and as it decreases he raises both prices. 
Secondly, he has a preferred inventory level that he is seeking to maintain.17
                                                 
17 Bradfield (1979) demonstrated that a specialist would adjust spreads to reach a preferred inventory 
position at the end of the day. 
 Thirdly, 
as with Garman (1976), the optimal bid and ask prices exhibit a positive spread. An 
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important assumption in this model is that inventory is bounded above and below by 
exogenous parameters, which removes the capital constraints of the Garman model, 
and means the bid-ask spread arises from the market makers efforts to maximise 
profits rather than simply reduce failure probabilities. 
 
Stoll (1978) departs from the analysis of Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980) by considering the market maker to be simply a market participant who is 
willing to alter his portfolio away from desired holdings to accommodate the trading 
desires of other dealers.18 As such, the market marker is assumed to be risk averse and 
therefore must be compensated for bearing this risk.19
                                                 
18 Ho and Stoll (1980) extended this considering the effect of dealer competition. They arguing that 
increased competition between dealers (including market makers) would then lead to narrower spreads. 
 This compensation comes in 
the form of the bid-ask spread, which itself consists of three components; order 
processing costs (Tinic 1972), inventory holding costs (Stoll 1978; Ho and Stoll 
1981), and an adverse selection component (Stoll 1976; Copeland and Galai 1983; 
Glosten and Milgrom 1985). The weakness of the Stoll (1978) model is that, like 
Garman (1976), it remains a one period model, whereby the market maker is assumed 
to have liquidated their holding at the end of the time period, and thus does not allow 
for random order flow. Ho and Stoll (1981) seek to address this issue by extending the 
model of Stoll (1978) to a multi-period framework in which both order flow and 
portfolio returns are stochastic. O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) developed a discrete time 
period model in which a trading day contained n trading intervals and the dealer 
maximises his utility over an infinite number of trading days. Under this model the 
dealer’s utility is measured at the end of each day rather than at the terminal period 
and because the dealer operates within an infinite time period there is no presumed 
19 Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson (1980) assume the market marker to be a risk neutral 
monopolist whose prices are a reflection of their relative market power. 
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date in which the dealer’s inventory is liquidated. However, these models are limited 
to explaining how an individual dealer would operate under conditions of return and 
transaction uncertainty.  
 
A further extension by Ho and Stoll (1983) models the problem of determining the 
equilibrium market bid-ask spread in a competitive dealer market. They are able to 
demonstrate that, under both homogeneous and heterogeneous opinions about the true 
price of the stock, there is a tendency for the observed market spread to be the 
reservation spread of any dealer. Ho and Stoll (1983) also explicitly recognise that 
although these models are framed in terms of a dealer market, they remain equally 
applicable to an auction market. This is because the decision of an investor to place a 
limit order or to trade immediately against an existing limit order is exactly analogous 
to the decision of a dealer to post his price and wait or to trade immediately with 
another dealer. 
 
The inventory models discussed above suggest that transaction costs determine the 
size of the bid-ask spread. A second set of models, starting with the ideas of Muth 
(1961), Radner (1968, 1972) and Bagehot (1971), instead focus on the central role of 
information, rather than transaction costs, in the price discovery process. These 
models are based upon distinction between informed and uniformed traders in the 
market place. Uninformed traders typically have access to only public information 
whilst informed traders have access to public and some private information. This has 
important implications for price formation since trading with a potentially better 
informed market participant can lead to an adverse selection problem. This problem is 
particularly acute for the market maker since their position in the middle of trades 
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means they will lose to informed traders. Thus they must make up those losses in 
trading with uninformed traders and the means they use to do that is the bid-ask 
spread.20
 
 Thus the information-based models seek to explain price behaviour in an 
environment of such information asymmetry. 
Radner (1968, 1972) undertook some of the earliest work on the first type of 
information-based model, often referred to as the rational expectations equilibrium 
(REE) model. Under this model there is one risky asset and a riskless asset, for which 
a budget constraint is defined along with initial wealth. The quantity of risk is 
uncertain as is the payoff on the risky asset. All traders are identical initially and 
understand the distribution of returns based on prices. Some traders choose to be 
informed and each informed trader receives the same information. All traders are risk 
averse and have identical constant absolute risk aversion utility functions. Informed 
traders form demand for the risky asset by maximising their utility given the current 
price and signal. Uninformed (liquidity) traders observe the price but not the signal 
observed by the informed traders. The model then assumes that after repeated 
observation, uniformed traders will learn the relation between the observed price and 
the return on the risky asset and will form expectations rationally. They will then take 
that information into account in their own trading behaviour. The interaction of 
demand by informed traders and supply by uninformed traders on a rational basis 
gives rise to a price that will clear the market. And thus the price is fully revealed and 
prices have become a vehicle for transmitting information. This is the essential 
component of Fama’s efficient market hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
20 Copeland and Galai (1983) considered a simple model of this relationship. The weakness of their 
model was that it did not identify how information arises or why liquidity traders would trade. 
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Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) challenged this approach on the 
basis that the search for information is costly. When the price system is a perfect 
aggregator of information it removes the incentive to collect private information. 
They argued that if information is costly, there must be ‘noise’ in the price system so 
that traders have an incentive to gather information.21
 
 Grossman (1976) argued that if 
there is no noise and information gathering is a costly activity, then a perfect 
competitive market will break down because no equilibrium exists where information 
collectors earn a return on their information, and no equilibrium exists where no one 
collects the information. This has become known as the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox.  
Various attempts have been made to overcome the implications of the Grossman-
Stiglitz paradox. Allen (1981), Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) 
argue that prices are only partially revealing, and therefore they are always incentives 
to gather costly information. This is achieved by making the information dispersed 
rather than uniform across all traders as in the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model. 
Thus, in small economies, when the information is dispersed the individual demand of 
the informed trader cannot reveal all information and in large economies the trading 
activities of informed traders cannot affect prices if their size is small relative to the 
size of the market. Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) also point that if information is 
dispersed, then information aggregated across all traders is more valuable than the 
information of a single trader. This implies that private information is always more 
valuable and aggregated information is more informative than information belonging 
to a single trader. In their model, Diamond and Verrechia characterise noise as 
aggregate supply uncertainty.  
                                                 
21 ‘Noise’ generally refers to supply shocks. Grossman (1976:574) suggested an example of noise “is 
the uncertain total return of the risky asset.”  
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Brown and Jennings (1989) extend the Diamond and Verrecchia model to two periods 
and show that past as well and current prices are used by traders to resolve the 
underlying aggregate supply uncertainty. In each of these models the information 
structure employed was one in which information is dispersed and symmetric across 
traders. Blume et al. (1994) extend the work of Brown and Jennings. However, they 
assume an information structure that is also dispersed but asymmetric across traders. 
They also assumed that the supply of the risky asset is fixed, and uncertainty is 
present only in the value of the information signals given to traders. Blume et al. 
(1994) demonstrated that prices are fully revealing for informed traders but only 
partially revealing to the uninformed traders. Hence, uninformed traders must look to 
other sources of information, such as trading volume, in order to estimate the noisy 
component of prices.  
 
Whilst the rational expectations equilibrium models assume that all traders except for 
noise traders are risk-averse and non-strategic, another set of models is based on the 
assumption that a trader with private information would have an incentive to act 
strategically in order to maximise their profits. These models are collectively referred 
to as strategic trader models. Kyle (1985) was one of the first scholars to examine the 
behaviour of market markers when facing insiders and liquidity traders. Kyle models 
the strategic interaction between a single insider, with a monopoly on information, 
who choose to trade in order to maximise the trading profit and a market maker who 
take the insiders trading strategy into account when updating their beliefs about the 
future value of the asset when setting the equilibrium price. Thus, price is set after the 
orders are placed in a batch auction market. The market maker will use an upward 
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sloping price schedule as a protection device against adverse selection. Under this 
model, after many rounds of trading, prices will converge to their full information 
(rational expectations) value.  Order flow is informative with prices responding to 
trading activity. In this model the market maker is simply acting as an order 
processor, setting the clearing price. 
 
One obvious weakness of the Kyle model is the assumption of a single trader with 
monopolistic private information. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) address this 
issue by extending the Kyle model to incorporate competition among multiple risk-
averse informed traders with long-lived private information. Holden and 
Subrahmanyam demonstrate that competition among informed traders is associated 
with high trading volumes and rapid revelation of private information. Back (1992) 
extended the Kyle model to incorporate trading in a continuous-time market, which 
provided insights into more general properties of the Kyle equilibrium. 
 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) also examined price behaviour under information 
asymmetry although they took a different approach from Kyle (1985). Whereas the 
Kyle model uses a batch auction market structure the Glosten and Milgrom model 
makes use of a quote driven market structure. Under this model the market maker 
posts bid and ask quotes that are subsequently executed against by their customers. 
The market marker trades with two types of agents; risk-neutral informed (insider) 
and uninformed (liquidity) traders. The insiders receive a perfectly informative signal 
about the security’s value prior to trading. Each trader arrives in the market place 
sequentially (that is one agent at a time) and may choose to buy or sell. Each trader 
may trade only once and the size of the order is equal to one unit. Thus, if an informed 
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trader wishes to trade further (to make maximum use of their information) they are 
obliged to return to the pool of traders and wait once more. Markets makers face an 
adverse selection problem in that they will lose to informed traders. In response the 
market maker quotes higher prices for buyer-initiated transactions (ask) and lower for 
seller initiated transactions (bid).  Over many trading rounds the market maker is able 
to observe the orders placed and use that information to update their beliefs about the 
future value of the asset. This process will be completed when all the value of the 
private information is incorporated into prices. Under this model only the market 
makers learn the value of the information content, uninformed traders do not learn 
information from observing prices. Therefore the probabilities of informed and 
uniformed traders faced by the market maker remain the same over time. 
 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) expanded on the Glosten and Milgrom model by 
incorporating the possibility of variation in trade sizes. They argued that the size of 
the transaction will affect the bid and ask prices by revealing the type of agent who 
has submitted the order. They assume that an informed trader has a greater incentive 
to submit larger orders than an uninformed trader. They also incorporate the 
possibility that there is no information and therefore trading activity provides a signal 
not only about the quality of information but also about the existence of information. 
Under this model, the informed trader faces a trade-off between initiating large trades 
to maximise the profitability of the information content knowing that if they do they 
will send a stronger signal of information to the market maker. This model gave rise 
to two possible equilibria. The first is the separating equilibrium where informed 
traders can be identified by their large trades and therefore small trades are 
undertaken by uniformed investors. In this outcome the spread for small trades does 
40 
 
not include an adverse selection component since the market maker does not face that 
problem. The second possible outcome is the pooling equilibrium. Here the informed 
trader strategically submits both large and small orders to improve the prices for the 
large trades. This leads to a positive correlation between trade size and the size of the 
spread. 
 
In an environment of asymmetric information, inferences about investor beliefs and 
the market’s ability to assimilate information can be inferred through changes in 
trading volume (Kim and Verrecchia 1991a, 1991b, 1994 1997, Atiase and Bamber 
1994, Blume, et al. 1994, Bamber et al. 1997). Beaver (1968) was one of the first 
researchers to identify the potential for trading volume information to yield unique 
insights regarding the nature of earnings announcements and trader behaviour.22
 
 
Beaver argued that trading volume reflects a lack of consensus regarding the 
appropriate price for a firm’s shares and that trading volumes capture changes in the 
expectations of individual investors whereas price reactions reflect changes in the 
expectations of the entire market. This has important implications, in that an 
announcement might be potentially neutral in the sense of not changing the 
expectations of the market as a whole (resulting in no significant price reaction) and 
yet greatly alter the expectations of individuals (leading to increased trading). In such 
a case, trading volume might yield valuable insights that returns measured might not. 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) show that the volume reaction to the announcement is 
proportional to: (i) the absolute price change at the time of the announcement and (ii) 
the differential precision of preannouncement private information across traders. They 
                                                 
22 Bachelier (1900) is generally acknowledged to have first raised this relationship. 
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argue that even though the announcement is commonly interpreted (that is each trader 
identically perceives the correct mean and precision of the signal and its realisation), 
the differential precision of private pre-disclosure information generates different 
belief revision among traders, which in turn generates trading. Traders with less 
precise private pre-disclosure information weight the announcement more heavily 
than those who had more precise pre-disclosure information. This differential belief 
revision causes some traders expectations to cross, which motivates them to change 
the original allocation of shares to trade. Kim and Verrecchia (1991b) add a variable 
for the cost of information that is increasing in its precision. They find that a decrease 
in the cost of private information causes an increase in the differential prior precision 
across all investors because investors with more precise information are motivated to 
increase the precision of their private information more than investors with less 
precise information. 
 
Kyle (1985) argued that when liquidity trading is exogenous and inelastic to price, 
trading volume increases in information asymmetry due to informed traders 
attempting to exploit their information advantage. If however, the liquidity traders 
have discretion over the timing of their trading activities, trading volume can decrease 
in information asymmetry (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988, Foster and Viswanathan 
1990).  Chae (2005) argued that when discretionary liquidity traders (DLT) receive 
exogenous trade demands prior to announcements, they will postpone trading until the 
announcement is made and information asymmetry is resolved.  
 
The type of announcement will significantly impact upon trader behaviour. If the type 
of announcement is scheduled, such as corporate earnings announcements (Chordia et 
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al. 2001), then trading volumes will decrease prior to the announcement because DLT 
will delay trading in order to avoid adverse selection costs due to information 
asymmetry. Thus in the pre-release period, high trading demand by informed traders 
would not be met with the provision of supply by DLT. Once the information 
asymmetry is resolved then trading volumes should increase. If the announcement is 
unscheduled, such as corporate restructuring announcements, bond ratings changes or 
official interest rate changes, then DLT might not be able to change the timing of their 
trading behaviour in order to avoid the adverse effects of information asymmetry.  In 
this case, trading volumes are likely to be elevated in the pre-release period as 
informed traders utilise the value of any private information they might have relative 
to uninformed traders. After the unscheduled announcement, uninformed traders will 
then trade in response to the information content of the announcement. This is likely 
to result in elevated trading volumes in both the pre-announcement and post-
announcement period (Chae 2005, Fabiano 2008). 
 
2.2.3 Summary 
 
The models discussed in this section provide a framework for understanding how 
markets respond to the information contained in corporate information releases. The 
EMH implies prescribes a rapid and orderly response to a new equilibrium price 
reflective of the intrinsic value of the security. Market microstructure models suggest 
that the efficiency of price response around such releases will be influenced by the 
degree of competition between liquidity providers, dealer inventory levels, the degree 
of information asymmetry in the marketplace, and the amount of discretion that 
liquidity traders have over the timing of their trading activity. A summary of the 
theoretical literature discussed in this section can be found in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 
Major Theoretical Literature on the Relationship between Information and Market Behaviour  
This table provides a summary of the main existing theoretical literature examining information and the price formation process. These theoretical models are 
classified according to their type; Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) or Market Microstructure (MM). 
 
 Classification Expected Impact of Corporate Earnings Release on Market Behaviour 
Fama (1965, 1970)  EMH The process of establishing a new equilibrium price reflecting the intrinsic value should occur 
instantaneous (or rapidly in an unbiased manner). 
Jenson (1978) EMH Prices will adjust to reflect the information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on 
the information exceed the marginal costs. 
Radner (1968, 1972) MM – Rational Expectations 
Equilibrium (REE) 
After repeated observation uninformed (liquidity) traders learn the relation between price and 
return and form rational expectations. The market clearing price reflects the value of the 
information release. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1980) MM -Inventory Model Extension of Garman (1976) to explicitly incorporate inventory in the pricing problem. Market 
makers actively adjust spreads in order to rebalance inventory levels towards a desired amount 
when faced with order flow imbalances. 
Stoll (1978) MM -Inventory Model Market maker is willing to alter their portfolio away from desired levels to but must be 
compensated through the bid-ask spread. Large order imbalances increase the size of the spread. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) MM -Information Model Information is dispersed rather than uniform. Prices reflected aggregate information with 
temporary imbalances caused by noise traders. 
Blume Easley and O’Hara (1994) MM -Information Model Information is dispersed and asymmetric across traders. Prices are fully revealing for informed 
traders but only partially revealing to uninformed traders.  
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) MM –Strategic Trader Model Extension of Kyle (1985). Multiple risk-averse informed traders. High trading volumes and rapid 
revelation of information. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) MM –Information Model Market maker widens spreads when faced with informed traders. Prices reflect information 
through the market maker observing order flow and updating their beliefs. Uniformed investors do 
not learn information from observing prices. 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) MM –Information Model Extension of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Large trades synonymous with informed traders. 
Larger trades result in wider spreads due to high adverse selection costs. 
Chae (2005) MM- Volume Model Discretionary liquidity traders postpone trading until the announcement has been made and 
information asymmetry resolved. 
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2.3 Empirical evidence on stock returns around corporate earnings 
announcements 
 
The existing empirical literature on stock returns around corporate information 
releases can be categorised into two main areas; (i) studies which examine the speed 
of response in the market to the information contained in earnings announcements, 
and (ii) studies which examine the role that strategic timing of the release of 
announcements by managers might have in influencing the markets response. Each of 
these areas will be examined in this section of the dissertation. 
  
2.3.1 Speed of response studies 
 
The pattern of stock returns around corporate earnings announcements has been of 
interest to researchers for a long time. The initial motivation for the early research in 
this area was to determine whether corporate earnings announcements were actually 
useful to market participants. Valuation theory posits a relationship between corporate 
earnings and a stock valuation.13
 
 Market efficiency theory states that security prices 
will rapidly impound the value of new information in the security price. So the 
question that early researchers examined was; ‘do corporate earnings releases contain 
new information?’  
Ball and Brown (1968) and Beavor (1968) were amongst the first scholars to 
empirically investigate the relationship between corporate earnings and security 
prices. Ball and Brown (1968) assumed that investors used the previous year’s 
                                                 
13 Early work by Miller and Modigliani (1966) argued that corporate earnings multiplied by the 
appropriate earnings multiplier for that risk class is an important determinant in determining stock 
valuation. 
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reported earnings as a benchmark for the level of earnings they expected the company 
to report in the current year. Using reported preliminary earnings figures for 261 
NYSE-listed companies over the period 1957-1965 they then classified the earnings 
in their study on basis of the relationship to the ‘expected’ (prior year reported 
earnings). Using an OLS regression model they determined the component of the 
announcement that constituted unexpected information based upon the difference 
between the change in the observation company’s income and the change in the 
broader market income. If the residual of this model was positive this was deemed to 
be ‘good’ news and negative then that was deemed to be ‘bad’ news. They proceeded 
to calculate the holding period returns for monthly intervals commencing twelve 
months prior to the earnings announcement date. They found that the majority of 
information contained within annual earnings reports was anticipated by the market in 
the twelve months prior to the release date. However, where the announcement 
contained new information they demonstrated (i) that the sign of the cumulative price 
residual (summed over a 12 month period including the announcement month) was 
highly associated with the sign of the earnings residual and (ii) that there was a 
persistent upward drift in the cumulative mean price residuals for the positive 
earnings group and a persistent downward drift in the cumulative mean price residuals 
for the negative earnings group. This drift started eleven months prior to the 
announcement and continued for approximately a month afterwards. The finding that 
investors tend to under-react to corporate earnings announcements has given rise to 
extensive literature on post-earnings announcement drift that seeks to explain the Ball 
and Brown findings.14
                                                 
14 See for example, Jones and Litzenberger (1970); Joy et al. (1977); Rendleman et al. (1982); Foster et 
al. (1984); Kormendi and Lipe (1987); Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990); Ball and Bartov (1996); 
Barberis et al. (1998); Daniel et al. (1998); Bartov et al. (2000); Kim and Kim (2003); Nicolas and 
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Beavor et al. (1979) undertook a logical extension of the Ball and Brown study by 
examining whether the magnitude of the unexpected component of the earnings 
announcement (rather than just the sign of the unexpected component of the earnings 
announcement) was related to the magnitude of the stock price response. Beavor et al. 
used annual earnings figures from 276 NYSE-listed companies from 1960-1975 to 
construct two forecast EPS models based on previous earnings results. They then 
examined the relationship between the size of the forecast error (as measured as the 
difference between the reported earnings and the forecast earnings based upon their 
two models) and the unsystematic monthly stock returns (calculated using the market 
model). The authors partitioned the securities into twenty five portfolios based on the 
size of the forecast error. Using both parametric and non-parametric rank tests they 
found that the magnitude of the forecast error was related to the magnitude of the 
stock price response.15
 
 
Beavor (1968) likewise sought to investigate the information content of corporate 
earnings announcements. Beavor examined log stock returns over the S&P price 
index (market model returns) and various measures of volume for weekly intervals 
around the announcements to determine whether annual earnings announcements 
convey information. Rather than attempt to predict investors expectations about the 
information content of the earnings announcement, and hence whether the unexpected 
component was ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news, Beavor calculated a ratio of the squared 
residual of the market model during the event window standardised by the squared 
                                                                                                                                            
Wahlen (2004); Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005); Francis et al. (2007); Hirshleifer et al. (2008); Zhang 
(2008); Zheng (2009). 
15 Joy et al. (1977) had previously reported similar results. 
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residual of the market model during the control period.16 Beavor argued that return 
tests provided useful information about changes in the expectations of the whole 
market whereas volume measures reflected changes in the expectations of individual 
investors. The sample used consisted of 143 NYSE-listed companies reporting during 
the period 1961-1965. This gave a sample of 506 annual earnings reports. Return 
analysis found that earnings reports contain information, with above normal price 
activity in the week of the announcement. Volume analysis confirmed these findings 
with evidence of elevated volumes (both raw and residual values) in the week of the 
announcement. To eliminate dividend changes as a possible factor in the results 
Beavor confirmed that there was no clustering of dividend announcements in weeks -
1 to +1 of the sample.17
 
  
These studies, together with Fama et al. (1969), established the event study 
methodology as the benchmark technique for investigating the market reaction to 
informative events. These early studies provided valuable confirmation of the 
relationship between corporate earnings announcements and security returns. 
However, they were limited in their ability to examine the speed of the market 
response to the information content of the earnings announcements. Commencing 
with work of Patell and Wolfson (1984), researchers have been able to draw on a far 
richer source of data to examine the speed of response to corporate earnings 
announcements. Brown et al. (1992) argue that, where the capital market reacts to 
information in less than one trading day, intraday data will better reflect the path and 
speed of adjustment. Intraday stock price data has enabled scholars to examine much 
                                                 
16 The control period consisted of data from the sample excluding the 17 weeks surrounding each 
announcement. 
17 Aharony and Swary (1980) found that dividend announcements contain useful information beyond 
that contained in quarterly earnings announcements and thus contemporaneous dividend clustering 
would limit the explanatory power of the results. 
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shorter measurement intervals than the daily, weekly or monthly returns used by 
earlier researchers.18 This enables more a more precise examination of capital market 
efficiency than longer measurement intervals allowed.19
 
 Furthermore, Berkman and 
Truong (2009) identify a possible misspecification problem that arises in event studies 
that use daily or longer measurement intervals when announcements are made after 
the close of normal trading.  
Patell and Wolfson (1984) examined the speed of adjustment of stock prices 
following earnings and dividend announcements. The authors used a sample of 571 
earnings and dividend disclosures released by 96 firms during the period 1976-1977.20 
The choice of firms was based upon the availability of data. Sixteen announcements 
were eliminated from the sample when an examination of the stock price data 
indicated that they triggered a trading halt.21
                                                 
18 For example, Potter (1992) used quarterly data, Ball and Brown (1968) used monthly data, Beavor 
(1968), Shores (1990) and Sivakumar and Waymire (1993) used weekly data, whilst Kiger (1972) and 
Morse (1981) used daily data.  Lev (1989) provides a detailed summary of early event studies on price 
reactions to earnings announcements. 
 The authors examined the market 
behaviour following the announcements using three measures; mean returns, return 
variance and serial correlation in consecutive price changes. For the return measure, 
the researchers used a trading strategy of taking a long/short position in the security 
based upon the sign of the forecast error (this was calculated as the difference 
between the reported earnings figure and the Value Line Investment Survey forecast) 
19 Although Easton et al. (1992) provide empirical evidence that a longer aggregation period leads to 
higher correlation between earnings and returns. 
20 93 firms were NYSE-listed companies, 2 were AMEX-listed and 1 switched from the OTC market to 
AMEX during the sample period. 
21 The authors argued this was necessary because the trading-halt announcements ‘exert a 
disproportionately large effect in many of the tests both because of the intensity of the trading activity 
following the halt and because this activity is postponed to a point when typical announcement effects 
have disappeared.” Patell and Wolfson (1984:229). Patell and Wolfson (1982) stated that ordinary 
earnings and dividend announcements rarely involve trading halts in the US. 
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for various holding periods around the earnings announcement.22
 
 Each stock was 
assigned an equal weight in computing test statistics. A control sample was 
constructed by matching five of the firm's non-announcement days to each disclosure 
date (at random) and replicating the trading strategy. The authors do not clearly state 
how announcements made outside of trading hours are treated but it appears as 
through announcements prior to the commencement of trading are treated as having 
an announcement time of 10am (the start of trading) and announcements made after 
the close of trading at treated as though they were made at 10am the following day for 
the calculation of holding period returns. The study found highly significant positive 
returns in the first 30 minutes after the release of the information. A 30 minute 
holding period commencing 5 minutes after the release of the information also 
exhibited positive returns although they were much smaller than the one commencing 
at the time of the announcement. The authors also found significant positive returns in 
the overnight period (close to open) after the announcement, as well as the first 30 
minutes of trading on the day after the announcement date. There was little evidence 
of significant returns neither for holding periods prior to the release of the 
information, nor for any other holding periods after the announcement. 
These results were important in that they implied a delayed reaction by market 
participants to the information content of the earnings (and dividend) announcements. 
Patell and Wolfson (984:235) suggested as a possible explanation for the results that 
the "evening following the announcement provides an opportunity for the news to be 
disseminated to investors who are unable to execute intraday trading strategies and 
                                                 
22 Thus the stocks were bought if the earnings exceeded the forecast and sold if the earnings fell short 
of the forecast. 
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their actions may affect the overnight price change and opening trades of the next 
day". 
 
Jennings and Starks (1985) extended the work of Patell and Wolfson (1984) to 
examine the speed of stock price adjustment to the size of the earnings surprise. The 
findings of Joy et al. (1977) and Beavor et al. (1979) showed that magnitudes, as well 
as the signs, of earnings forecast errors were associated with the differences in 
abnormal returns following information events.23
                                                 
23 Numerous studies have shown that analyst recommendations reveal information to the market. Lloyd 
Davies and Canes (1978), Bjerring et al. (1983), Beneish (1991), Brown and Kim (1991), Stickel 
(1995), Womack (1996), Kim et al. (1997), Asquith et al. (2005) and Green (2006) all found positive 
abnormal returns following the release of analyst recommendations. Juergens (1999) demonstrated that 
abnormal returns were greater when the recommendation were released in conjunction with other 
public news. Busse and Green (2002) found prices respond to the information contained in analysts’ 
TV segments within seconds of the initial mention, with positive reports fully incorporated within one 
minute. 
 Jennings and Stark argued that 
Patell and Wolfson’s findings were limited by the fact that it was not possible to 
conclude whether the adjustment stock price adjustments observed on average were 
due to the little or no new information (requiring minimal price adjustments) or if the 
market process permits rapid adjustments regardless of how informative the new 
information was. Furthermore, they argued that it was not possible to determine if the 
differential in observed adjustment times in the Patell and Wolfson study was simply 
random differences or the result of differences in the information content of the 
announcements. Jennings and Starks employed a measure of revisions of analyst’s 
forecasts as a proxy for investor beliefs to classify the information content of the 
earnings announcements. Using the financial analysts’ forecasts in the Standard and 
Poor’s Earnings Forecaster or the Value Line Investment Service Reports the authors 
split their sample into two groups: (i) those which led to less than average belief 
revision (low information content) and (ii) those which led to above average revision 
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of investor beliefs (high information content). Then using price data for two sample 
periods (15 June 1981 to 21 August 1981 and 4 October 1982 to 31 December 1982) 
for 214 and 204 NYSE-listed firms with either options or inclusion in the S&P 500 
respectively, the authors examined the stochastic process (price continuances and 
reversals) around earnings/dividend announcements. They found that most 
adjustments take place between price sequences -1 and +4 although they also found 
significant results in sequences +8 through to +16 for the high information content 
group but was inconsistent for the low information content group. As a secondary test 
they used the variance of price changes (in either 5% tails of the non-announcement 
period) for hourly intervals around the event time. For the high information content 
group the increase in variance began 1-2 hours before the announcement and extended 
for 7-8 hours after the announcement. For the low information content group it began 
2 hours after the announcement and extended until 6-8 hours after the announcement. 
Although this study demonstrated a link between information content and speed of 
adjustment it did not use stock returns.24
 
  
Woodruff and Senchack (1988) also examined the speed and path of adjustment in 
stocks to the degree of earnings surprise in their quarterly announcement. Their main 
contributions to this literature was that they control for the degree of information 
content by dividing their sample into five groups25
                                                 
24 Jennings and Starks (1986) expands upon this research by looking at the effect of option trading on 
the underlying stock prices. They find that firms without listed option require substantially more time 
to adjust to earnings announcements than firms with traded options.  
, and they included trading volume, 
transaction frequency and transaction size in their analysis. As with Patell and 
Wolfson (1984) and Jennings and Starks (1985), the authors used Value Line 
Investment Survey as their proxy for investor’s expected earnings. Their sample 
25 The five groupings used were; most favourable, less favourable, neutral, less unfavourable, and most 
unfavourable. 
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comprised 325 NYSE-listed stocks from 15 January to 15 April 1980. As with 
previous literature the authors defined day 0 (the event day) as the following calendar 
day for any announcements made after the close of trading. The authors then 
measured the speed until the price fully adjusts to the information by using the closing 
price on day +1 as a proxy for the fully adjusted price.26
 
 They measured the 
percentage of the return between the last trade prior to the release of the information 
and the fully adjusted price that had been achieved at intervals of one-half-hour, one 
hour, two-hours and three-hours. They found that stocks with the largest positive 
earnings surprise had 61% adjustment within one hour and 91% adjustment after three 
hours. Stocks with the largest negative earnings surprise reached 69% of their full 
adjustment after 3 hours. Using transaction price, those with the largest positive 
earnings surprise reached 83% adjustment by the tenth trade after the release time 
whilst those with the largest negative surprise had reached 73% adjustment by the 
same trade interval. The volume and transaction frequency tests showed increased 
activity the first half-hour but that it had dissipated after three hours. These results 
were consistent with previous research which suggested the speed of adjustment for 
‘bad’ news is slower than that for ‘good’ news. The authors suggest the uptick rule on 
the NYSE, which makes shorting the stocks more difficult, might have been 
responsible for this result. 
Lee (1992) examined the intraday directional volume (buy/sell trade imbalance) and 
returns patterns around the release of different types of earnings announcements. He 
argued that the duration and adjustment path of buy/sell imbalance provides new 
insights how quickly market participants (rather than just prices) adapt to the new 
                                                 
26 The authors based this proxy on “the conclusions of earlier work and our own results” Woodruff and 
Senchack (1988:482). 
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equilibrium price. Announcements sourced from the Dow Jones News Service (DJNS) 
for 302 NYSE-listed firms between 4 January 1988 and 30 December 1988 (253 
trading days) were used to create the study sample. Only announcements made during 
normal trading were used in the study on the grounds that the focus of the study was 
the intraday dissemination process. As with Patell and Wolfson (1984) and Jennings 
and Starks (1985), Lee used the Value Line Investment Survey as a proxy for expected 
earnings, although he also uses the change in price (measured as the mid-point of the 
spread) after the announcement as a second proxy. This enabled the classification of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ news consistent with previous research. Returns and trade imbalance 
were then measured in half hour intervals surrounding the earnings release. The 30 
minute interval that contains the announcement was labelled ‘interval 0’. This meant 
the time after the announcement varied within each interval zero.  
 
Consistent with Patell and Wolfson (1984), Lee found both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news 
resulted in significant positive abnormal returns in 30 minute interval containing the 
announcement but no other intervals exhibit any significant abnormal returns. They 
also found that order imbalance for large trades (a proxy for informed trading) largely 
mirrors the pattern of return behaviour but small trades exhibit order imbalance for 
much longer intervals (and in the case of ‘bad’ news starts to exhibit significant 
activity at least 3 hours after the information release).27
 
 
Lee and Park (2000) extend the previous research by using intraday returns to 
examine the speed of adjustment and explanatory power of interim and fourth quarter 
earnings announcements. Using quarterly announcements drawn from January 1989 
                                                 
27 For large trades/’bad’ news the order imbalance (selling) extended 90 minutes after the information 
release. 
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to December 1990 the authors constructed a sample of 1,359-1,393 NYSE and 
AMEX-listed firms.28
 
 Announcements were drawn from the PR Newswire and 
Business Newswire databases. As with Lee (1992), the sample was restricted to those 
announcements that were released during normal trading hours (9:30 to 16:00 EST). 
Also consistent with previous research, analysts’ forecasts were used as a proxy for 
market expectations, although this study used EPS forecasts drawn from the I/B/E/S 
database to classify announcements as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news. Returns were calculated 
using the mid-point of the spread for 30 minute intervals around the announcement 
time, starting 90 minutes before the announcement and ending 6 hours after the 
announcement. As with Lee (1992) the 30 minute interval that contained the 
announcement was labelled ‘interval 0’. The study found that the market adjusted to 
new equilibrium price levels within 2 hours after the fourth quarter announcements, 
whereas it took at least one trading day to do so for the interim quarter 
announcements.  
Furthermore, constructing an equally weighted portfolio that took a long position in 
securities that reported ‘good’ news and a short position in securities that reported 
‘bad’ news, the authors were able to demonstrate a two stage reaction to the 
information content of those announcements. This consisted of an initial reaction in 
the period commencing 1 to 1½ hours before the announcement and dissipating 
between 1 and 1½ hours after the announcement, followed by a second stage reaction 
commencing approximately 3½ hours after the announcement and dissipating 
approximately 5½ hours after the announcement. This response is broadly consistent 
                                                 
28 The sample contained 1,393 firms for 1989 and 1,359 firms for 1990. The authors note the firms had 
a larger than average market capitalisation. 
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with the findings of Patell and Wolfson (1984) who also found a delayed reaction to 
the information contained in earnings announcements. 
 
Francis et al. (1992) extend previous research by examining the price and volume 
reactions to trading and non-trading hours’ announcements made by the same firm in 
adjacent years. They argue that the market response to trading and non-trading hours’ 
announcements might differ for a number of reasons. Firstly, differences in the sign 
and magnitude of unexpected earnings released during, versus outside, of normal 
trading hours might affect the speed of adjustment process.29 Secondly, investors have 
more time to analyse the information content contained in overnight announcements 
prior to trading on it relative to daytime announcements. This might reduce the 
adverse impact of information asymmetry for overnight announcements. Thirdly, 
differences between the market mechanism used to determine the opening price and 
the price discovery process that operates during normal trading might influence the 
speed of adjustment.30 Finally, the accumulation of orders that remain in the system 
from prior to the announcement (uninformed orders) mixing with newly placed orders 
(informed orders) might preclude the opening price from fully reflecting the value of 
the information contained in the announcement.31
 
  
                                                 
29 For example, the release of ‘bad’ news by managers outside of normal trading hours in order to 
minimise its potentially adverse price impact. This is explored in more detail in the next section of this 
chapter. 
30 For example, the opening priced might be determined using a call-market procedure (NYSE) or an 
informal price discovery procedure (NASDAQ). Likewise the price formation process is a function of 
an order-driven, quote-driven or a hybrid system.  
31 The authors acknowledge that all pre-announcement (post-announcement) orders placed are not 
necessarily uninformed (informed) orders.  
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The authors used a sample of annual earnings releases for 558 NYSE-listed firms 
reporting between 1982 and 1986.32 The full sample was divided into two 
subsamples; (i) a “daytime’ subsample that released their earnings report during 
normal trading hours (9:30am - 4:00pm EST), and (ii) an ‘overnight’ subsample that 
released their earnings report outside of these hours.33
 
 As with previous research, the 
Value Line Investment Survey consensus analysts’ forecasts were used as a proxy for 
the expected earnings result. Abnormal returns were calculated as the raw return 
minus the median return computed over the control period (days -14, -3; +3, +14). 
They found no evidence that investors impounded the information contained in 
overnight announcements at the open of the following day’s trading but rather that 
this information is impounded in within the first half hour of normal trading that day. 
As the result they concluded that the opening price was not that informative.  
Furthermore there was also evidence that the reaction to daytime announcements 
began in the trading period in which they occur and extended into the overnight 
period following the announcement (consistent with Patell and Wolfson 1984). There 
was no evidence that these results were sensitive to either the size of the earnings 
surprise, or whether the news was good or bad news. Francis et al. (1992:181) 
suggested two possible explanations for their findings; “(1) characteristics of an active 
market are necessary to impound new information in stock prices; and (2) traders’ 
actions preclude full revelation of the supply and demand for shares of the stock at the 
open”. 
 
                                                 
32 Sample companies were restricted to those that released their annual earnings report within a two-
week window each year.  
33 The full sample contained 150 companies that reported prior to the market open, 129 companies that 
reported after the market closed and 279 that reported during normal trading hours. 
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Greene and Watts (1996) extend this research one step further by examining the 
market response to quarterly earnings announcements made during trading and non-
trading hours on the NYSE and NASDAQ. Following the reasoning of Francis et al. 
(1992), the authors posited that differences between the trading mechanisms 
(specialist versus dealer market, call auction versus continuous trading) and opening 
mechanisms used by the two exchanges might lead to differences in the path of 
adjustment of prices following the release of earnings announcements.34 The authors 
tested this by constructing a sample of quarterly earnings announcements for 100 
NYSE-listed firms and 100 NASDAQ-listed firms over the period 1990-1994.35 
Consistent with previous studies the expected earnings per share was proxied using 
the consensus analyst forecasts from the I/B/E/S database. The authors identified 5 
out of 1307 NYSE-listed company announcements that resulted in trading halts. 
These were discussed in a footnote separately.36 Using the same technique as Patell 
and Wolfson (1984), the authors measure cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in 
transaction time37 and clock-time38
 
 based on a strategy of trading on the sign of the 
analyst forecast error.   
                                                 
34 Four hypotheses were tested: (i) no difference in the price discovery process following trading and 
nontrading hours announcements on the NYSE, (ii) no difference in the price discovery process 
following trading and nontrading hours announcements on the NASDAQ, (iii) no difference in the 
price discovery process following non-trading hours news announcements on the NYSE and 
NASDAQ, and (iv) no difference in the price discovery process following trading hours news 
announcements on the NYSE and NASDAQ. 
35 The sample firms were randomly selected from all NYSE and NASDAQ firms whose stocks were 
traded at least 30 times per day, on average, over the sample period. This was done to ensure the firms 
were visible enough to be followed by financial analysts and to ensure that their earnings 
announcements were broadcast over financial newswires and retained on the Dow Jones 
News/Retrieval text database. 
36 The authors found evidence of significant transaction period returns for a number of periods after the 
announcement but the small sample size limited the inferences that could be drawn. 
37 Event period transaction abnormal returns are calculated by adjusting each observed raw transaction 
return for a firm-, quarter-, and time-of-the-day-specific average transaction return. 
38 Event period clock-time abnormal returns are calculated by measuring the difference between each 
observed 15 minute return and a firm-, quarter-, and time-of-the-day-specific average return 
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For the NYSE subsample the authors found the significant CARs for the first 
transaction after the release for the ‘trading hours’ group and the first three 
transactions after the release for the ‘non-trading hours’ group. They also found that 
regardless of the release time, 80% of the CAR is generated by the seventh post-
announcement trade. For the NASDAQ subsample they found the significant CARs 
for the first transaction after the release for the ‘trading hours’ group and the first four 
transactions after the release for the ‘non-trading hours’ group. However, for both 
groups most of the CAR was generated during the first post-announcement trade 
(72% and 88% of the CAR for the trading hours’ and non-trading hours’ partition 
respectively).  
 
With respect to clock–time returns, the authors measured CAR’s using 15 minute 
intervals commencing 1½ hours before then announcement and proceeding until 1½ 
hours after the announcement.39
                                                 
39 Period 0 contains the announcement. 
 For the NYSE subsample they found the significant 
results for first two intervals following the announcement (the 15 minutes containing 
the announcement and the following 15 minutes) for the ‘trading hours’ group and the 
first pre-announcement interval (15 minutes before the close), the announcement 
interval (close to open) and first two post announcement intervals (the first 30 minutes 
of trading the next day) around the release for the ‘non-trading hours’ group. Unlike 
Patell and Wolfson (1984) and Francis et al. (1992) they found no significant results 
in the overnight period after, nor subsequent trading day, following the release of the 
earnings result for announcements made during trading hours. For the NASDAQ 
subsample they found significant results for the first post announcement interval (15 
minutes containing the announcement) for the trading hours’ group and the overnight 
59 
 
interval (close to open) for the non-trading hours’ group. Thus the authors conclude 
there are differences between the speed with which these two markets adjust prices 
following the release of earnings information, especially for non-trading hours 
releases. However, both markets still impound the information relatively quickly.  
 
2.3.2 Strategic timing studies 
 
The timing of the release of earnings announcements has also been demonstrated to 
play an important role in how the market responds to the information contained. This 
branch of research emerged from the belief that manager’s may attempt to 
strategically time information releases to minimise any adverse affects that might 
arise out of lower than anticipated earnings results.40 Patell and Wolfson (1982) were 
the first scholars to empirically test the hypothesis that ‘good’ news is more likely to 
be released when security markets are open while ‘bad’ news appears more frequently 
after the close of trading.  The authors used a sample consisting of 1000 earnings and 
dividend announcements released by 96 US firms between 1976 and 1979.41 Sample 
firms were selected on the basis of data availability.42
                                                 
40 Genotte and Trueman (1996) provide a theoretical proof that if announcements have a positive 
impact on firm value, managers should prefer to make them separately during trading hours as this will 
maximise the stock price benefit. Likewise, if the announcements have a negative impact upon firm 
value, the managers should prefer to make them together after trading hours as this will reduce the 
negative stock price impact. 
 The announcements were 
classified as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news based on two techniques; (i) the earnings change 
from the previous period (an increase constituted ‘good’ news whilst a decrease 
constituted ‘bad’ news) and (ii) sign of the change in the price following the 
announcement release (price increase constituted ‘good’ news whilst a ‘decrease’ 
41 93 firms in the sample were NYSE-listed, 2 firms were AMEX-listed and 1 firm went from over-the-
counter to AMEX-listing during the sample period.  
42 Data was sourced from the CBOE. 
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constituted ‘bad’ news). The authors found evidence that ‘bad’ news announcements 
are more likely to be released after the market is closed whilst ‘good’ news is more 
likely to be released during trading. They argued that it is possible that managers are 
doing this to create a natural non-trading period for the dissemination and evaluation 
of news releases, especially since trading halts were not commonly employed 
 
Damodaran (1989) also considered the strategic timing of information releases by 
examining whether earnings and dividends released on Fridays are more likely to 
contain reports of declines and are more likely to be associated with negative 
abnormal returns than those on other weekdays.43 A primarily motivation for this 
research was examine whether such timing could explain the previously identified 
‘weekend effect’ market anomaly.44
                                                 
43 Penman (1987) had previously identified that bad news was more likely to reach the market on 
Mondays and Fridays than on other days of the week during his sample period of October 1971 to 
December 1982. Whilst he did not seek to explain these results he did suggest that the reported practice 
of firm’s releasing bad news over the weekend could explain the Monday result. 
 The study sample comprised 18,929 earnings 
announcements and 11,544 dividend announcements for NYSE-listed firms over the 
period January 1981 to December 1985. Earnings surprise was defined as the 
proportional change in quarterly earnings per share relative to the corresponding 
quarter in previous years.  Using the market model daily abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for an event window for day -3 to day 
+3. Damodaran found evidence of negative abnormal returns on the day following the 
announcement for reports on every day of the week, which he argued was consistent 
with two complementary explanations; (i) earnings reports containing bad news are 
released after the close of trading and markets do not have the opportunity to respond 
to them until the following day and/or (ii) there is some evidence that markets do not 
44 For a more detailed discussion of the weekend effect refer to Cross (1973), French (1980), and 
Gibbons and Hess (1981). 
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adjust instantaneously to earnings surprises (as exhibited by the findings of previous 
research). The study also found evidence that announcements made on Friday tend to 
contain more bad news than announcements made on other days of the week and that 
Friday announcements elicit negative abnormal returns not only on that day but also 
on the following day (which was usually a Monday). There was also evidence on a 
size effect; with smaller firms have a larger negative abnormal return on the following 
day than larger firms. Damodaran interpreted these results as possible evidence that 
the market adjusts to the information content of small firm announcements more 
slowly than it does for large firm announcements.  
 
Bagnoli et al. (2005) expand upon the previous strategic timing research by 
investigating whether the rise of 24/7 media coverage and other technological 
advances have impacted on the propensity of managers to release bad news 
announcements after the close of trading and on Fridays. The authors cited four 
possible motivations for releasing earnings announcements outside of trading hours; 
(i) to minimise the negative price impact of bad news, (ii) to reduce the coverage of 
bad news on newswire services that only operate during business hours, (iii) because 
investors are less attentive to news broadcasts outside of business hours or as the 
weekend approaches, and (iv) to deliberately delay the release of the information from 
the intended release time to give investors time to absorb the fact it will be bad 
news.45
                                                 
45 Other factors that might create differential incentives to disclose good and bad news at different 
times have also been examined in the literature. These include; the incentive to release bad news early 
to reduce litigation risk (Kasznik and Lev 1985, Skinner 1994, 1997, Baginski et al. 2002), the timing 
of good news and bad news to influence capital raising (Frankel et al. 1995, Lang and Lundholm 
2002), and the timing of good news bad news to influence executive options (Yermack 1997, Aboody 
and Kasznik 2000). 
 Using a sample of 49,238 quarterly earnings announcements made by 4,183 
firms on US equity markets between 2000 and 2003, the authors they use the sign of 
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the earnings surprise (based on the difference between the reported EPS and analysts 
forecasts taken from the Reuters Forecast Pro database46
 
) to classify the 
announcements as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news. They found that if managers consistently 
announce outside of trading hours, there was no difference in the news they release 
before trading commences or after the market closes. If however the manager releases 
information both during and outside of trading hours, they found weak evidence that 
the manager would release worse news when the markets were closed. They also 
found that evidence that price response to Friday announcements was more muted 
than for mid-week bad news announcements suggesting that investors anticipated at 
least a portion of the news. The authors concluded that increasing news coverage and 
technology advances did not significantly impact of previously reported strategic 
timing behaviour. 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) also test the theory that managers will strategically time 
bad news announcements for Friday because limited investor attention on that day 
will minimise the adverse price consequences. By constructing a theoretical model of 
endogenous choice, the authors demonstrate how investors respond to the 
announcement signal when either a high fraction or a low fraction of investors are 
distracted by other events/information. To test the model, the authors used a sample of 
143,583 quarterly earnings announcements taken from the COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S 
databases for the period January 1994 to June 2006.47
                                                 
46 The authors assert that the analysts’ and brokerage houses that contribute to this database overlap to 
a large degree with those of First Call and I/B/E/S. They argue this means their results are comparable 
with previous research. 
 Only 5.7 per cent of 
announcements in the sample period were on Fridays. Earnings surprise was defined 
as the difference between the earnings announcement and the consensus analyst 
47 Issues with accurately being able to identify announcement dates resulted in 85,068 announcements 
made prior to 1994 being discarded from the sample.  
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forecast. They then constructed CARs for various holding periods around the 
announcement date. They used the market model to estimate each firm’s beta for over 
a control period beginning 300 days prior to- and ending 46 days prior to- the 
earnings release date. They then used the market model again to estimate CARs over 
various holding periods around the announcement date. The study measured the 
immediate response (using an interval from the close before the announcement to the 
close after) and a delayed response (for the period commencing two days after the 
announcement continuing through to seventy five days after the announcement).48
 
 
They found that Friday announcements were associated with a 15.8% lower 
immediate response and a 70% higher delayed response. For non-Friday 
announcements they determined that 40% to 45% of the market response to 
information content is delayed whereas for Friday announcements this figure was 
much higher (between 54% and 62%). The authors were also able to demonstrate that 
a portfolio that was long on Friday drift and short on the other weekdays was able to 
generate a significant monthly abnormal return of 3.84%. This result was robust to 
matching extreme surprises and less extreme surprises. Finally the study also used an 
abnormal volume measure to demonstrate that volume was lower on the 
announcement day for Friday announcements (by 8%) even after controlling for 
announcement quality, control variables and firm-specific variation. These results 
supported the theory of strategic timing by managers. 
Doyle and Magilke (2009) investigate why earnings announcements released after the 
market closed and or/on Friday’s tended to be worse than those released at other 
times. They investigate this by testing the strategic timing using only firms that have 
                                                 
48 The authors were unable to separate announcements made outside of trading hours from those made 
during trading hours. 
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switched their announcement time rather than including those that consistently report 
at the same time.49 By this technique the authors sort to capture those firms that 
appeared to exhibit opportunistic timing of their results. The authors argued that this 
created a more powerful test of strategic timing than previous pooled research. The 
study used a sample of 51,352 earnings announcements collected from the Wall Street 
Journal Online for the period 2000 to 2005. Only announcements made outside of 
trading hours were included in the sample.50
 
 Earnings surprise was defined as the 
difference between mean analyst forecasts and the actual earnings per share taken 
from the I/B/E/S database. This was used to calculate a measure of the percentage of 
observations that meet or exceeded the mean analyst forecasts. The study found a very 
small number of announcements were made on Fridays (81.9 per cent lower than the 
average number reporting on other weekdays), with very few reporting after the 
market closed (94.1 per cent lower than the average for other weekdays).  
The results indicated little evidence that firms switching from announcing before the 
market opens to after the market closes (or the reverse) announced worse news (better 
news). Likewise, there was little evidence that firms switching announcements from 
Monday through Thursday to Friday announced worse news.  They also found little 
evidence that media attention (as proxied by firm size and number of analysts) or 
institutional ownership had any influence on the choice of announcement time. 
Furthermore, there was little evidence that switching times lowered the earnings 
response coefficient (suggesting that firms were not able to fool the market). Thus the 
                                                 
49 Bagnoli et al. (2002) previously found that if managers consistently announce results outside of 
trading hours, there was no difference in the news they release before trading commences or after the 
market closes. 
50 The authors reported that 4.3 per cent of announcements in the full sample were made during trading 
hours. This was much lower than that reported by previous research, especially Bagnoli et al. (2005) 
who sample a similar timeframe. 
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authors rejected strategic timing as the reason for firm announcement timing. Instead 
they concluded that corporate headquarter location (time zones)51
 
, industry clustering, 
and firm complexity were the main factors influencing the choice of reporting after 
the close of trading. 
Kothari et al. (2009) used voluntary management earnings forecasts (rather than 
mandatory periodic earnings announcements) to examine whether managers are more 
likely to delay disclosure of unfavourable information relative favourable information 
and, if this is the case, why? The sample used in the study consisted of 4,016 public 
management forecasts of quarterly earnings per share between 1995 and 2002 from 
the First Call database. Forecasts were classified as good or bad news based on the 
sign of the difference between the management forecast EPS and the most recent 
consensus analyst forecast EPS.52
                                                 
51 This contrasts with Patell and Wolfson (1982) who did not find a significant difference between the 
reporting patterns of firms located on the East versus West Coast of the United States. 
 After calculating the market adjusted cumulative 
abnormal return in a five day event window around the announcement date they found 
that the reaction to pessimistic management forecasts exceeds that for optimistic 
forecasts (4.7 per cent CAR for good news and -8.3% CAR for bad news). These 
results held even after controlling for magnitude of the announcement. The authors 
then examined the cumulative stock return commencing 60 days prior to the 
announcement and found that around 63% of the news is pre-released or leaked prior 
to good news events. However, for bad news events this figure was much lower at 
49%. This indicates that good news is leaked to the market whereas bad news is 
withheld until it becomes inevitable. The authors also found that managerial 
52 The sample contained 965 good news management earning s forecasts and 3,051 bad news 
management forecasts. 
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incentives to withhold bad news dominate disclosure behaviour and, on average, led 
managers to withhold bad news and leak good news. 
 
Truong (2010) builds upon previous research by examining whether after-hours 
earnings announcements are associated with reduced stock price reaction and hence 
encourage strategic timing of information releases. They used a sample of 48,536 
quarterly earnings announcements by 2,672 firms from the 2004 Russell 3000 index 
listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. The earnings announcements collected from the 
Wall Street Journal Online for the period commencing with the fourth quarter 1998 
and ending at the fourth quarter 2007. As with Doyle and Magilke (2009), the sample 
excluded earnings announcements made during trading hours.53 Only firms with at 
least one before market opens (BMO) and after market closes (AMC) announcements 
are included in the sample in order to focus on possible strategic timing.54 Analysts 
forecasts used as a proxy for expected returns are sourced from the I/B/E/S database. 
Two period abnormal returns were calculated: (i) close on the day prior to the release 
to open on the day of the announcement, and (ii) open on the day of the 
announcement to close on the day of the announcement.55
 
 Abnormal returns were 
measured as the actual interval return minus the return on the size-decile the stock 
belongs to.  
The study found that most of the market reaction to earnings released outside of 
trading hours is realised at the opening the following day. Also firm specific 
                                                 
53 Trading hours announcements accounted for only 9 out of 2887 firms and 457 out of 53,947 
announcements.  49% of the sample announcements were released after the market closed whilst 51% 
of the sample announcements were released before the market commenced trading. 
54 This is consistent with the sampling technique of Doyle and Magilke (2009). 
55 For a BMO announcement the ‘announcement day’ is the trading day on which the announcement 
was released. For AMC announcements the ‘announcement day’ is the trading day following the date 
on which the announcement was released. 
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regressions found little evidence that the response varies regardless of whether the 
announcement was made before trading commenced or after the market closed. To 
further investigate possible strategic timing the author examined only ‘straddle’ 
announcements. Straddle announcements were defined as cases in which an AMC 
(BMO) announcement was preceded by two BMO (AMC) announcements and 
followed by two BMO (AMC) announcements. Such cases should be indicative of 
opportunistic reporting by managers. The study found that is such cases there was no 
relationship between the announcement time and the measured abnormal return. Also 
three day event window abnormal returns and CARs centred on the announcement 
day found no significant under-/over-reaction and no evidence of pre-announcement 
leakage. Overall, the research found little support for the notion of strategic timing by 
managers. 
 
2.3.3 Summary 
 
The existing empirical evidence on the intraday speed of adjustment to the 
information contained in corporate earnings announcements is mixed. Previous 
research has indicated that the price adjustment can take as little as 30 minutes or as 
long as several hours, appears to be dependent upon the trading mechanisms used by 
the market, is contingent upon the degree of earnings surprise, and could be affected 
by the timing of the announcement (although this remains disputed in the previous 
literature). The scholarly research examined in this chapter on speed of response and 
strategic timing of corporate earnings announcements is summarised in Tables 2.2 and 
2.3 respectively. 
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The existing evidence on releases outside of trading hours suggests that the 
opportunity for investors to reflect upon the information prior to the commencement 
of trading can affect the efficiency of price response. This raises the question of 
whether trading halts also provide this benefit and how release timing might interact 
with the existence of trading halts. This has not been explored in the existing 
literature, which concentrates on US markets where trading halts are rarely 
implemented for corporate earnings announcements during trading hours.  
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Table 2.2 
Empirical Literature on Intraday Speed of Response around Corporate Earnings Announcements 
This table provides details of the market, sample size and period, proxy for expected return, timing of announcements included in sample, whether trading 
halts were included in the sample, return measurement interval used and the findings on return behaviour for the existing empirical literature. 
 
 Market Sample 
Size/Period 
Expected Return 
Proxy/s 
Announcement 
Timing 
Trading 
Halts 
Interval Main Findings 
Patell and 
Wolfson (1984) 
NYSE/AMEX
/OTC 
96 firms 
1976-1977 
Analysts forecasts No restrictions Deleted 30 min Abnormal returns in first 30 
minutes, overnight period and first 
30 minutes of the next day. 
Woodruff and 
Senchack (1988) 
NYSE 325 firms 
1980 
Analysts forecasts No restrictions Not 
specified 
Various Stocks reached equilibrium price 
within three hours. ‘Bad’ news 
reactions were slower. 
Lee (1992) NYSE 302 firms 
1988 
Analysts forecasts 
Price change 
Restricted to 
trading hours 
Not 
specified 
30 min Abnormal returns in first 30 
minutes. No other intervals 
significant. 
Francis et al. 
(1992) 
NYSE 558 firms 
1982-1986 
Analysts forecasts 
 
Used to partition 
sample 
Not 
specified 
30 min Differences in speed of adjustment 
for trading and non trading hours. 
‘Daytime’ announcement returns 
extended into overnight period. 
‘Overnight’ announcement returns 
extended beyond the opening. 
Greene and 
Watts (1996) 
NYSE/ 
NASDAQ 
200 firms 
1990-1994 
Analysts forecasts Used to partition 
sample 
Discussed 
separately 
15 min Differences in speed of adjustment 
between the two markets. NYSE 
abnormal returns extend beyond 
the first interval. NASDAQ 
limited to first measurement 
interval. 
Lee and Park 
(2000) 
NYSE/AMEX 1359-1393 firms 
1989-1990 
Analysts forecasts 
 
Restricted to 
trading hours 
Not 
specified 
30 min Abnormal returns for first 2 hours 
for quarterly announcements. 
Interim took even longer. 
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Table 2.3 
Empirical Literature on Strategic Timing of Corporate Dividend and Earnings Announcements 
This table provides details of the market, announcement sample size and period, method used to classify announcements as good/bad news (News 
Classification), and the findings on strategic timing for the existing empirical literature. 
 
 Market 
 
Sample Size/Period News Classification Main Findings 
Patell and Wolfson (1982) NYSE/AMEX
/OTC 
1,000 announcements 
1976-1979 
Change from previous 
Sign of price change 
Evidence that ‘bad’ news more likely to be released 
after close whilst ‘good’ news more likely to be 
released during trading.  
Damodaran (1989) NYSE 30,473 announcements 
1981-1985 
Change from previous Abnormal returns on day after announcements. Friday 
announcements more likely to be bad news with 
larger abnormal returns that extend to Monday. 
Bagnoli et al. (2005) US equity 
markets
49,238 announcements 
† 2000-2003 
Analyst forecast error If the manager varies announcement times between 
trading and non-trading hours, there was weak 
evidence they would release bad news after the close. 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) US equity 
markets
143,583 announcements 
† 1994-2006 
Analyst forecast error Friday announcements were associated with a lower 
immediate response and higher delayed response than 
other days.  
Doyle and Magilke (2009) US equity 
markets
51,352 announcements 
† 2000-2005 
Analyst forecast error Little evidence that switching between before the 
market opens and after the market closed, or to 
Friday, was correlated with the information content. 
Kothari et al. (2009) US equity 
markets
4,016 announcements 
† 1995-2002 
Analyst forecast error The negative reaction to bad news was significantly 
larger than the positive reaction to good news.  
Suggests good news is leaked and bad news withheld. 
Truong (2010) NYSE/ 
NASDAQ 
48,536 announcements 
1998-2007 
Analyst forecast error For ‘Straddle’ announcements, no evidence of 
relationship between timing and abnormal returns. No 
evidence of under-/over-reaction or information 
leakage. 
 
† Actual equity market/s are not explicitly identified
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2.4 The impact of algorithmic trading in security markets 
 
As both AT and HFT are relatively new in academic literature, there is no firm 
consensus on precise definitions for each of these terms. However, there are some 
broad definitions that seem to have found a measure of acceptance in the literature. 
Hendershott and Riordon (2011:2) broadly define algorithmic trading as “the use of 
algorithms to automatically make trading decisions, submit orders and manage those 
orders”. Brogaard (2010:1) defines HFT as “a type of investment strategy whereby 
stocks are rapidly bought and sold by a computer algorithm and held for a very short 
periods, usually seconds or milliseconds”56
 
. Thus, HFT is a subset of AT. Karagozoglu 
(2011) argues that both HFT and AT are made possible by (and hence are themselves 
subsets of) Direct Market Access (DMA) improvements. 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) identify two main types of algorithms used by algorithmic 
traders. The first are agency algorithms which were developed to minimise the market 
impact of large orders and thus reduce the cost of trading. Perhaps the most common 
of these is VWAP, which is designed to achieve, or better, the volume weighted 
average price of the day. The second are proprietary algorithms, which seek to profit 
from changes in data information and events. These have developed more recently. 
Generally then it could be argued that agency algorithms tend to be used by investors 
(especially superannuation/pension funds, mutual funds and other institutional 
investors) for market impact minimisation, arbitrage, asset allocation and other 
traditional trading strategies, whereas proprietary algorithms are more likely to be 
                                                 
56 Kearns et al. (2010) define high frequency traders as those traders who hold positions between 10 
milliseconds and 10 seconds. 
72 
 
used by high frequency traders (especially proprietary desks, hedge funds and 
institutional investors) seeking to exploit trading opportunities that may open up for 
only seconds or even milliseconds.57
 
 
Prix et al. (2007) undertook one of the earliest attempts to detect algorithmic trading 
with a study that examined the lifetimes of cancelled orders on the Xetra trading 
system used on the Deutsche Böerse (DB). They noted that as at April 2007 round-
trip speeds were 10 milliseconds on the Xetra system. They focused their study on 
‘no-fill-deletion’ orders, which are orders that are inserted and subsequently 
cancelled. The sample used consisted of all order book changes for the 30 DAX 
stocks on Xetra for two periods; 8-15 December 2004 and 5-12 January 2005. The 
first period was used to get the defining criteria that were then subsequently applied to 
the second sample period. They found that no-fill-deletion orders embody 65% of all 
order insertions during the sample periods. The authors analysed all no-fill-deletion 
orders with lifetimes equal to multiples of 60 seconds and detect sequences of orders 
which they term constant-initial-cushion (CIC) orders. These are orders which consist 
of both bids and asks, where the bids and asks have the same order size and a constant 
cushion at insertion.58
 
  Further analysis found that the distance at insertion between 
the bid (ask) limit and the best bid (ask) limit was about 0.2% of the median price for 
most 30 DAX stocks. They concluded that these observed trading patterns might be 
interpreted as fishing for profitable roundtrips. 
                                                 
57 The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX Review 2010) uses the terms execution algorithms and 
situational algorithms to refer to agency and proprietary algorithms respectively. 
58 The cushion at insertion was defined as (best bid limit – bid limit) for the bid side and (ask limit – 
best ask limit) for the ask side.  
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Hendershott and Riordan (2011) examine algorithmic trading and its role in the price 
discovery process. They use data from the Automated Trading Program (ATP) from 
the Xetra trading system used by the Deutsche Böerse. This program provides rebates 
on the exchange fees for participants who are registered with the program. In order to 
qualify for the ATP an electronic system must determine the price, quantity, and 
submission time for orders. Before being admitted potential participants must submit 
a high-level overview of the electronic trading strategies they plan to employ and 
once admitted this is periodically reviewed for compliance. Because the rebates can 
be quite substantial, the authors are confident that algorithmic traders have a strong 
incentive to join the program, and as such, the dataset provides a comprehensive 
insight into their trading activities.59
 
 Data used in the study comprises all orders 
submitted for the 30 DAX stocks between 1 January and 18 January 2008 (13 trading 
days). To examine the impact upon market quality the authors measure quoted half-
spreads, effective spreads and depth (depth at the inside quote and depth at 3 times the 
quoted half-spread).  
They found that 51% of price discovery comes from AT quotes, 39% from human 
traders and 10% occurs contemporaneously in AT and human quotes. They also found 
that algorithmic traders are more likely to initiate trades when liquidity is high in 
terms of narrow spreads and higher depth. They demonstrated that AT liquidity 
demanding trades are not related to volatility but are negatively related to volume in 
the 15 minutes prior to order placement. The study also found that ATrs contribute to 
price discovery by having more efficient quotes and by demanding liquidity so as to 
move prices towards the efficient price. Furthermore, the authors found that, after 
                                                 
59 Gsell and Gomber (2009) were the first to use the ATP to explicitly identify algorithmic trading on 
the Deutsche Böerse. They provided a very basic analysis of the activities of ATrs. 
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decomposing the variance of the efficient price into its trade-correlated and non-trade 
correlated components, AT liquidity demanding trades help impound 40% more 
information than human trades. The authors concluded that this suggested ATrs have 
more private information than human traders. 
 
Brogaard (2010) undertook a study examining the impact of HFT on US equity 
markets using a unique dataset that allowed him to identify HFT firms. Brogaard 
examined HFT trading behaviour using a sample of 120 NYSE- and NASDAQ–listed 
firms between various periods from 2008 and 2010.60 Although NYSE-listed firms 
are included in the sample, the study only observed trading on the NASDAQ, which 
accounts for 20-30% of US equity trading activity. The NASDAQ dataset also 
allowed him to distinguish 26 firms that were primarily engaged in high frequency 
trading. This identification was based upon “...known information regarding the 
different firms’ trading styles and also on the firms’ website descriptions” (Brogaard 
2010:7).61
                                                 
60 50% of the sample firms were listed on NYSE and 50% were listed on the NASDAQ.  
 Brogaard found that HFTrs trade primarily in large value stocks, tend to 
follow a price reversal strategy driven by order imbalances, were involved in 68.5% 
of all dollar-volume activity, and supply liquidity in 48.7% of all trades. HFTrs 
provided the inside quotes 65.3% of the calendar time for all stocks and 80.5% to 
85.7% of the calendar time for large stocks but provided only one-fourth as much 
book depth as non-HFTrs. During periods of high volatility, HFTrs were 
demonstrated to increase their trading demand and transfer from liquidity supplying to 
liquidity demanding trading. During extreme 15 minute price movements HFTrs 
61 Brogaard (2010:7) noted that “potential HFT firms are excluded if they fall into one of the following 
categories: brokerage firms that provide direct market access and other powerful trading tools to their 
customers; proprietary trading firms that are a desk of a larger, integrated firm, like a Wall Street bank; 
independent firms  that are engaged in HFT activities, but route their trades through a Market 
Participant ID (MPID) of a non-HFT firm; small firms that engage in HFT activities.” 
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increase their supply of liquidity and decrease the amount they demand. In particular, 
around corporate earnings announcements he found that HFTrs take less liquidity than 
during normal periods and increase the liquidity they supply. He also found that 
HFTrs tend to have more private information than other market participants62
 
, avoid 
trading with informed traders and do not seem to engage in non-HFTr anticipatory 
trading.  Overall, Brogaard suggested his findings demonstrated that HFTrs were not 
detrimental to other market participants and their activities tend to improve market 
quality.  
Hendershott et al. (2011) examined the impact of algorithmic trading upon market 
quality in the US. In particular they use the introduction of the NYSE autoquote 
system to establish causality between AT and liquidity. The authors use a sample of 
943 NYSE-listed stocks from 2001 to 2005.63 The authors proxy the amount of 
algorithmic trading (which cannot be directly observed on the NYSE) using rate of 
message traffic.64
                                                 
62 Consistent with Hendershott and Riordan (2011) 
 They justify this proxy on the grounds that it is commonly used by 
market participants, including consultants such as AITE Group and TABB group, as 
well and exchanges and other market venues. Liquidity is measured using the 
standard microstructure variables of quoted half-spreads, effective half-spreads, 5 
minute and 30 minute realised spreads and 5 and 30 minute price impacts. The 
authors found evidence that realised spreads decline, as do adverse selection losses, 
over the sample period of 2001 to 2005, whilst the rate of message traffic has 
increased over the same period. This implies a generally positive impact from the rise 
of AT.  They are also able to demonstrate a casual relationship between the 
63 The liquidity tests in the paper use 1082 NYSE-listed stocks over the period 2 December 2002 to 31 
July 2003 (this period commences 2 months prior to the introduction of autoquote and ends 2 months 
after the completion of the implementation of the autoquote system). 
64 Specifically the measure is the number of messages per $100 of trading volume. 
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introduction of autoquote and message traffic; autoquote increases message traffic by 
an average of 2 messages per minute. Overall they demonstrate that, for large stocks 
in particular, AT lowers adverse selection and decreased the amount of price 
discovery that is correlated with trading. They found that AT lowers the cost of 
trading and increases the informativeness of quotes.  
 
Fabozzi et al. (2011) examined the existing literature on HFT and the impact of HFT 
on financial markets. The authors outline the reasons for the increase in HFT 
identified in previous literature. The reasons identified were; (i) the change to 
decimalisation in the US in 2001, (ii) the cost of trading has declined over time, (iii) 
the increase in derivatives products and ETF’s has lead to an increase in overall 
trading volume, and (iv) faster transaction speeds enabled by new technology has 
facilitated more HFT. They also identified the main HFT trading strategies; (i) trading 
on news by exploiting the time advantage in placing orders before the market reacts to 
news, (ii) price arbitrage which is based on revealing and exploiting small price 
discrepancies between different markets or between different assets that should 
theoretically have the same price, and (iii) short-term forecasts based on the 
econometric properties of data (including ‘front running’). Drawing on interviews 
with prominent scholars in the field and previously published research, the authors 
identified a number of impacts of HFT on security markets. Those effects were; (i) 
increased correlation between securities (which has potential consequences for the 
ability to diversify investments), (ii) increased information efficiency (as measured in 
terms of parameters such as bid-ask spreads), (iii) reduced volatility but possibly 
volatility spikes, (iv) reduction of  bid-ask spreads, and (v) increased (short-term) 
liquidity.  
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The effectiveness of AT (in particular HFT) strategies is determined by the level of 
latency that operates within the trading environment. Hasbrouck and Saar (2011:1) 
define latency as “the time it takes for information to reach the trader, the time it takes 
for the trader’s algorithms to analyse the information, and the time it takes for the 
generated action to reach the exchange and get implemented”. Riordan and 
Storkenmaier (2011) use more narrow definition of latency; the time it takes for an 
investor to submit and receive feedback about an order. This is the element of latency 
that stock exchanges have recently devoted significant resources in terms of new 
technology towards improving. This can have many benefits. If automation and speed 
can reduce transaction costs, that would enable more efficient allocation of securities 
among heterogeneous investors, improve risk sharing and can raise asset prices 
(Paster and Stambaugh 2003, Acharya and Pederson 2005). Automation and speed 
may also enhance price discovery, or how efficiently new information is incorporated 
into prices (Barclay et al. 2003, Chordia et al. 2008, Boehmer and Kelley 2009). 
Many exchanges around the world65 now offer co-location facilities to market 
participants seeking to capture the trading opportunities available with millisecond 
transaction times. Co-location is the practice of locating the broker or client trading 
software and hardware in close proximity to the trading platform’s trading engine.66
 
 
The goal of co-location is to minimise the transmission latency. 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) examine the influence of low-latency traders on the 
market environment. The millisecond environment shows evidence of two types of 
                                                 
65 For example, NYSE Euronext, NASDAQ, LSE, Deutsche Börse, TSE, SGX, TMX, and ASX all 
offer co-location services with many other exchanges planning on doing so in the near future. 
66 The SEC refers to co-location as “a service offered by trading centres that operate their own data 
centres and by third parties that host the matching engines of trading centres”. (SEC, 2010: 3610) 
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activities: traders who seem to operate according to a schedule (agency algorithms) 
and those that respond to events (proprietary HFTrs). The study sample consisted of 
345 (2007) and 394 (2008) NASDAQ-listed stocks.67 The research found that the 
millisecond environment consists of activity by some traders who are able to respond 
to market events (such as changes in the limit order book) within 2-3 milliseconds.68
 
 
The authors construct a measure of low-latency trading behaviour by identifying 
‘strategic runs’; “...which are linked submissions, cancellations and executions that 
are likely to be parts of a dynamic strategy” (Hasbrouck and Saar 2011:16). This was 
done by using the reference numbers that are attached to each initial order and are 
linked with its subsequent cancellation or execution. The runs are created by then 
linking each cancelled order with a subsequent limit order submission or execution in 
the same direction, of the same size and placed within one second of the previously 
cancelled order.  
The authors found that roughly 60 per cent of cancellations in the 2007 sample and 55 
per cent in the 2008 sample can be linked in this way. Using measures of liquidity and 
short-term volatility observed during 10-minute intervals throughout the trading day 
the authors assess the influence of this low-latency trading behaviour. They find 
higher low-latency trading activity implies lower posted and effective spreads 
(consistent with Hendershott et al. 2011, and Riordan and Storkenmaier 2011), greater 
depth and lower short-term volatility. This was consistent across all stocks (whereas 
Hendershott et al. 2011 found this was only the case lower for large stocks). 
 
                                                 
67 This consisted 23 trading days in 2007 and 21 trading days in 2008. 
68 The authors note that Kosinski (2010) found human response time was in the order of 200 
milliseconds. Thus they conclude 2-3 millisecond response time must be algorithmic traders. 
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Hendershott and Moulton (2010) examined the introduction at the end of 2006 of the 
NYSE Hybrid market, which increased automation and reduced execution time for 
market orders from 10 seconds to less than 1 second. The study used a sample of 400 
NYSE-listed stocks matched against a sample of 400 NASDAQ-listed stocks for the 
period June 2006 to May 2007 (roughly four months either side of the introduction of 
Hybrid).69
 
 The study found that automation led to a reduction in floor trading (which 
the authors speculate could lead to a breakdown in cooperation among floor traders 
which in turn may result in higher adverse selection costs for transactions between 
floor traders). The results demonstrated increases in effective and quoted spreads on 
NYSE as well as an increase in the differences between the spreads of the NYSE and 
NASDAQ group following the introduction of Hybrid. This resulted in an increase in 
the cost of immediacy of about 10 per cent. They found the adverse selection 
component of the spread increased over both a 40 day and 8 month event window 
following the introduction of Hybrid which was consistent with liquidity demanders 
becoming more informed. They also demonstrated that pricing efficiency improves 
with a reduction in pricing error after the introduction of Hybrid, especially for small 
stocks.  
Riordan and Storkenmaier (2011) also undertook a study examining the impact that 
improving automation (reducing latency) had upon two dimensions of market quality; 
liquidity and price discovery. As with Prix et al. (2007) and Hendershott and Riordan 
(2011), the authors examined the Deutsche Böerse Xetra system. The upgrade to 
Xetra 8.0 provided a natural test of reduced latency without any changes in the market 
model, mechanism, or other meaningful microstructure changes (this contrasts with 
                                                 
69 Matching is done using a matching error technique based on market capitalisation and closing price. 
Prices below $1 and above $500 were excluded from the sample. 
80 
 
the Hendershott and Moulton (2010) study of the introduction of Hybrid which 
introduced broader market changes other than just a reduction in transaction spreads). 
Xetra 8.0 reduced trading system latency from an average of 50 milliseconds to an 
average of 10 milliseconds. The study sample consisted of 98 stocks that made up the 
Deutsche Böerse HDAX index for the period 22 February 2007 to 19 June 2007.70
 
 
The authors found that quoted and effective spreads fell after Xetra 8.0 was 
introduced. Depth also fell and turnover increased. The effective spread was then 
decomposed into its two components; liquidity suppliers’ revenue (realised spread) 
and adverse selection costs (price impact).  
The reduction in latency was found to have caused a substantial increase in realised 
spreads that was counteracted by a much larger decline in the adverse selection 
component of the spread. These results were consistent with the findings of 
Hendershott et al. (2011), suggesting an apparent lack of competition between 
liquidity suppliers following increased system automation. Decomposing the 
information of quotes into trade-correlated and uncorrelated portions (Hasbrouck 
1991) the authors found the percentage of price discovery increases dramatically from 
roughly 42% to nearly 80% post upgrade. Consistent with Brogaard (2010), the study 
found that liquidity suppliers are better able to avoid informed trades, stating that “it 
appears as if, post upgrade, liquidity suppliers are able to impound more information 
into quotes before liquidity demanders can exploit this information.” (Riordan and 
Storkenmaier 2011:18). 
 
                                                 
70 The HDAX is a combination of three main Deutsche Böerse indices: DAX, TecDAX and MDAX. 
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Whilst most research has focused on the role of AT and HFT in equity markets there 
has also been a limited amount of research into other markets. Karagozoglu (2011) 
provides empirical evidence of the positive impact of AT and HFT on liquidity in US 
futures markets using data from five CME Group futures contracts (crude oil, Euro 
FX, Eurodollar, E-Mini S&P 500, and 10 Year US Treasury note) over the period 
2008 to 2010. The study uses the Hendershott et al. (2011) method to measure 
liquidity (although it does not use the same proxy for AT). They find that increases in 
AT lead to lower spreads and higher market depth. Chaboud et al. (2009) investigate 
the effects of AT in the spot foreign exchange markets over the period 2006 to 2007 
and find that AT activity and volatility are not correlated, and that order flow 
generated by AT does not affect the return variance. This suggests that humans 
contribute more to the price discovery process than do algorithms in currency 
markets. 
 
2.4.1 Summary 
 
 
The relatively recent rise of algorithmic trading, and in particular HFT, means there is 
very limited amount of academic literature available on its impact in financial 
markets. Only Hendershott and Riordan (2011) have explicitly examined the 
behaviour of Algorithmic Traders (ATrs) response to information.71
                                                 
71 Brogaard (2010) explicitly examines the behaviour of high frequency traders (HFTrs) around 
corporate earnings announcements. 
 What research is 
available has generally examined two aspects of this phenomenon; firstly, what has 
been the impact of algorithmic trading (and HFT) upon measures of security market 
quality and, secondly, what impact has advances in new technologies (in particular 
trading systems) had upon the behaviour of algorithmic traders (especially high 
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frequency traders). This is a significant gap in the research that this dissertation will 
seek to address.  
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Table 2-4 
Major Empirical Literature on the Impact of Algorithmic Trading on Equity Markets  
This table provides a summary of the main existing empirical literature examining algorithmic trading on equity markets. The table provides details of the 
market (and trading system used where relevant), study sample size and period, type of computer trading examined [Algorithmic Trading (AT), High 
Frequency Trading (HFT) or Not Specified (NS)], method of identifying computer trading, focus of the research, and the major findings of the study. 
 
 Market  
(Trading System) 
Sample 
Size/Period 
Type Method Focus Main Findings 
Prix et al. (2007) Deutsche Böerse 
(Xetra) 
30 stocks 
2004-2005 
NS No-fill-deletion orders Trading patterns Evidence of fishing for profitable 
round trips. 
 
Brogaard (2010)  NYSE/NASDAQ 120 stocks 
2008-2010 
HFT 26 HFT firms Trading activities 
and market quality 
HFT increases liquidity supply 
around information releases. HFTr 
better informed. HFT improve 
market quality. 
Hendershott and 
Moulton (2010) 
NYSE (Hybrid)/ 
NASDAQ 
800 stocks 
2006-2007 
NS Trading technology Market quality Hybrid increased spreads, increased 
immediacy costs, and increased 
pricing efficiency. 
Hendershott and 
Riordan (2011) 
Deutsche Böerse 
(Xetra) 
30 stocks 
2008 
AT ATP registered traders Market quality AT provides liquidity and the 
efficiency of price discovery. ATr 
better informed. 
Hendershott at el. 
(2011) 
NYSE (Autoquote) 943 stocks 
2011-2005 
AT Message traffic proxy Market quality AT lowers adverse selection costs, 
improves price discovery, lowers 
cost of trading, and improves 
informativeness of quotes. 
Hasbrouck and Saar 
(2011) 
NASDAQ 345-394 stocks 
2007-2008 
HFT Strategic runs Market quality HFT decreases spreads, increases 
depth and reduces volatility. 
 
Riordan and 
Storkenmaier (2011) 
Deutsche Böerse 
(Xetra) 
98 stocks 
2007 
NS Trading technology Market quality Xetra 8.0 reduced spreads, 
decreased depth and increased 
turnover. 
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2.5 Venture capitalists and the IPO process 
 
It is generally accepted in the literature that venture capitalists (VCs) play a role in 
capital markets that is distinct from other capital providers.72
 
 This section will 
examine the unique characteristics of the venture capital investment process and how 
those characteristics impact upon the initial public offering (IPO) process. This will 
be accomplished in two parts. The first section examines how the venture capital 
investment process functions and the factors that might lead to it having particular 
significance for third party investors in IPOs. The second section examines the 
existing empirical literature of the role of venture capitalists in the IPO process. 
Existing research on the activities Australian venture capitalists is also examined here. 
2.5.1 Nature of the venture capital investment process 
 
Venture capital refers to an equity, or equity-type, investment in a high growth 
potential small or medium sized, often technology based, unlisted enterprises (SMEs). 
With this type of investment the VC assumes a proportion of the business risk in 
return for the potential rewards associated with the rapid growth. VCs provide 
financing and expertise to those firms, which by virtue of their small size and limited 
asset base, are unable to access public capital markets or bank finance (Brophy 1984). 
Due to the high risk associated with this type of investing, VCs will closely monitor 
their investment by taking one or more seats on the board of directors. Through their 
direct involvement in the company VCs are able to use their expertise to facilitate the 
development of the company. However the need to closely monitor each investment 
                                                 
72 In particular see Gompers (1998). 
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made limits the VCs scope to invest in numerous portfolio companies and hence 
restricts the ability of SMEs to access this form of financing. This definition is 
consistent with those used by the professional bodies73 and scholars engaged in 
research in this field.74
 
 
Venture capitalist funds are usually organised as a limited partnership agreements that 
consist of one or more general partners (the venture capitalists) plus a number of 
limited partners (fund investors, usually institutions and high net worth individuals).75 
The VC’s compensation for managing the fund typically consists of two components; 
a management fee and some form of carried interest. The management fee is used by 
the VC to cover salaries and expenses and is charged as a percentage of committed 
capital.76 The carried interest represents the VCs portion of the fund’s gains. Usually 
the VC is entitled to around 20 per cent of the profits allocated to the limited partners 
of the fund.77
                                                 
73 Such as the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), British Venture Capital Association 
(BVCA), European Venture Capital Association (AVCA), and Australian Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association Limited (AVCAL). 
 Limited partners are not entitled to participate in the operational 
decisions of the fund but are compensated for this with their liability being limited to 
the amount of committed capital. The limited liability partnerships typically dissolve 
after ten or twelve years, with distributions from the fund being made to the limited 
74 The term private equity is also used by practitioners and academics to describe this type of financing 
(together with development capital, distressed investments and mezzanine capital). They are sometimes 
(incorrectly) used interchangeably.  See Cornelius (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the 
differences between these two forms of financing.  
75 Previous research has found that 80% of US venture capital firms were organised as limited 
partnership agreements (Sahlman 1990, Porter 1992). 
76 Sahlman (1990) and Gompers and Lerner (2000a) suggest that the management fee is typically 
around 1.5 to 3 percent of the committed capital or net asset value of the fund. 
77 The 20 percent carried interest figure is taken from the Australian Venture Capital Association 
(AVCAL) website as being representative of the industry standard. Sahlman (1990), Gompers (1998) 
and Gompers and Lerner (2000a) also quote this figure as being typical of the US. 
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partners at this time78
 
. 
Figure 2.1: The Venture Capital Investment Process 
 
 
The need for professionalism in the process resulted in the development of a 
reasonably formalised approach to venture capital investing, beginning with the 
establishment of the fund and moving through to the distributions of stock and capital 
to the limited partners at the dissolution of the fund. This approach is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. As this diagram illustrates, the process of investing in venture capital is 
                                                 
78 This form of organisational structure “…imposes a healthy discipline, forcing VCs to take the 
necessary, but painful, step of terminating underperforming firms in their portfolios.” (Gompers and 
Lerner 2000a:19) 
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complex and involves many subjective decisions on the part of the VC. This process 
will be examined in the remainder of this section. 
 
The use of the limited partnership structure for venture capital funds raises a number 
of potential agency conflicts between the goals of the venture capital manager and the 
fund’s investors (Gompers 1996, 1998). Given that the traditional mechanisms of 
corporate governance, for example an active board of directors or the market for 
corporate control, are not available within limited partnership arrangements, the terms 
of the partnership agreement (which will cover the entire life of the fund) are the 
primary means by which the limited partners can curb these potential conflicts. 
Restrictive covenants and compensation have become important instruments for 
aligning the incentives of the VC firm with those of the investor. Therefore, 
considerable effort is expended at the establishment of the venture capital fund to 
ensure the partnership agreement contains the incentives needed to align the venture 
capitalists goals with those of the investor at a cost that the investor considers to be 
appropriate (Gompers and Lerner 1996; Sahlman 1990). 
 
Once a venture capital fund is established, the general partners of the fund begin the 
process of signing on limited partners and raising the fund’s required investment 
capital. This process usually involves some form of ‘road trip’, whereby the VCs 
solicit contributions to the fund from institutional investors and high net worth 
individuals (and in some rare cases private retail investors). This solicitation often 
takes the form of a presentation, or series of presentations, by the VC to potential 
investors, outlining key aspects of the fund that would complement their existing 
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investment portfolio. These include factors such as the type of fund (direct 
investment, fund of fund, etc), the stage of investment of the fund (for example early 
stage, late stage, balanced, sector or industry specific, etc), the life of the fund, the 
size of the fund, the investment philosophy of the fund managers, the track record of 
the fund managers and so on. In essence the role of the fund manager at this point in 
the venture capital cycle is to ‘sell’ the fund to potential investors (Sahman 1990; 
Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Wright and Robbie 1998; Gompers and Lerner 2000a, 
2000b). 
 
Previous research has demonstrated a potential investor’s willingness to commit 
capital to a private equity fund is often dependent upon the strength of the initial 
public offering (IPO) market (Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Gompers 1998; Gompers 
and Lerner 2000b; Jeng and Wells 2000). It has been shown that the cyclical nature of 
venture capital fund raising since its inception in the 1940s was in part driven by 
returns in the IPO market. When the IPO market was ‘hot’, and investors were 
receiving substantial returns from their equity investments in companies going public, 
they were inclined towards putting additional funds into venture capital and, thus, 
gaining additional exposure to growth companies before they reach the IPO stage. In 
this way investors expected to profit from the surge in interest in newly floated 
companies. However, when the IPO market exhibited a downturn then investors 
would withdraw their capital from the risky venture capital market and instead direct 
it towards safer investments. This in turn created a downturn in the ability of VCs to 
raise additional funds as investor interest in the sector waned. Because this 
phenomenon was dependent upon the investor appraising the strength or weakness of 
the IPO market, the impact upon venture capital fund raising tended to be lagged at 
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least one year.  
 
Black and Gilson (1998) demonstrated the attitude of a country’s banking and finance 
sector towards risk could also impact upon the success of fund raising by VCs within 
that country. In a country where the banking sector was prepared to accept the high 
level of risk that financing venture capital deals entails, and finance deals directly, 
then that sector could act as a substitute for the VCs. This would reduce the amount of 
investment capital available to the independent VCs, as the banking sector becomes a 
direct competitor rather than a general partner in the manager’s venture capital fund. 
 
After the venture capital fund has been established and the investment capital 
committed, the VC must commence the task of investing the funds raised. Tyebjee 
and Bruno (1984) in a survey of VCs in the US found that 90 per cent of deals in their 
sample originated as unsolicited cold calls from entrepreneurs. They found the VCs’ 
typical response was to request the entrepreneur send them a business plan. The other 
significant source they identified was referrals from prior investees and personal 
acquaintances, banks or investment brokers. Many of those deals referred by other 
VCs were instances of the referrer being prepared to act as the lead investor and 
seeking other funds with which to syndicate the deal. Additionally a VC may be 
proactive in the deal generation process by actively searching for potential 
investments. 
 
The VC typically receives more applications for funding than there are funds 
available, and must therefore set up screening criteria to select proposals for further 
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analysis. This is an involved process, known as deal screening. Wells (1974) found 
that for seven venture capital funds the annual number of proposals received ranged 
between 120 and 1,000 making it essential that screening criteria be used to reduce 
this to a more manageable number. Emphasizing the importance of the deal screening 
process, Golis (1998) stated that 75 per cent of applications are screened out at this 
point in the venture capital cycle. Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) identified four criteria 
that a VC would use to screen potential investments down to a manageable level: (i) 
size of the investment79 and investment policy of the venture capital fund, (ii) the 
technology and market sector of the venture80, (iii) the geographic location of the 
venture81
 
, and (iv) the stage of financing of the venture.  
Potential venture capital deals that are not rejected during the deal screening process 
are then subject to a more detailed analysis to determine if the potential investee firm 
represents a suitable addition to the VCs investment portfolio. Of particular concern 
to the VC is the level of information asymmetry between themselves and the 
entrepreneur. That is, the VC is expected to make an investment decision relying on 
information about the entrepreneur that has been supplied by the entrepreneur – 
creating a potential adverse selection problem. These high levels of information 
asymmetry may lead the manager to misjudge and invest in unviable companies or 
reject viable deals. Hence the manager must undertake a detailed analysis of the 
                                                 
79 An important caveat to the upper limit though is the ability to syndicate investments. Syndicating 
investments allows venture capital funds to invest in high entry cost deals in collaboration with other 
venture capital funds, without limiting their ability to effectively manage the risk of their portfolios 
through diversification. 
80 “The venture capitalist is investing in more than a company. Implicitly, he/she is investing in the 
future of a particular technology or market.”  (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984:1057) 
81 Venture capitalists tend to specialise in geographic locations and thus spatial proximity between the 
venture capitalist and the potential portfolio company is a consideration for those fund managers during 
the deal screening process (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Gupta and Sapienza 
1992; Norton and Tenenbaum 1993; Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Chen et al. 2010). 
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potential portfolio company. This process, known a due diligence, is undertaken in 
order to minimise the investment risk by gaining a greater insight into the elements 
that create value within the company; the management team, the product, and the 
market potential of the investee firm.82
 
 Extensive research has been carried out on the 
criteria used by VCs to evaluate new ventures (Wells 1974; Poindexter 1976; Tyebjee 
and Bruno 1981; MacMillan et al. 1985; Knight 1986) and the sources of information 
used by VCs to undertake due diligence (Chan 1983; Arnold and Moizer 1984; Dixon 
1991; Pike et al. 1993; Muzyka et al. 1996; Wright and Robbie 1996a). The final 
decision rests with the VC firm’s investment committee. 
Previous studies have shown (Arnold and Moizer 1984; Sahlman 1990; Wright and 
Robbie 1996a) that discounted cash flows (DCF) or earnings multiples (PE ratio) are 
the most frequently used methods for valuing an unlisted company. When using the 
discounted cash flows technique the VC must consider a benchmark internal rate of 
return (IRR) that will be used to discount cash flows and determine the company’s 
value.  Wright and Robbie (1996a), in their survey of 114 VCs found that the 
benchmark IRR used to evaluate expected after tax returns was a mean of 29.2 per 
cent (median 30 per cent). They found this result to be consistent with previous 
research such as Dixon (1991). They also found that the required benchmark was 
higher for early stage investments than was the case for later stage investments. This 
is consistent with the principle that riskier early stage investments attract a higher 
required rate of return than is the case for later stage investments. 
 
The VC may make use of syndication as a mechanism for controlling risk. 
                                                 
82 This risk is also minimised by providing financing in a series of ‘rounds’ or ‘stages’. This enables a 
review of the company’s performance before committing additional funds.  
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Syndication occurs when a VC invites other venture capitalists to invest in an 
entrepreneurial firm. This is usually achieved by one of the VCs acting as lead 
investor, taking responsibility for continuation decisions and taking an active role in 
overseeing the company, whilst the other syndicate members are play a less active 
role (although they may still hold board seats) (Lerner 1994a). Gompers and Lerner 
(2000a) identified a number of reasons why VCs syndicate their investments. Firstly, 
they argued that syndication allowed the VCs to diversify their portfolio risk by 
investing in multiple companies; many more than would be possible if they were the 
sole investor in each deal. This is view is supported by practitioners such as Robert J. 
Kunze of Hambrecht and Quist who stated: 
 
Most financing involves a syndicate of two or more venture [capital] groups, 
providing more capital availability for current and follow-on cash needs. Syndication 
also spreads the risk and brings together more expertise and support. These benefits 
pertain only to start-up financing requiring the venture capitalists first investment 
decision. There are different strategies and motivations for syndication in follow-on 
financing. [Robert J. Kunze, Humbrecht and Quist 1990 quoted in Gompers and 
Lerner (2000a:187)]  
 
Secondly, Gompers and Lerner (2000a) argue that syndication of deals would enable 
the VC to garner a second opinion on the investment opportunity, thus potentially 
acting as another mechanism for reducing the adverse selection problem VCs face 
when assessing new investments. Bygrave and Timmons (1990) believe that 
syndication for the purposes of sharing information is as important, if not more 
important, than the spreading of risk. They argued that the higher number of VCs 
syndicating investments in high-technology and early stage deals, as opposed to lower 
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the levels of syndication observed in low-technology and later stage deals, indicates 
that they are inviting other VCs to participate in their deals in order to gain from their 
expertise and gather a second opinion.  
 
Once the decision has been made to commit capital to the company the VC faces a 
constant agency problem. The nature of investing in unlisted equities means that the 
investor’s access to information about the ongoing operations of the company is 
considerably more limited than a similar investment in listed equities, where the firm 
is constantly under the scrutiny of capital market participants. The problem of how to 
deal with the agency conflicts over the life of the investment can, at least partially, be 
overcome through a careful structuring of the investment process (Chan et al. 1990; 
Sahlman 1990). The VC deals with this problem several ways; (i) by structuring the 
investments so that they keep firm control over them (staging finance), (ii) by creating 
appropriate compensation schemes that provide the entrepreneur with the right 
incentives (signing over equity when performance milestones are achieved), (iii) by 
active involvement in the company (in effect acting as consultants and holding board 
seats), and (iv) by preserving mechanisms that make their investments liquid (through 
the use of hybrid securities and put options within the financing contract that enable 
them to force repurchase by the portfolio company).  
 
Many authors (Cooper and Carleton 1979; Chan 1983; Amit et al. 1990; Admati and 
Pfleiderer 1994; Gifford 1997; Bergemann and Hege 1998; Neher 1999; Elitzur and 
Gavious 2003) have empirically examined the relationships between VCs and 
entrepreneurs, particularly with reference to the staging of investments. These have 
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resulted in various multistage decision models and game theories that attempt to 
determine what the optimal financing decision is at each stage of the financing cycle. 
 
VCs are typically actively involved in the companies in which they have investments. 
Sahlman (1990:508) described the functions performed by the VC in the operations of 
their portfolio company as follows: 
 
Venture capitalists sit on the board of directors, help recruit and compensate key 
individuals, work with supplies and customers, help establish tactics and strategy, 
play a major role in raising capital, and help structure transactions such as mergers 
and acquisitions. They often assume more direct control by changing management 
and are sometimes willing to take over day-to-day operations themselves. All of 
these activities are designed to increase the likelihood of success and improve return 
on investment: they also protect the interests of the venture capital fund and 
ameliorate the information asymmetry. 
 
Gorman and Sahlman (1986) argue though that the VCs do not spend an inordinate 
amount of time directly involved with the management of their portfolio companies. 
Rather they found that the VCs tend to intervene only cursorily in the day-to-day 
operations of the company.  They also found that the degree of involvement varies 
with the stage of investment, with early stage portfolio companies typically requiring 
two hours of attention per week by the lead investor whilst later stage investments 
require less attention. The authors also determined that lead investors visit their 
portfolio companies approximately one and half times per month and stay for an 
average 5 hours. The non-lead investors usually visit about half as often and only stay 
for about two-thirds of the time of the lead investor. However, work carried out by 
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Elango et al. (1995) found that whilst later stage venture capital fund managers spent 
more time evaluating a potential investment, once the investment was made they 
found no difference in the time spent assisting the portfolio company between early- 
and late-stage VCs. Elango et al. (1995) did, however, find that investors could be 
grouped into three categories based upon the amount of time they devoted to assisting 
the portfolio companies, with the most active group averaging over 35 hours per 
month per investment whilst the least active group averaged less than seven hours.  
 
Venture capitalists are also typically represented on the portfolio company’s board. 
Early work by Rosenstein (1988) examined characteristics of the board of directors of 
a typical high technology company receiving venture capital financing. He found that: 
 
…the board is typically small, with outsiders rather than management in control; 
further, at least some of the outside members were found to have a high degree of 
expertise and a close working relationship with management. Board meetings are 
frequent and deal actively with key issues and with the review of how strategy is 
working and what changes in strategy may be required. (Rosenstein, 1988:159) 
 
Furthermore, Rosenstein (1988) states that boards in those companies receiving 
venture capital financing have a high level of power relative to management and that 
this power is more than just financial power, but also in terms of the expertise and 
contacts of the VC. This research, consistent with that of Sahlman (1990), implies that 
the VCs contribution to the success of the venture involves more than simply their 
financial contribution but that they are able to make an important contribution to the 
operational and strategic decision making of the company. Research carried out by 
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MacMillan et al. (1988) found that VCs were involved in four distinct areas of the 
firms operations: development and operations, management selection, personnel 
management, and financial participation. Of these areas though, the authors found that 
the highest degree of involved occurred with respect to financial operations whilst the 
lowest degree of involvement was in the area of ongoing operations. Work by Gomez-
Mejiia et al. (1990), in examining the post-investment activities of VCs in high 
technology firms, found that they were deeply involved in establishing policies and 
monitoring managerial activities of the firms. When respondents to the MacMillan et 
al. (1988) questionnaire were asked if they could change their involvement how 
would that have done so, the majority of respondents indicated that they would have 
increased their involvement in activities requiring the a low time commitment and 
decreased their involvement in activities requiring a high time commitment. This 
suggests that time considerations play an important part in determining the degree of 
the VC’s involvement in their portfolio companies and that, presumably, this is 
directly correlated to the size of their investment portfolio. According to Gifford 
(1997) this is a rational response by the VC who has limited time to allocate between 
improving current ventures and evaluating new projects for possible investment. Thus 
the VC allocates time in a manner which maximises the overall value of the portfolio, 
possibly at the expense in individual portfolio companies. 
 
However, follow up work by Rosenstein et al. (1993), in a study of 98 venture capital-
backed high technology firms, found that the CEOs of these firms did not, on average, 
rate the value of advice from a VC any higher than other members of the board. 
Although, where the lead venture capitalist was rated as a top 20 firm, then on 
average, the CEO’s did rate their advice significantly higher than the advice of other 
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outside board members. Rosenstein et al. (1993) found instead that the areas in which 
the CEO’s rated the outside board members as most helpful were as a sounding board, 
interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring 
financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short-term 
crises. Rosenstein et al. (1993) also found that this assistance was rated higher for 
early-stage rather than later-stage companies. These results suggest that CEO’s 
question the value of VCs’ contributions beyond simply the provision of capital and, 
therefore contrary to previous research, raised questions about the ‘value-added’ that 
VCs contributed to the success of the venture. In support of this, Murray (1994) 
shows that finance was the only area in which VCs’ skills were rated by entrepreneurs 
to be greater than those of other parties.  
 
Research carried out by Beecroft (1994) suggests that the VC’s ability to add value to 
the venture can be the result of the skills they possess, with managers employed by 
captive funds tending to be more financial skills oriented whilst those employed by 
independents tend to have greater industrial skills. This is supported by the findings of 
Sapienza et al. (1996), in a study of venture capital investing in the US and the three 
largest venture capital markets in Europe (UK, Netherlands and France), who found 
that VCs with operating experience in the portfolio company’s core industry added 
significantly more value than those with less industry-specific experience.  
 
Another factor that may impact upon the degree of ‘value added’ by the VC is the 
frequency of interaction between the fund manager and the portfolio company’s CEO. 
Sapienza and Gupta (1994) argued, within an agency framework, that even when 
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management is a significant shareholder, agency problems might persist as a result of 
disagreements regarding how to prioritise operating goals.  Empirical analysis carried 
out by Sapienza and Gupta (1994) found that when the level of goal congruence 
between the lead VC and the firm CEO is low (often as the result of minimal new 
venture experience on the part of the CEO) then the frequency of interaction between 
the VC and the CEO will be greater. Thus, the monitoring time for the VC correlates, 
at least in part, positively with the degree of new venture inexperience of the portfolio 
company’s CEO. This is supported by the findings of Sapienza et al. (1996) who 
found that the amount of ‘value-added’ is strongly related to the amount of face-to-
face interaction between the VC-CEO pairs and to the number of hours the VC 
devoted to each portfolio company.  
 
Research carried out by Sweeting (1991) and Hatherly et al. (1994), looking at the 
UK, found that informal personal relationships are an important component of venture 
capital governance and that formal powers need to be used sparingly, and only when 
things go wrong, in order to remain effective. Lerner (1995), in research examining 
the degree intensity of scrutiny that VCs exhibit with respect to their investments, 
found that the involvement of VCs on the board increases around the time of CEO 
turnover. He also found that the number of outsiders on the board remains constant. 
This finding is consistent with the notion that VCs are willing to take an active hand 
in the event that the progress of the investment deviates from the benchmarks 
established at the time of the initial investment of capital.  
 
Ehrlich et al. (1994) examined the differences in assistance provided to a sample of 
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entrepreneurial firms, located in Southern California, from two different types of 
investors: VCs and private investors. The authors found that whilst the entrepreneurs 
perceived both types of investors to be involved in similar sets of activities with 
respect to assisting the firm, the VCs were perceived to be setting more difficult 
performance targets for the firm. They also found that VCs were providing more 
detailed feedback more frequently to the management team. The authors argued that 
other private investors were perhaps unable to allocate the same amount of time to the 
portfolio firm because of outside activities they were involved in. They reasoned that 
this was not a problem for entrepreneurs with managerial experience but that 
managers with more technical or scientific knowledge needed this extra attention. 
Based on their finding, Ehrlich et al. (1994) concluded that VCs were able to add 
more value to entrepreneurs with good technical or scientific skills but limited 
managerial experience, whereas those with more managerial experience were better 
suited to alternative sources of financing. 
 
Sweeting and Wong (1997) examined the approached to post-investment activities by 
a UK VC and found they took a more ‘hands-off’ approach to their investments than 
was the case for US VCs. They found that the venture capital managers were selecting 
investee firms that were compatible with this approach and that they used a process of 
‘feedback learning’ from previous investments to identify these potential investees. 
They also found that trust was an integral part of the investment process and that 
achieving that trust required careful and considered nurturing. This investment pattern 
is perhaps well suited to the more experienced entrepreneurs identified in the findings 
of Ehrlich et al. (1994). 
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In addition to the value-adding/monitoring roles they undertake during this stage of 
the venture capital investment process, the VC must also make decisions regarding 
additional financing. Rosenstein (1988) found that VCs would undertake reviews of 
the business plan when a new round of funding is required. When objectives laid out 
in the business plan have not been achieved the VC may withhold funding or, more 
likely, force a fundamental rethink of strategy before supplying the necessary capital. 
In extreme cases the VC may enforce the removal and replacement of the CEO before 
providing the additional capital. Thus the supply of additional rounds of financing is 
closely related to the performance of the firm. 
 
Lan (1991) theoretically demonstrated how venture capitalists add value to the firms 
in their investment portfolio. He argued that each stage of financing is itself an option 
to invest at the next stage. He found that a venture capitalists “...appreciation of the 
industry or product market and technology required to gain the competitive edge adds 
value to the firm by extending its product possibility frontier” (Lan 1991:139). He 
argues that a venture capitalists extensive due diligence and industry knowledge 
means that they are better able to overcome the information symmetry driven market 
collapse predicted by Ackeroff (1970). Lan argued that VC investment decisions 
provide a signal to third party capital providers of the firm’s quality. He also argued 
the provision of capital to the firm by VCs also avoids opportunity loss due to wealth 
constraints of the entrepreneur. Finally, Lan believed that VC participation in the firm 
would reduce credit risk (and thus should reduce debt funding costs). 
 
Gompers (1995) examined the structure of staged venture capital investments when 
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agency and monitoring costs exist. Gompers argued that staged venture capital 
infusion helps keep the owner/manager on a ‘tight leash’ and reduces the potential 
losses from bad decisions. This argument predicts that the duration of funding and 
hence the intensity of monitoring should be negatively related to the expected agency 
costs. This means also that venture capitalists should concentrate their investment 
activities in early stage ventures and high technology industries where information 
asymmetries are significant and therefore the value of monitoring activities is 
greatest.83 Using a random sample of 794 US firms that received venture capital 
financing between January 1961 and July 1992, Gompers found evidence that those 
companies that subsequently go public received significantly more dollar value of 
funding and more financing rounds that those which were exited through some other 
mechanism.84 This suggests that VC sells off or liquidates those firms without 
potential. Furthermore, firms in industries with high market to book values (which 
serves as proxy for growth prospects) and R&D intensive industries were found to 
have received more venture capital financing than other firms. Lerner (1995) also 
looked more closely at the monitoring activities of venture capitalists by examining 
changes in the composition of the board of portfolio companies around the time the 
CEO is replaced.85
                                                 
83 Gompers argues that the entrepreneur’s equity stakes are essentially call options. This is because 
their holding are often junior to the preferred equity position of the venture capitalist and this creates an 
incentive to pursue high variance strategies like rushing a product to market without adequate testing. 
This gives rise to agency costs for the VC. 
 Using a sample of 271 US biotechnology firms listed in the 
Venture Economics database as having received VC financing between 1978 and 
1989, Lerner found a significant increase in the number of venture capitalist board 
members between the second last and last financing round when there has been a 
84 For the sample; 22.5% of firms went public through the IPO process, 23.8% were sold through trade 
sales, 15.6% were liquidated or went bankrupt, and 38.1% were still private companies. 
85 The replacement of the CEO is used as a proxy for a crisis that would necessitate greater monitoring 
by the VC. 
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change in the CEO during that period. Cross-sectional regressions found that the exit 
of the CEO increases the number of venture capitalists directors from 0.25 to 1.59.  
 
One of the critical skills that differentiate a successful VC from a less successful one 
is the ability to profitably exit from an investment.86 The primary reason for this is the 
structure of venture capital funds. Due to the fact that the majority of venture capital 
funds are organised as ten to twelve year limited partnership agreements, the general 
partners strive to exit their investments by this time to provide a return to the limited 
partners. Also given that not all of the available funds are going to be distributed in 
the first year of the funds existence this means that on average the investor has to exit 
the investments in between three and seven years from the time of the initial 
investment (Gompers 1996). If the investment is not realised by that time it becomes 
what VCs refer to as a “living dead” investment. This is an investment which is self-
sustaining but which does not provide the investors a return sufficient to compensate 
them for the risk they have borne over the life of the investment (Ruhnka et al. 1992). 
The exit mechanisms available to venture capitalists are; (i) initial public offering87
 
, 
(ii) sale to another firm, (iii) management buy-in/management buy-out, (iv) 
undertaking a turnaround, and (v) liquidation or write-off (Wright and Robbie 1998; 
Gladstone and Gladstone 2004). This dissertation will focus on the first method. 
According to Wall and Smith (1997) most VCs were reactive rather than proactive 
when considering the exit strategy for a new investment. They tended to start 
                                                 
86 Not only to provide adequate returns to investors to compensate them for the risk involved in 
investing in venture capital but also because of the links between capital raising and a successful track 
record for exits.   
87 Megginson and Weiss (1991) dispute the claim that the IPO is an ‘exit’ (at least in the US) since 
venture capitalists typically retain large shareholdings and board seats long after the firm’s public 
listing.  
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considering the exit strategy only after the investment had reached, as far as the 
venture capitalists were concerned, “maturity”. The main reason that authors 
(Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Ruhnka et al. 1992; Wall and Smith 1997; Black and 
Gilson 1998; Brouwer and Hendrix 1998; Golis 1998; Mahur 1999; Neidorf 1999) 
have identified for this reactive strategy is the fact that most VCs consider an initial 
public offering (IPO) as the preferred exit strategy.  The primary advantage for the 
VC of an IPO exit is the perception that they will receive a higher price (return) in the 
public market. Mahur (1999:31) supports this perception when he states “venture 
capitalists still prefer to take their companies public because the public markets tend 
to pay more for the stock than do sophisticated buyers in the trade”.  
 
Bygrave and Timmons (1992), in a study of how 26 venture capital funds exited 442 
investments between 1970 and 1982, found that gains were produced by IPO’s (1.95 
times investment), acquisitions (0.40 times), company buybacks (0.37 times) and 
secondary sales (0.41 times). Losses were suffered in liquidations (-0.34 times 
investment) and write-offs (-0.37 times). In a follow-up chapter in Wright and Robbie 
(1999), Bygrave and Timmons reported that IPO’s remained the exit route of choice 
for US venture capital firms between 1992 and 1994. Gompers (1995) reported the 
results of a 1988 Venture Economics review of returns on venture capital that found 
that VC-backed IPO’s yielded an average return of 59.5 per cent per year (or 7.1 
times invested capital returned over 4.2 years). Acquisitions offered average returns 
of 15.4 per cent per year (or 1.7 times the invested capital over 3.7 years) whilst 
liquidations lost 80 per cent of their value over 4.1 years. From this Gompers (1995) 
concluded that IPO’s offered the most attractive returns to investors. Lerner (1997:27) 
agreed, stating “private equity [VC] investors exit most successful investments 
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through taking them public”.88
 
 Lerner (1994b) found that IPOs backed by more 
experienced VCs are better able to time their IPOs by going public when equity 
values are high and using private financings when values are lower. 
 
2.5.2 The role of venture capitalists in the IPO process 
 
A number of studies have examined the role that venture capitalists play in the public 
offering of companies in their fund portfolios. These studies have led to the 
development of a number of theoretical models of impact of VC involvement in the 
IPO process. This section will examine the development of those models and the 
subsequent testing of them by other scholars. 
 
Amit et al. (1990) investigated analytically, within the principal-agent framework 
(Harris and Raviv 1978; Holmstrom 1979), the decisions of entrepreneurs to develop 
their ventures independently or with the assistance of venture capitalists. The problem 
framework for this analysis is that the venture capitalist is uncertain about the 
entrepreneur’s talent when making a potential venture investment. The entrepreneur’s 
talent is their ability (skill, experience, ingenuity, leadership, etc) “...to combine 
tangible and intangible assets in new ways and deploy them to meet customer needs in 
a manner that could not easily be imitated” (Amit et al. 1990:1233). This talent may 
be known to the entrepreneur but unknown to the venture capitalist. The authors 
suggest that the inability of the VC to assess the venture founder’s core attributes may 
affect both the decisions of entrepreneurs to involve outsiders and the prices venture 
capital firms may be willing to pay for new ventures. This gives rise to an adverse 
                                                 
88 Many other authors have reported similar findings (Black and Gilson 1998, Gannon 1999, Golis 
1998, Brouwner and Hendrix 1998, Ruhkna et al. 1992). 
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selection and moral hazard problem.  
 
To understand this problem the authors modelled the entrepreneur’s optimal 
behaviour under three information settings; (i) the entrepreneur’s skills are common 
knowledge – under these conditions all risk adverse entrepreneurs would involve risk 
neutral VC’s, as the risk share dominates the agency relationship, (ii) there is 
information asymmetry regarding entrepreneur’s skill levels – then adverse selection 
means that only less profitable ventures will be sold whilst more profitable would be 
retained by the entrepreneur without outside involvement, and (iii) there is 
information asymmetry reading the entrepreneurs skill levels but the entrepreneur can 
invest to reveal his skill – under these conditions there will always be some selling out 
by less skilful entrepreneurs who do not generate a signal about their abilities. They 
also find that it is not a general result that high-ability entrepreneurs either necessarily 
generate or necessarily develop the venture alone. In both the later two settings the 
authors found that the equilibrium price paid for the investment is one that yields a 
zero NPV for the least skilled entrepreneur. The implications of this adverse selection 
hypothesis is that, in general, VC funding will be provided to the least attractive new 
ventures with the implication that VC-backed IPOs will be, in general, less attractive 
then non-VC-backed IPOs. 
 
Barry et al. (1990) examined the influence of VC monitoring of their portfolio 
companies on the IPO process. With previous research indicating that VCs hold 
significant equity stakes and play an active role in monitoring their portfolio 
companies (through holding board seats, providing consulting and industry contacts, 
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and staging investments) the authors sort to determine if this had any impact upon the 
market’s perception of the value of companies brought to the market by venture 
capitalists. The study used a sample of 433 VC-backed IPOs and 1,123 non-VC-
backed IPOs on US equity markets over the period 1978 to 1987.89
 
 In their sample 
they found that VCs held an average of 34.3% of the pre-IPO equity in the listing 
firms and 25% held at least 50% of the pre-IPO equity. On average VCs sold 6.6% of 
their pre-IPO shares (although 58% were found to have retained all of their equity 
holding post listing). The average VC still held 17.8% equity in the firm one year after 
the public listing.  
Barry et al. (1990) found evidence that VC-backed IPOs exhibit higher underpricing 
of 2.78% (8.43% mean) compared non-VC backed IPOs with median underpricing of 
1.29% (7.47% mean).90 This result was not statistically significant. They also found 
evidence that VC-backed IPOs use more prestigious underwriters than non-VC-
backed IPOs.91 Their results indicated that VC-backed IPOs have a lower earnings 
yield (higher P/E ratio) than non-VC-backed IPOs although they suggested this was 
due to the nature of the industries that VC invest in rather than an effect of VC 
participation. In order to test the effects of VC participation on underpricing the 
authors regressed underpricing against a series of control variables for VC monitoring 
quality and underwriter quality.92
                                                 
89 Venture capitalists were identified using the Venture Capital Journal and Pratt’s Guide to Venture 
Capital Sources. 
 The results indicated that underpricing is reduced (i) 
90 Underpricing was calculated as the percentage change by the end of the first trading day from the 
offer price. This is also referred to as the initial return in the IPO literature. 
91 Underwriter prestige is measured using Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriter ranks, on an ordinal 
scale of 0-9. 
92 Variables for venture capitalist monitoring skill used were; Number of VCs holding equity, Length 
of time the lead VC had been on the board, Age of the lead VC, Number of prior IPOs the VC had 
successfully brought to market, Funds under management, Fraction of pre-IPO equity held by the lead 
VC. 
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the larger the number of VCs owning equity in the issuers, (ii) the longer the lead VC 
has served on the company’s board, (iii) the older the venture capitalist is, (iv) the 
larger the number of prior IPOs in which the lead VC participated, (v) the larger the 
fraction of issuers equity owned by the VC.93
 
  They concluded that the quality of 
monitoring services appears to be recognised by capital markets in lower underpricing 
for IPOs with better monitors.  
Megginson and Weiss (1991) expanded upon the work of Barry et al. (1990) by 
formalising the expected effect of venture capital participation in the IPO process. 
Building on the certification hypothesis of Booth and Smith (1986), Megginson and 
Weiss argued that the presence of venture capitalists, as investors in a firm going 
public, can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant 
inside information. This has become known as the certification hypothesis. 
Megginson and Weiss examined the certification model by testing three hypotheses; 
(i) VC-backed IPOs should have higher quality underwriters and auditors as well as 
larger institutional following than non-VC-backed IPOs, (ii) VC-backed IPOs should 
have lower underpricing as well as lower issuing costs than non-VC-backed IPOs, and 
(iii) VC’s should have high ownership levels before and after the IPO. Megginson and 
Weiss used a matched sample of 320 VC-backed IPOs and 320 non-VC-backed IPOs 
on US equity markets over the period 1983 to 1987 to examine these three 
hypotheses.94
 
  
                                                 
93 The Funds under management variable was not found to be significant in determining underpricing. 
94 VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs were matched on the basis of having the same industry 
classification (three digit SIC classification) and as closely as possible the same size. Time was not one 
of the matching criteria. Venture capital backing was identified using the Venture Capital Journal. 
Underwriter quality was measured using market share. Auditor quality was based on whether or not the 
firm was one of the ‘Big eight’ accounting firms.  
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Megginson and Weiss found that VC-backed IPOs are younger than their equivalent 
non-VC-backed counterpart which they suggested was evidence that venture 
capitalists were able to bring the companies to the market quicker. VC-backed IPOs 
exhibited evidence of higher quality underwriters and auditors. They also had 
significantly higher institutional shareholdings than non-VC-backed firms. They 
found evidence of lower underpricing for VC-backed IPOs, lower underwriter 
compensation and other issuing costs which resulted in a higher ratio of net proceeds 
to offer amount (and first trading day amount) for VC-backed firms. Regressing 
underpricing and underwriter spreads against various control variables95
 
 (including 
VC presence) the authors found venture capitalist participation lead to a significant 
reduction in both dependent variables. VCs were also found to hold significant 
portions of the equity both before the IPO (36.6 per cent) and after the 
commencement of trading (26.3 per cent). These results supported the certification 
hypothesis. 
Jain and Kini (1995) test the proposition that VCs can continue to add value to their 
portfolio companies after the IPO process by comparing post-IPO operating 
performance of a sample of VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs.96 Their 
sample consisted of 136 VC-backed IPOs matched to 136 non-VC-backed IPOs on 
US equity markets for the period 1976 to 1988.97
                                                 
95 Control variables were; VC backing dummy, offer amount, underwriter quality and age of the issuing 
firm. 
 Operating performance up to three 
years after listing was measured using two cash flows; (i) operating return on assets, 
96 The evidence that venture capitalists continue to hold equity stakes and board positions after the 
listing of the firm forms the basis for the expectation that their participation would continue to add 
value to the company  (Barrey et al. 1990, Sahlman 1990, Megginson and Weiss 1991).  
97 As with Megginson and Weiss (1991) the matching criteria used was three digit SIC classification 
and offering amount. 
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and (ii) operating cash flows deflated by total assets. The authors found that VC-
backed IPOs have higher median IPO offering size and offer price in comparison to 
their non-VC-backed counterparts. Whilst both groups exhibited a decline in 
operating performance post listing, that decline was faster for non-VC-backed IPOs 
relative to the VC-backed IPOs using both operating performance measures. Cross-
sectional regressions of operating performance with control variables for market 
expectations found that VC-backed IPOs exhibit superior operating performance in 
the period after listing over the three-year measurement interval. Thus, the authors 
concluded that VC participation adds value to post-IPO operating performance and 
signals quality to other market participants at the time of the public offering. This 
supports the certification hypothesis of venture capitalist participation. 
 
Lin (1996) also provides evidence of the certification role played by VCs in the IPO 
process. Lin tests two predictions stemming from the certification hypothesis; that 
VC-backed IPOs should exhibit lower underpricing and lower underwriter spreads at 
the time of offering relative to non-VC-backed IPOs due to the signal of quality that 
the VCs equity position indicates to other market participants. Lin used a sample of 
497 VC-backed and 2,137 non-VC-backed IPOs on US equity markets between 1979 
and 1990.98 He found evidence that VC-backed IPOs use more prestigious 
underwriters and are able to do so with significantly lower underwriter spreads.99
                                                 
98VC participation was identified using the Venture Capital Journal and Pratt’s Guide to Venture 
Capital Sources. 
 VC 
participation was shown to have a negative effect on underpricing (although this result 
was not significant). Cross-sectional regressions of underpricing against VC 
99 Underwriter prestige is ranked using the Cater and Manaster (1990) rankings. 
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reputation100 and four control variables101
 
 found that underpricing was positively 
related to the offering size, negatively related to the VC’s shareholding and negatively 
related to VC prestige. Lin concluded that these results were consistent with the 
previous findings that venture capitalist participation certifies the value of the listing 
company to potential third party investors.  
Gompers (1996) develops and tests the hypothesis that younger (less experienced) 
venture capital firms take companies public earlier that older (more experienced) 
venture capital firms in order to establish a reputation and successfully raised capital 
for new funds. This has become known as the grandstanding hypothesis. Gompers 
tests a number of predictions based upon this hypothesis; (i) there will be a shorter 
interval until the next fundraising after an IPO for younger VCs relative to older VCs, 
(ii) companies brought to the market by younger VCs will be less well developed 
(younger) than those brought to the market by older VCs, (iii) younger VCs will have 
spent less time on the board of their portfolio companies than older VCs, and (iv) 
IPOs backed by younger VCs will exhibit greater underpricing than those backed by 
older VCs. To test these predictions Gompers uses two samples; 433 VC-backed IPOs 
on US equity markets between January 1978 and December 1987102
                                                 
100 VC reputation was proxied using VC age and amount of funds under management. 
, and all IPOs for 
62 VC funds between August 1983 and July 1993. Gompers classifies the venture 
capitalist who has been on the board the longest as the lead VC (as opposed to Barry 
et al. 1990 who use the largest equity holding as a proxy for the lead VC). Gompers 
classifies VCs established less than six years prior to the IPO as ‘young’ and those 
101 Control variable were log of offering size, age of issuing firm, pre-IPO shareholding of lead VC and 
underwriter rank. 
102 This is the same sample used by Barry et al. 1990. 
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established six or more years prior to the IPO as ‘old’.103
 
  
The results demonstrated that companies backed by more inexperienced VCs were 
younger at the time they were brought to the market and that the VC had spent less 
time on the board than those backed by more experienced VCs. IPOs backed by 
younger VCs also exhibited greater mean (median) underpricing of 13.6 per cent (6.7 
per cent) compared to 7.3 per cent (2.7 per cent) for those backed by older VCs. 
Younger VCs were also demonstrated to have held smaller mean (median) equity 
stakes in their portfolio companies at the time of the offering of 32.1 per cent (28.7 
per cent) compared to 37.7 per cent (37.1 per cent) for older VCs. Gompers suggests 
this indicates that younger VCs bear the costs of early IPOs with smaller equity 
stakes. Cross-sectional regressions demonstrated a positive relationship between the 
number of companies taken public and the size of the next capital raising. Gompers 
also demonstrated that younger VCs raise money after IPOs sooner than older VCs 
(eight to nine months sooner). The results supported the hypothesis that younger VC 
firms rush their companies to market in an effort to establish a reputation of success 
for future capital raisings. 
 
Brav and Gompers (1997) investigated the long-run market underperformance of VC-
backed versus non-VC-backed IPOs.104
                                                 
103 Gompers states the results are not sensitive to cut-offs between four and ten years prior to the IPO. 
 They argued that if the involvement of a 
venture capitalist certifies the offering to third party investors then this should be 
incorporated into the price (through lower underpricing) and the long-run stock price 
performance ought to be similar for the two groups (VC-backed versus non-VC-
104 Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) had previously documented a pattern of severe long-
run underperformance in IPOs over a twenty year period. 
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backed offerings). However, they argue that if the market underestimates the 
importance of a venture capitalist in the pricing of new issues than the long-run 
performance might differ. To examine the long-run effects the authors used a sample 
934 VC-backed IPOs on US equity markets from 1972-1992 and 3,407 non-VC-
backed IPOs on US equity markets from 1975-1992.105,106 The authors found that for 
equal weighted buy and hold returns over five years, VC-backed firms earned 44.6 
per cent on average, whilst non-VC-backed firms earned 22.4 per cent. VC-backed 
firms also exhibited higher wealth relatives (using various benchmarks) over the five-
year holding periods of around 0.95 compared to 0.86 for non-VC-backed firms.107
 
  
Using the Fama and French (1993) three factor model the authors find that 
documented IPO underperformance is driven by non-VC-backed IPOs (even after 
controlling for size and book-to-market in time series regressions). VC-backed IPOs 
were demonstrated not to have exhibited long-run underperformance using this 
model. The authors also demonstrated that the long-run underperformance was not an 
IPO effect since they found that similar size and book-to-market firms that have not 
issued equity perform as poorly as IPOs over the sample period. This supports the 
certification hypothesis. 
Lin and Smith (1998) examined the relationship between venture capitalist selling 
decisions and reputation during the IPO process. They hypothesize that VC firms 
balance the costs of continued involvement and ownership against the adverse market 
                                                 
105 VC participation was identified using the Venture Capital Journal and other sources. 
106 The authors noted a low incidence of mergers over the sample period; 11.2% of the VC-backed 
IPOs and 9.7% of the non-VC-backed IPOs merge within the first five years of listing. Also 7.5% of 
VC-backed and 13.3% of non-VC-backed IPOs in the sample are delisted within five years of the IPO.  
107 Wealth relatives are calculated as (1+ buy and hold return on IPO)/(1+ buy and hold return on 
benchmark portfolio).  The benchmarks used were S&P 500 index, Nasdaq composite, NYSE/AMEX 
value-weighted index, NYSE/AMEX equal-weighted index, size and book-to-market (5x5), and Fama-
French industry portfolio. 
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reaction to insider selling. The authors argue that the venture capitalist will seek to 
liquidate their holdings in listed companies in order to free up their limited advisory 
for other potential ventures.108 Maintaining a large shareholding after the public 
offering can obligate the venture capitalist to an ongoing monitoring role (due to 
contractual obligations and fiduciary relationships) that may not be the best use of 
their unique skill set (which is specialised towards advising early stage companies). 
They also argued that the VC will seek to minimise the adverse reaction by 
developing a reputation for selling shares that are not overpriced. The study used a 
sample of 497 VC-backed IPOs and 2,136 non-VC-backed IPOs on US equity 
markets between 1979 and 1990.109 The authors found that VC-backed IPOs go public 
more quickly than non-VC-backed firms (VC-backed firms have on average only 
been incorporated half as long as non-VC-backed firms). Consistent with previous 
research they also found the quality of underwriters used by VC-backed firms was 
significantly higher than for non-VC-backed IPOs.110
 
 They suggest that their findings 
imply that it is the underwriter rather than the venture capitalist that is performing the 
certification function.  
However, they also argue that their findings were not consistent with the 
grandstanding hypothesis since the average age for VC-backed firms was 7.5 years 
and none of them was even close to the average age for non-VC-backed firms of 15 
years. They also find evidence of significant declines in long-term venture capitalist 
ownership (only 12.3 per cent of venture capitalists are still shareholders after 3 years) 
                                                 
108 Also they state that equity cannot be distributed to the limited partners of the fund during the ‘lock-
up’ period (of between 6 months to 2 years) after listing. This restriction is critical given the life of a 
typical limited partnership agreement is between ten and twelve years.  
109 VC participation was identified using the Venture Capital Journal and Pratt’s Guide to Venture 
Capital Sources. 
110 Underwriter quality was measured using Cater and Manaster (1990) rankings. 
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and directorships. Their results indicated that the lead VC is more likely to sell at the 
IPO when they have an established reputation and that VCs with an established 
reputation will refrain from selling unless the IPO is expected to be significantly and 
materially underpriced. This did not hold for VCs with less established reputations. 
These results suggest little evidence of support for either IPO certification or 
grandstanding by venture capitalists. 
 
Hamao et al. (2000) examine the long-run performance of VC-backed IPOs in the 
Japanese market. This market is different from the US market (which most prior 
research is focused upon) because most of the VCs in Japan are subsidiaries of 
securities firms rather than independent organisations. The authors suggested that 
these firms faced potential conflicts of interest between their role as investors in their 
portfolio companies and the goals of the parent firm to which they are aligned. Thus, 
the authors test two hypotheses; the certification hypothesis and a ‘conflict of interest’ 
hypothesis.111 The study used a sample of 210 VC-backed and 246 non-VC-backed 
IPOs on the Japanese OTC market between 1989 and 1995.112
                                                 
111 The conflict of interest hypothesis is largely based on the possibility that the securities firm to which 
the venture capitalists is affiliated has an incentive to more aggressively market (and set a higher 
offering price for) any offering in which it is indirectly a shareholder (through its VC subsidiary) than 
would be the case if it was acting solely as a financial intermediary. This hypothesis assumes that not 
all investors are sufficiently sceptical about firm quality which would enable hyping of the stock to be 
successful. 
 The authors found little 
evidence of strong monitoring being performed by Japanese VCs with shorter holding 
periods, fewer board seats and smaller equity stakes (average of 5.92 per cent of the 
equity) than previous research reported for US firms. The study found evidence of 
significant underpricing (average 19.8 per cent) at the time of listing and poor three-
year returns measured against an industry or size matched non-IPO portfolio, although 
112 The majority of the venture capitalist firms were affiliated with either a bank or securities firm. 
Seventy five per cent were affiliated with the lead underwriter of the offer. 
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the wealth relative was 0.851 which was higher than the 0.8 reported in Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) but lower than the 0.86 to 0.95 reported by Brav and Gompers (1997). 
They also found evidence that Japanese VCs sell significant portions of their equity 
holdings in the IPO (post IPO holding are on average 40 per cent below the pre-IPO 
levels) unlike their US counterparts.113 Cross-sectional regressions of 355 IPOs 
between 1989 and 1994114 matched by industry classification and size found evidence 
that foreign or independent VC-backed IPOs were underpriced at the time of the IPO 
but exhibit positive average long-run returns (unlike other VC-backed and non-VC-
backed IPOs). However, once other determinants of performance were controlled 
for115
 
, the authors found that VC-backed IPOs were less underpriced and had better 
long-run performance than non-VC-backed IPOs (confirming the certification 
hypothesis) except in the case of affiliates of the lead underwriter where the conflict 
of interest hypothesis seemed to prevail. 
Francis and Hasan (2001) examined the pre-market underpricing of VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed IPOs using a stochastic frontier approach and maximum likelihood 
estimates to separate pre-market and post-market effects on IPO underpricing. Using a 
sample of 415 VC-backed IPOs116 and 428 non-VC-backed IPOs on US equity 
markets between 1990 and 1993 the authors find evidence consistent with previous 
research that VC-backed IPOs are associated with more prestigious underwriters117
                                                 
113 Foreign or independent VCs in Japan were found to have sold most of their holdings during or 
shortly after the IPO. 
 
and lower underwriter compensation. This is consistent with the certification 
114 The shorter cut-off was to enable three year holding periods. 
115 Independent variables were; log of proceeds, log of book-to-market ratio, log of firm age, 
subscription ratio, institutional lag, and VC and regulatory regime dummies. 
116 VC-backing was identified using the Venture Capital Journal. 
117 Underwriter prestige is determined using Carter et al. (1998) rankings. 
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hypothesis. However, the authors also found that underpricing of VC-backed IPOs 
was, on average, higher than for non-VC-backed IPOs. They determined that this 
initial return was determined not only by factors such as third party certification and 
public information about the offering, but also by inefficiencies in the initial offer 
price of VC-backed IPOs suggestive of deliberate pre-market underpricing.  
 
Barnes and McCarthy (2002) examined whether the effects of the grandstanding 
hypothesis (Gompers 1996) occur in the United Kingdom. They test whether young 
venture capitalists grandstand by bringing companies to the market earlier than older 
venture capitalists in an effort to build a reputation and successfully raise more capital 
in future funds. The study used a sample of 85 VC-backed IPOs on UK equity 
markets during the period July 1992 to December 1999.118 The study found that 
listing companies were significantly younger if the VC was younger but there was no 
difference in the level of underpricing between young or old venture capitalists. They 
also found no evidence of a difference in the quality of underwriter used in the 
offering.119
                                                 
118 Venture capitalists were identified using a list produced by the British Venture Capital Association. 
In order to be classified as VC-backed the venture capitalists stake had to be at least 3% of all the 
shares outstanding. 
 There results suggested that differences in underpricing instead related 
more to offering characteristics than VC reputation. Unlike previous research they 
also found younger VCs did not appear to bear significant costs of rushing 
investments to the market in the form of reduced ownership stakes at the issue nor did 
younger VCs time their IPOs closer to their follow-on funds than more established 
VCs. Overall, the authors found little evidence of grandstanding behaviour in their 
results. 
119 Underwriter prestige was ranked using the league tables published annually by the International 
Financial Review (IFR). 
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Franzke (2003) examined the certification hypothesis for IPOs in Germany’s Neuer 
Markt. She examined two implications of the certification hypothesis; (i) the more 
prestigious the venture capitalist, and the bigger their equity stake, the lower should 
be the level of underpricing at the IPO, and (ii) the higher the participation ratio120 the 
lower the level of underpricing.  The study used a sample of 300 IPOs that went 
public on the Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2002.121 The sample 
consisted of 79 VC-backed IPOs122
 
, 160 non-VC-backed IPOs and 61 companies that 
received ‘bridge financing’. Franzke argued that, due to their shorter holding periods, 
the bridge financing providers were not expected to provide the same degree of 
certification as the venture capitalists. The study found 52.44 per cent average 
underpricing for VC-backed IPOs and 48.38 per cent for non-VC-backed firms, 
although the difference was not significant. Using a two stage least square regression 
of underpricing and non underwriter expenses, the author found no evidence to 
support the certification hypothesis. It was found that more prestigious venture 
capitalists (prestige was ranked on three age categories) experience greater 
underpricing (average 75.32 per cent) compared to their less prestigious counterparts 
(average 39.16 per cent).  
Wang et al. (2003) examined both the certification and grandstanding/adverse 
selection hypotheses in the Singaporean market. They argued that, with only twenty 
years of venture capital experience, Singapore represented a good location to test the 
                                                 
120 The participation ratio was defined as number of old shares sold in the IPO divided by the number 
of pre-IPO shares. 
121 The Neuer Markt closed in 2003. 
122 Venture capitalists were identified using prospectuses and German Venture Capital Association and 
European Venture Capital Association membership lists. 
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applicability of the existing theories on venture capitalist participation in the IPO 
process in an emerging market. The study used a sample of 82 VC-backed IPOs123 
matched with 82 non-VC-backed IPOs over the period 1987 to 2001.124
 
 In order to 
test the two hypotheses the study examined three performance measures; IPO 
performance, post-IPO operating performance and post-IPO market performance. The 
authors argued that the different hypotheses gave different empirical predictions in 
both IPO and post-IPO performance. In the IPO process, the certification model 
predicts lower underpricing and lower IPO cost for VC-backed IPOs whereas the 
grandstanding/adverse selection models predict higher underpricing and higher IPO 
costs. In post-IPO operating and market performance, the certification model predicts 
VC-backed IPOs with exhibit better performance compared to non-VC-backed IPOs 
but that that outperformance with decline over time as the VC withdraws whereas the 
adverse selection/grandstanding model predicts that VC-backed IPOs with 
underperform compared to non-VC-backed IPOs.   
The study found that VC-backed firms were younger at the time of the IPO, had lower 
underpricing (when hot issue periods were excluded) and had higher underwriter 
quality than non-VC-backed IPOs. This implied some support for the certification 
hypothesis however this did not translate into lower issuing costs of VC-backed firms. 
They found various measures of post-IPO performance of VC-backed firms declined 
faster than those of non-VC-backed firms, which contradicted the previous findings of 
Jain and Kini (1995), and suggested support for the grandstanding/adverse selection 
model. The post-IPO market results were inconclusive. However, when Wang et al. 
                                                 
123 Venture capitalists are identified using IPO prospectuses. 
124 IPOs are matched according to industry classification, size and year. This is similar to the technique 
used by Megginson and Weiss (1991). 
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(2003) partitioning their sample into longer and shorter investment VC duration and 
young and old venture capitalists the authors were able to find evidence that firms 
backed by older VC and those that had longer VC support exhibited evidence of lower 
underpricing and better post-IPO performance which implies support for the 
certification hypothesis. Those backed by younger venture capitalists and those that 
had shorter VC support exhibited higher underpricing and weaker post-IPO 
performance which the authors argued supported the adverse selection/grandstanding 
hypothesis. 
 
Lee and Wahal (2004) also examined the certification and grandstanding hypotheses 
of venture capitalist participation in the IPO process. They used an extensive matched 
sample of 2,208 VC-backed IPOs125 and 2,208 non-VC-backed IPOs in US equity 
markets over the period 1980 to 2000.126
                                                 
125 Information on VC firms, dates, funding etc was obtained from Venture Economics database and 
Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Sources.  
 The authors found that differences between 
underpricing for VC-backed versus non-VC-backed IPOs was non stationary. For the 
full sample, they found VC-backed firms exhibited a higher degree of underpricing 
than non-VC-backed firms. However when replicating the periods of Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) and Barry et al. (1990) they found, consistent with those studies, that 
VC-backed IPOs exhibited a lower degree of underpricing than their non-VC-backed 
matched counterparts. They found that the tech boom of 1999 to 2000 accounted for 
most of this difference. In order to better assess the impact of venture capital 
participation, the authors then used a two-stage regression technique to endogenize 
the receipt of venture financing without imposing linearity or function form 
restrictions. This was an attempt to remove the bias of the choice of venture 
126 IPOs were matched according to three-digit SIC code, closest net proceeds and listing dates within 2 
years of each other. 
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financing.127 Using this technique the authors found the selection bias-adjusted 
average IPO underpricing was 18 per cent with VC-backed firms being five to ten per 
cent higher than their non-VC-backed counterparts.128  Regressing the time until the 
next capital raising against VC reputation129
 
 and various control variables, the authors 
found VC reputation, underpricing, the interaction between VC age and underpricing, 
and the interaction between number of previous IPOs and underpricing, to be 
significant in determining the timing of the next round of capital raising. This implied 
strong support for the grandstanding hypothesis. 
Chiang and Lo (2007) used a microstructure approach to investigate the certification 
and adverse selection/grandstanding models for VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs 
in Taiwan. The study examined relative spreads, information asymmetry cost and 
price volatility in the period immediately after listing on the exchange. The empirical 
prediction was that if the certification effects outweighed the adverse 
selection/grandstanding effects then each of microstructure measures would be lower.  
If, however, the adverse selection/grandstanding effects outweighed the certification 
effects then each of those measures would be higher. The study used a matched 
sample of 34 VC-backed and 34 non-VC-backed IPOs on the Taiwan stock exchange 
between April 1999 and March 2002.130
                                                 
127 In essence this technique sort to match the venture capital receiving firm with one that reflects what 
it would have been like had the founders not made the choice to use venture capital financing. 
 The variables were measured daily over a 
period commencing four days after listing and ending thirty days after listing. The 
authors found no differences in effective spreads between the two groups, the 
information asymmetry costs were smaller for VC-backed IPOs for days four through 
128 This result was significantly higher in the 1999-2000 period. 
129 VC reputation was proxied using the age of the VC firm and number of previous IPOs. 
130 As with previous studies the matching was done by industry, market size and IPO timing. 
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six (but not significantly) and volatility was larger for VC-backed IPOs (again not 
significantly). Further cross-section regressions yield little further evidence to support 
either model. 
 
Wong and Wong (2008) examined the roles of venture capitalists in the IPO process in 
the emerging venture capital market of Hong Kong. They examined three theoretical 
models; (i) the dynamic strategies model131, (ii) the certification model, and (iii) the 
adverse selection/grandstanding model. The study used a sample of 67 VC-backed 
IPOs132 and 291 non-VC-backed IPOs on the Hong Kong market from 1999 to 2003. 
The authors examined IPO valuation, post-IPO operational performance and post-IPO 
market performance. The study found evidence of significantly larger underpricing for 
VC-backed IPOs than non-VC-backed IPOs. Regressing underpricing against a VC 
dummy and various control variables133
 
 found VC participation significant. It was 
also found that VC-backed IPOs exhibited lower operational performance, using 
various measures, then non-VC-backed firms in the two years after the IPO although 
there were not significant differences between the market performances of the two 
groups. Thus the author’s concluded there was some support for the grandstanding 
model. 
Limited academic research has been carried out on venture capitalist activities in the 
Australian market. There has been some work on the economic importance of venture 
                                                 
131 The authors suggest this model postulates that a firm with good prospects would underprice more in 
the IPO in order to create a favourable market for future equity offerings. Thus they argue VC-backed 
firms (if the VCs can add value) should be more underpriced than non-VC-backed firms. The authors 
do not explain why the VCs, who presumably sit on the board and plan on exiting the firm at some 
point, would support this strategy. 
132 Venture capitalists were identified using the Journal of Asian Venture Capital. 
133 Control variables were; age, log of proceeds, log of market capitalisation, log of assets, log of sales 
and industry.  
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capital and the role of government policy in encouraging its continued development 
(Wan 1989, 1991; Ryan 1990). Wan (1991) also noted that, consistent with overseas 
evidence, Australian venture capitalists widely used hybrid securities and, unlike their 
overseas counterparts, there was an increasing trend by venture capitalists to look to 
some form of dividend or interest payment rather than relying solely on the capital 
gain on exit. However, these early papers did little to address the relationship between 
the activities of venture capitalists and the success of their portfolio companies. 
 
Cumming et al. (2005) examined the impact on venture capital fundraising of various 
value added activities and found that significantly more capital is allocated to venture 
capitalists that provide financial and strategic/management expertise to their portfolio 
companies than those venture capitalists that provide only marketing/administrative 
expertise. Alavi et al. (2008) found that IPOs that contain a large block of non-
managerial investors (such as VCs) tend to offer more shares to the public than those 
dominated by owner/managers. They suggest this is because they are more concerned 
about exiting than retaining control and their presence tends to increase issue size and 
costs. Suchard (2009) examined the participation of venture capitalists in the boards 
of their investment companies and found that whilst they tend to hold a lower number 
(percentage) of board seats than their US counterparts, their portfolio companies do 
exhibit a higher number (percentage) of independent directors, particularly those with 
relevant industry experience. These results are consistent with the view that venture 
capitalists add value to their portfolio companies through their involvement. This 
implies support for the certification hypothesis.  
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da Silva Rosa et al. (2003) examined IPO underpricing, and long-run performance for 
a period of 24 months after the IPO. They used a sample of 38 VC-backed IPOs134
 
 
and 295 non-VC-backed IPOs on the Australian Securities Exchange between 1991 
and 1999. They found that the VC-backed companies exhibited higher underpricing 
than non-VC-backed companies although the differences were insignificant. 
Likewise, they found that VC-backed companies exhibited a slightly lower long-run 
performance than non-VC backed companies but again the differences were 
insignificant. Thus, the authors were unable to find support for neither the 
certification hypothesis nor the grandstanding hypothesis. 
2.5.3 Summary 
 
The unique nature of venture capital investment process holds important implications 
for how equity market participants perceive the involvement of a venture capitalist in 
the initial public offering process. Their role in screening potential new investments, 
conducting detailed due diligence, staging capital rounds, actively monitoring their 
investee companies, and bringing their specialised skills to their portfolio suggests a 
positive effect that has led to the development of the certification model. However, 
the existence of information asymmetry and structure of VC fund raising activities has 
also led to the development of an adverse selection/grandstanding model. 
 
Existing empirical literature has yielded mixed results with evidence of support for 
both of these models. This literature is summarised in Table 2.5. Furthermore, much 
of the existing literature is focused on US markets, where venture capital investments 
                                                 
134 Venture capitalists were identified using IPO prospectuses and the membership directory of the 
Australian Venture Capital Association (AVCAL). 
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have enjoyed a long history and the VC process is well developed. Very limited and 
inconclusive research has been carried on less developed venture capital markets such 
as Australia. The last chapter of this dissertation will address this shortfall by 
comprehensively examining both of these models in light of the Australian 
experience. 
125 
 
 Table 2-5 
Major Empirical Literature on the Role of Venture Capitalists in the IPO Process  
This table provides a summary of the empirical literature examining the role of venture capitalists (VC) in the IPO process. The table provides details of the 
market, study VC (and non-VC) sample size and period, performance intervals examined (IPO performance, post-IPO operating performance, and post-IPO 
market performance) where ‘X’ indicates that interval was examined, and the findings for the two models (Certification/Monitoring and/or 
Grandstanding/Adverse Selection) where ‘Y‘ indicates support for the model and ‘N’ indicates no conclusive finding.  
 
 Market Sample Performance Interval Model Support 
  VC (non-VC) Size Period IPO Post-IPO 
Operating 
Post-IPO 
Market 
Certification/ 
Monitoring 
Grandstanding/ 
Adverse Selection 
Barry et al. (1990) US 453 (1,123) IPOs 1978-1987 X   Y  
Megginson and Weiss (1991) US 320 (320) IPOs 1983-1987 X   Y  
Jain and Kini (1995) US 136 (136) IPOs 1976-1988  X  Y  
Lin (1996) US 497 (2,137) IPOs 1979-1990 X   Y  
Gompers (1996) US 433 (-)IPOs 1978-1987 ǂ  X    Y 
Brav and Gompers (1997) US 934 (3,407) IPOs 1975-1992   X Y  
Lin and Smith (1998) US 497 (2,136) IPOs 1979-1990 X   N N 
Hamao et al. (2000) Japan 210 (246) IPOs 1989-1995 X  X Y  
Francis and Hasan (2001) US 415 (428) IPOs 1990-1993 X   Y  
Barnes and McCarthy (2002) UK 85 (-)IPOs 1992-1999 X   N N 
Franzke (2003) Germany 79 (160) IPOs 1997-2002 X   N N 
Wang et al. (2003) Singapore 82 (82) IPOs 1987-2001 X X X Y Y 
De Silva Rosa et al. (2003) Australia 38 (295) IPOs 1991-1999 X  X N N 
Lee and Wahal (2004) US 2,208 (2,208) IPOs 1980-2000 X    Y 
Chiang and Lo (2007) Taiwan 34 (34) IPOs 1999-2002   X N N 
Wong and Wong (2008) Hong Kong 67 (291) IPOs 1999-2003 X X X  Y 
ǂplus a second sample of all IPOs for 62 VC firms between August 1983 and July 1993. 
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2.6 Hypotheses Development 
 
This section considers the literature reviewed in sections 2.2 to 2.5 to develop several 
testable hypotheses that will be analysed in the ensuring chapters. 
 
2.6.1 Stock Returns around Corporate Earnings Announcements 
 
The economic link between corporate earnings releases and security prices is well 
established in existing accounting and finance literature. Investors, upon the release of 
a corporate earnings statement, will revise upwards (downwards) their perception of 
the intrinsic value of the firm’s securities and, where current market price deviates 
from that perceived value, purchase (sell) securities until a new equilibrium level is 
reached. The first set of research questions seek to provide greater insight into the 
intraday speed of the price response to corporate earnings announcements. 
 
Market efficiency (Fama 1965, 1970; Jenson 1978), rational expectations equilibrium 
(Radner 1968, 1972), and strategic trader behaviour models (Kyle 2985; Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992) posit a rapid price adjustment in the marketplace to the 
information contained in corporate earnings announcements. Such a rapid reaction 
would preclude investors from profiting by trading on any new information contained 
within the announcement.  Dealer information and inventory models, however, 
suggest that factors such as the degree of information asymmetry (Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1981; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Easley and O’Hara 1987; Blume et al. 
1994) and market marker inventory levels (Stoll 1978; Amihud and Mendelson 1980; 
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Copeland and Galai 1983; Ho and Stoll 1983) would also influence the speed with 
which prices incorporate the content of any new information release. 
 
Existing empirical literature (Patell and Wolfson 1984; Lee 1992; Francis et al. 1992; 
Greene and Watts 1996) provides some evidence of different response speeds based 
on the timing of the information release (whether the announcement was released 
during normal trading hours or outside of normal trading hours).  Furthermore, 
Greene and Watts (1996) demonstrated that the speed of response appeared to be 
contingent upon the type of trading system used by the exchange.135
 
 Thus, the first 
hypothesis to be examined in chapter three of the dissertation represents a test of the 
applicability of previous findings in a market which operates an open electronic 
central limit order book (CLOB) with automatic trading halts for market sensitive 
announcements made during normal trading hours. 
Hypothesis3,1
 
: There is a difference between the speed of price adjustment for 
corporate earnings announcements made during normal trading hours and those made 
outside of normal trading hours.   
The literature in section 2.3.2 reviewed the empirical studies on strategic timing of 
corporate earnings announcements by firm managers in order to minimise the adverse 
effects of negative information releases. The evidence was mixed. Some research 
suggested managers were engaging in such behaviour (Patell and Wolfson 1982; 
Damadaran 1989; Bagnoli et al. 2005; DellaVigna and Pollet 2009; Kothari et al. 
2009) whereas others found little evidence the strategic timing of corporate earnings 
                                                 
135 Greene and Watts (1996) compared the NYSE and NASDAQ. 
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announcements (Doyle and Magilke 2009; Truong 2010). As with the previous 
hypothesis, none of the existing studies have examined this issue in a market in which 
trading halts are automatically implemented following the release of market sensitive 
information during normal trading hours. The second hypothesis tested in chapter 
three will examine whether such a difference in information release procedures has 
any impact upon strategic timing by firm managers. 
 
Hypothesis3,2
 
: Announcements made after the close of trading and/or on Fridays are 
more likely to contain negative earnings news than announcements made before the 
market opens or during normal trading hours on Monday through Thursday. 
Existing research has suggested that the relationship between corporate earnings 
announcements and abnormal stock returns is a function of the surprise contained 
within the announcement (Patell and Wolfson 1984; Woodruff and Senchack 1988; 
Lee 1992; Francis et al. 1992; Greene and Watts 1996; Lee and Park 2000; Kothari et 
al. 2009; Truong 2010). Scholars have examined many different techniques for 
establishing the surprise contained within corporate earnings announcements; the 
change from the previous reported earnings per share (Damodaran 1989); the sign of 
the difference between the reported earnings and the consensus analysts forecast 
(Patell and Wolfson 1984; Woodruff and Senchack 1988; Kotheri et al. 2009), the 
revision of analyst’s forecasts (Jennings and Starks 1985), and the magnitude of the 
difference between the reported earnings and the consensus analysts forecast (Lee 
1992; Francis et al. 1992; Greene and Watts 1996; Lee and Park 2000; Bagnoli et al. 
2005; DellaVigna and Pollet 2009; Doyle and Magilke 2009; Truong 2010). This is 
the focus of the third hypothesis examined in chapter three. 
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Hypothesis3,3
 
: The abnormal stock returns around corporate earnings announcements 
are positively related to the degree of earnings surprise contained within the 
announcement. 
Collectively these hypotheses represent an investigation into the efficiency of an open 
electronic central limit order book market in impounding the information contained 
within corporate earnings announcements. 
 
2.6.2 Algorithmic Trading around Corporate Earnings Announcements 
 
The relatively recently rise of algorithmic trading has meant that many aspects of this 
phenomenon are yet to be explored in academic literature. Previous scholarly 
literature has tended to address how the increase in algorithmic trading, and in 
particular high frequency trading, has impacted upon market quality (Brogaard 2010; 
Hasbrouck and Saar 2011; Hendershott et al. 2011; Hendershott and Riordan 2011), 
or how improvements in the market technology that facilitate algorithmic trading have 
impacted upon market quality (Hendershott and Moulton 2010; Riordan and 
Storkenmaier 2011). The question of how algorithmic traders behave around 
corporate earnings announcements has not been empirically tested in existing 
literature. This dissertation seeks to fill that gap. 
 
Fabozzi et al. (2011) suggested that algorithmic traders could exploit their time 
advantage by placing orders before the market reacts to the information content within 
the earnings announcement. They did not empirically test this proposition. This would 
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imply an increase in liquidity demanding trades by algorithmic traders following the 
release of information announcements. Hendershott and Riordan (2011) found 
evidence that algorithmic traders demand more liquidity to move prices towards the 
efficient price in response to information. On the other hand, Riordan and 
Storkenmaier (2011) found that reducing system latency resulted in liquidity suppliers 
being able to impound information into quotes before liquidity demanders can exploit 
their information advantage. Hendershott et al (2011) found algorithmic trading 
results in lower adverse selection costs and improves price discovery associated with 
trading whilst Brogaard (2010) found that high frequency traders supply more 
liquidity rather than demand more liquidity around information releases. These results 
were consistent with the Riordan and Storkenmaier findings. Thus, there are 
arguments to explain algorithmic traders increasing both the amount of liquidity they 
demand and the amount of liquidity they supply following the release of corporate 
earnings announcements. The implication of both of these arguments is that there 
should be an increase in the amount of algorithmic trading activity immediately after 
the release of the information announcement. The first hypothesis tests this 
proposition. 
 
Hypothesis4,1
  
: Algorithmic traders utilise their speed advantage over other market 
participants and therefore there is an increase in the amount of algorithmic trading 
activity immediately after the release of corporate earnings announcements. 
There is some evidence in the previous research that algorithmic traders are ‘better 
informed’ than other market participants.  Hendershott and Riordan (2011) found 
evidence that algorithmic trader’s liquidity demanding trades impound significantly 
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more information than corresponding orders by human traders. They suggested this 
implied algorithmic traders have more private information than human traders. 
Brogaard (2010) found evidence that high frequency traders have more private 
information than other market participants. Previous literature (Holden and 
Subrahmanyam 1992; Lee et al. 1993; Foster and Viswanathan 1996; Krinsky and 
Lee 1996; Barclay et al. 2003; Chae 2005; Cho 2007; Chordia et al. 2008) found 
evidence that informed traders would commence their trading activities in the pre-
announcement period to utilise their information advantage. If algorithmic traders 
(collectively) have more private information than other market participants this would 
imply an increase in algorithmic trading activity prior to the release of the earnings 
announcement. The second hypothesis tests this proposition. 
 
Hypothesis4,2
 
: Algorithmic traders are informed investors and therefore their trading 
activity will increase in the pre-announcement period as they act upon their 
informational advantage before returning to normal levels in the post-announcement 
period.  
Algorithmic traders consist of a broad group of market participants with a wide 
ranging set of goals. Those traders using agency algorithms are primarily interested in 
minimising the adverse market impact of large trades. Traders making use of 
proprietary algorithms, on the other hand, seek to profit from changes in data 
information and events. Previous research (Chordia et al. 2001; Chae 2005; Fabiano 
2008) indicates that discretionary liquidity traders (who do not possess private 
information) will postpone trading around earnings announcements until the 
information asymmetry is resolved. Brogaard (2010) found evidence that high 
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frequency traders avoid trading with informed investors. Therefore, if the proportion 
of algorithmic traders without private information exceeds those with that information 
then the aggregate level of algorithmic trading would decline in the period 
immediately prior to the release of the information as the traders withdraw from the 
market until the information asymmetry is resolved. The third hypothesis on 
algorithmic trading tests this argument. 
 
Hypothesis4,3
 
: Algorithmic traders are discretionary liquidity (uninformed) investors 
and therefore their trading activity will decrease prior to the announcement and 
remain below normal levels until the information asymmetry is resolved. 
Research on the impact of reduced latency in electronic markets indicates that 
increased speed results in higher levels of algorithmic trading. Hendershott et al. 
(2011) found that the introduction on Autoquote on the NYSE resulted in an increase 
in message traffic of around 2 messages per minute. Hendershott and Moulton (2010) 
and Riordan and Storkenmaier (2011) also found similar results for other 
improvements in market trading technology. The fourth hypothesis in this section 
tests whether the introduction of co-location by the Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) has had an impact upon the patterns of algorithmic trading observed around 
corporate earnings announcements. 
 
Hypothesis4,4
 
: The introduction of co-location has caused changes in the observed 
trading patterns of algorithmic traders around corporate earnings announcements. 
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Collectively these hypotheses represent an examination of the activities of algorithmic 
traders around corporate earnings announcements. This is an area which had not 
previously been empirically investigated. 
 
2.6.3 Venture Capitalists and the Initial Public Offering Process 
 
The existing scholarly research on the role of venture capitalists in the initial public 
offering process suggests two main models; the certification/monitoring model and 
the adverse selection/grandstanding model. This research has generally focused on the 
US venture capital market with very limited research on less well developed markets. 
The fifth chapter of this dissertation will empirically examine these models in the 
context of the Australian venture capital market, which is structurally different from 
its US counterpart.136
 
 
The certification/monitoring model posits that the participation of a venture capitalist 
in the IPO process will certify the value of the offering to third party investors 
(Megginson and Weiss 1991). This is a function of the venture capital investment 
process whereby the venture capitalist; selects potential new investments out of a 
range of ventures seeking scarce capital (Wells 1974; Tyebjee and Bruno 1984), 
rigorously investigates their potential future growth prospects through a stringent due 
diligence process (Wells 1974; Poindexter 1976; Tyebjee and Bruno 1981; Chan 
1983; Arnold and Moizer 1984; MacMillan et al. 1985; Knight 1986; Dixon 1991; 
Pike et al. 1993; Muzyka et al. 1996, Wright and Robbie 1996a), generally takes large 
equity stakes and board seats on those firms they provide capital to (Rosenstein 1988; 
                                                 
136 de Silva Rosa et al. (2003) previously found no support for either model in Australia. 
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MacMillan et al. 1988; Sahlman 1990; Rosenstein et al. 1993), stages financing 
contingent upon achieving prespecified goals (Cooper and Carleton 1979; Chan 1983; 
Amit et al. 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer 1994; Gifford 1997; Bergemann and Hege 
1998; Neher 1999; Elitzur and Gavious 2003; Gompers 1995), activity participates in 
assisting their portfolio companies to develop their full potential (Gorman and 
Sahlman 1986; Sahlman 1990; Lan 1991; Elango et al. 1995; Lerner 1995), before 
finally bringing them to market when they have reached a sufficient level of 
development. Previous research by Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), 
Jain and Kini (1995), Lin (1996), Brav and Gompers (1997), Hamoa et al. (2000), 
Francis and Hasan (2001), and Wang et al. (2003) found evidence in support of this 
model. The first hypothesis tests whether the predictions of the certification model 
hold in the Australian market. 
 
Hypothesis5,1
  
: Venture capital-backed IPOs exhibit better IPO performance and 
better post-IPO operating and market performance (although with the difference 
declining over time) than non venture capital-backed IPOs. 
The adverse selection/grandstanding model posits that the participation of a venture 
capitalist in the IPO process provides a negative signal about the value of the offering 
to third party investors (Amit et al. 1990; Gompers 1996). Amit el at (1990) argued 
the 'promising' new ventures would be self-funded since more-capable entrepreneurs 
would not need to share the risk and therefore would not seek external financing. 
'Average' new ventures on the other hand, would require venture capital financing 
since less-capable entrepreneurs would seek to share their risk. This gives rise to an 
adverse selection problem for the venture capitalist in finding promising new ventures 
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to invest in. Furthermore, Wang et al (2003) argued that this problem would be more 
severe the earlier the stage of the venture capitalists investment. The grandstanding 
hypothesis (Gompers 1996) predicts that younger venture capital firms have a strong 
incentive to bring companies to market prematurely in order to establish a track 
record of IPO success. Venture capital funds are usually structured as limited 
partnerships and the funds have a typical life of ten years (Sahlman 1990). This means 
that the venture capitalist must regularly attempt to raise new capital in order to 
establish new funds (Sahlman 1990; Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Wright and Robbie 
1998; Gompers and Lerner 2000a, 2000b; Jeng and Wells 2000). This is likely to be 
more easily accomplished if the venture capitalist has a proven track record of 
success. Also, given that a portion of the venture capitalists remuneration, the 
management fee, is charged as a percentage of this committed capital, the venture 
capitalist has a strong personal incentive to devote considerable time and energy 
towards ensuring the success of the capital raising process (Gompers 1996, 1998). 
Together these structural and remuneration factors could give rise to grandstanding by 
younger venture capital firms. Previous research by Gompers (1996), Wang et al. 
(2003) and Lee and Wahal (2004) found support for this model. The second 
hypothesis tests whether the predictions of the adverse selection/grandstanding model 
hold in the Australian market. 
 
Hypothesis5,2
 
: Venture capital-backed IPOs exhibit worse IPO performance and 
worse post-IPO operating and market performance (with an increasing difference over 
time) than non venture capital-backed IPOs. 
These hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Older venture capital firms 
are likely to be more experienced in identifying promising ventures and more skilled 
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at successfully bringing them to market, whereas younger venture capitalists might be 
more likely to suffer the consequences of adverse selection or to need to bring 
companies to market prematurely in order to support future capital raising. The third 
hypothesis tests whether there are differences, based upon the experience of their VC-
backers, between the performance of VC-backed IPOs in the Australian market.  
 
Hypothesis5,3
 
: IPOs backed by more experienced venture capital firms exhibited 
better IPO performance and better post-IPO operating and market performance than 
those backed by less experienced venture capital firms. 
The findings of these tests enhance our understanding of the role played by venture 
capitalist backing of IPOs in a market where venture capital has a shorter history than 
is typically the case for most previous research in this field. 
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Chapter 3: Stock Returns around Corporate Earnings 
Announcements 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The first essay of this thesis empirically examines the intraday speed of stock price 
response to corporate earnings announcements. Using data from the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) this chapter investigates this issue in a market which 
operates an open electronic central limit order book (CLOB), with exchange initiated 
trading halts for market sensitive announcements made during normal trading hours. 
Theoretical models of market efficiency prescribe a rapid adjustment of prices to a 
new equilibrium level following the release of corporate earnings announcements. 
Market microstructure models though suggest that this reaction speed may be 
tempered by the degree of information asymmetry between market participants and 
dealer inventory levels. Existing empirical literature on the intraday adjustment to 
earnings announcements provides evidence of differences in speed of price response 
based upon the timing of the announcement (Patell and Wolfson 1984; Lee 1992; 
Francis et al. 1992; Greene and Watts 1996) and the type of trading systems used by 
the market (Francis et al. 1992). The inconclusive nature of this evidence requires 
further investigation. 
 
The findings of this chapter are presented in accordance with the documented 
hypotheses derived in Section 2.6.1. Specifically the chapter investigates three main 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H3,1) predicts that there will be a difference between 
the speed of price adjustment for corporate earnings announcements made during 
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normal trading hours and those made outside of normal trading hours. The second 
hypothesis (H3,2) predicts that announcements made after the close of trading and/or 
on Fridays are more likely to contain negative earnings surprises than announcements 
made before the market opens or during normal trading hours on Monday through 
Thursday. The third hypothesis (H3,3) predicts that the abnormal stock returns around 
corporate earnings announcements are positively related to the degree of earnings 
surprise contained within the announcement. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the 
institutional detail of information disclosure procedures on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX). Section 3.3 describes the dataset and provides summary statistics of 
the sampled data. Section 3.4 outlines the research design. Section 3.5 presents the 
empirical results and a summary of the primary findings. Finally section 3.6 provides 
a concluding summary of the chapter. 
 
3.2 Institutional Detail 
 
The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) operates an open electronic central limit 
order book trading system known as the Integrated Trading System (ITS).137 As of the 
financial year ended 30 June 2011, the ASX had 2,247 listed entities with a combined 
market capitalisation of AUD 1.35 trillion. An average of 570,000 daily trades took 
place on the market with an average daily trade value of AUD 5.3 billion.138
                                                 
137 This system has recently (November 2010) been replaced by ASX Trade. The ITS system was in 
operation from October 2006 until November 2010. 
 Trades 
are executed on a price then time priority and unexecuted limit orders are visible to all 
138 Figures sourced from ASX Ltd 2011 Annual Report.  
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market participants. Between 10:00 and 10:10 EST/EDT stocks are opened using a 
single price auction procedure and closing occurs randomly between 16:10 and 16:12 
EST/EDT using a similar single price auction procedure.139
 
 Normal trading occurs 
between 10:10 and 16:00 EST/EDT.  
Under Chapter 3 of the ASX Listing Rules, companies listed on the ASX are required 
to disclose to the exchange, prior to its release to any other source, any information 
that may influence the decision by an investor to buy or sell the company’s securities. 
Specifically, ASX Listing Rule 3.1 states:  
 
Once an entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable 
person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the entity’s 
securities, the entity must immediately tell the ASX that information. 
 
Listing Rule 3.1A outlines the exceptions to this rule. The entity is not required to 
disclose the information where all of the following criteria are satisfied; (i) a 
reasonable person would not expect to be disclosed, (ii) the information is 
confidential and the ASX has not formed the view that the information has ceased to 
be confidential, and (iii) one or more of the following applies [it would be a breach of 
law to disclose the information, the information concerns an incomplete proposal or 
negotiation, the information comprises matters of supposition or is insufficiently 
definite to warrant disclosure, the information is generated for internal management 
purposes of the entity, and/or the information is a trade secret]. 
 
 
                                                 
139 The same algorithm is used to calculated opening and closing prices on the ASX.  
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Figure 3.1 
Total Market Announcements Released on ASX  
This figure depicts the total number of company announcements released on the ASX over the 
financial years 2005/2006 to 2008/2009. Figures are taken from the ASX Annual Reports and 
ASX Markets Supervision Quarterly Activity Reports. 
 
 
 
Where the information is not subject to one of these exceptions, the company is 
required to immediately submit the announcement in electronic form to the ASX. 
Under Chapter 16 of the ASX Market Rules, if the exchange receives information 
which, in the opinion of the designated ASX officer, is market sensitive a trading halt 
may be imposed. For announcements made during normal trading hours the exchange 
enforced trading halt is typically ten minutes in duration.140 During that time the 
company’s securities are placed in the pre-open phase, which means that limit orders 
can be entered, deleted and modified but no trades occur.141
                                                 
140 Trading halts for takeover announcements extend for up to 1 hour. 
 The information is then 
released by ASX ComNews in two stages. The first stage contains the headline for 
display on trading terminals whilst the second stage contains the full document in 
141 Market orders cannot be placed during the pre-opening phase. 
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PDF format. This service is available directly through the ASX website or through 
information vendors such as Bloomberg, IRESS and Reuters. Trading halts end at a 
time announced by the ASX. At the end of the halt interval the stock is opened using 
the same single price call auction algorithm used for the opening and closing call 
markets. The stock then resumes normal trading.  Figure 3.1 provides an illustration 
of the total number of information announcements released through the ASX each 
financial year over the period 2005/2006 to 2008/2009. 
 
3.3 Data 
 
The initial sample used in the study consisted of the final earnings announcements for 
the 100 stocks in the S&P/ASX 100 index for the financial years 2005/2006 through 
to 2008/2009. The S&P/ASX 100 index comprises 100 of the largest Australian 
companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), weighted in the index 
according to each company’s market capitalisation. The date and time of the annual 
earnings announcement was taken from the SIRCA Australian Company 
Announcements (ACA) database containing details of the earnings announcement for 
each of the respective companies. These statements are issued by the ASX Company 
Announcements Office (CAO) through the Integrated Trading System (ITS) and 
provide subscribers with all company announcements lodged with the ASX. The 
announcements are date and time stamped. Since ASX listing rules require listed 
companies to release any information that might have a material effect upon the 
company’s stock price to the exchange prior to the release to the general market, these 
announcement times should represent the first opportunity an investor would have to 
react to the public release of the earnings information. To avoid any possible 
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problems caused by inaccuracies in the recorded time of the earnings announcement 
the ACA database times are cross referenced with those reported by the Thompson 
Reuters I/B/E/S database. Any discrepancies between these two times are further 
investigated to pinpoint the exact announcement time. The inability to resolve the 
conflict between these two sources for 118 announcements in the initial sample 
resulted in their elimination from the study. This left a study sample of 282 earnings 
announcements during the observation period. 
 
 
Table 3.1 
Announcement Sample Composition 
 
This table provides summary statistics of the announcement sample. Panel A provides details 
of the number of announcements in the sample released during various intervals throughout the 
trading day. “Before Trading” is defined as announcements occurring between 7:00 and the 
market open at 10:10 EST/EDT. “After Trading” is defined as announcements occurring 
between 16:12 and 18:00 EST/EDT. No announcements occurred after this time. Panel B 
provides details of the number of announcements in the sample released on each calendar day. 
 
Panel A: Sample announcement by clock time 
Time of Release (EST/EDT) Number of Earnings Announcements 
Before Trading 213 
10:00-11:00 12 
11:00-12:00 14 
12:00-13:00 15 
13:00-14:00 2 
14:00-15:00 4 
15:00-16:12 7 
After Trading 15 
Total during normal trading hours 54 
Total outside of normal trading hours 228 
 
 
Panel B: Sample announcements by calendar day 
Day of Release Number of Earnings Announcements 
Monday 33 
Tuesday 48 
Wednesday 87 
Thursday 79 
Friday 35 
Total 282 
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Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of the announcement sample. The final sample of 282 
announcements was partitioned into two subsamples based upon announcement time. 
Those announcements that were made during trading hours on the ASX 
(approximately 10:10 to 16:12pm142
 
 EST/EDT) are classified as part of the ‘trading 
hours’ subsample. Those announcements that were made either before the market 
opened (prior to 10:00 EST/EDT) or after the close of trading (after 16:12 EST/EDT) 
are classified as part of the ‘overnight’ subsample. 
Two sets of data were collected for the companies in the sample. Both datasets were 
constructed from the SIRCA Australian Equities Tick History database. The first 
dataset consisted of executed trade price data recorded to the nearest hundredth of a 
second. To minimise the possible impact of bid-ask bounce a second dataset was 
constructed using the midpoint of the bid-ask spread at each examination interval.143
 
 
This second set of data provided a comparative set of information with which to 
enhance the accuracy of conclusions drawn. Due to the fact the data comes directly 
from an automated trading system this provided information of uncommon accuracy 
and reliability. 
The data for the test sample was collected for a three-day event period window 
consisting of the trading day prior to the announcement, the announcement day and 
the trading day after the announcement. The control sample data was collected for the 
                                                 
142 The ASX uses a random opening procedure to open trading in the morning. Under the opening 
procedure stocks are opened in staged sets at different times based upon the first letter of their ASX 
code. This also fluctuates by up to 15 seconds each day. This is designed to minimise the impact of 
front running by traders. Hence the 10am start is not necessarily the opening time for any individual 
stock. Likewise the market ceases trading at a random time around 16:10-16:12 each trading day. 
143 Bid-ask bounce occurs in trade price information as the result of one trade taking place at the bid 
price and then a successive trade taking place at the ask price. This could create the illusion of an 
information-induced return over an interval when the equilibrium price remains unchanged and could 
lead to false conclusions. 
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corresponding weekdays for a period of ten weeks prior to, and ten weeks subsequent 
to, the event day. This meant that, for example, if the announcement was on a 
Tuesday then the control period was calculated using values on Monday (the 
corresponding pre-announcement weekday), Tuesday (the corresponding 
announcement weekday) and Wednesday (the corresponding post-announcement 
weekday) for ten weeks before and ten weeks after the announcement date. This was a 
much longer control period than previous intraday papers used.144
 
 
For the final parts of the study consensus earnings forecasts of up to 29 brokers in the 
period immediately prior to the earnings announcement was collected.145 The most 
recent consensus forecast prior to the release of the announcement reported on the 
Thompson Reuters I/B/E/S database was recorded for each announcement. The 
equally weighted aggregate of these forecasts was used as a proxy for the market 
expectations of the firm’s EPS and hence the difference between this aggregate 
forecast and the actual earnings announcement is taken to reflect the unanticipated 
component (earnings surprise) of the earnings announcement. This is consistent with 
the method used by previous empirical research to proxy earnings surprise.146
 
 
 
3.4 Research Design 
 
The four data sets (overnight trade prices, trading hours’ trade prices, overnight 
midpoint bid-ask spread and trading hours’ midpoint bid-ask spread) were then used 
                                                 
144 For example Patell and Wolfson (1984) used five randomly selected non-event days for the control 
period. 
145 The precise number of analyst forecasts varies from stock to stock and year to year. 
146 See for example, Patell and Wolfson 1984; Woodruff and Senchack 1988; Lee 1992; Francis et al. 
1992; Greene and Watts 1996; Lee and Park 2000; Bagnoli et al 2005; DellaVigna and Pollet 2009; 
Doyle and Magilke 2009; Kothari et al. 2009; Truong 2010). 
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to calculate returns over a series of measurement intervals. Figure 3.2 illustrates the 
return intervals used for the two trading hours’ subsamples. Each half-hour interval on 
the pre-announcement day and the post-announcement day is treated as an observation 
period. Half-hour intervals were selected as they represent a suitable compromise 
between the problem nonsynchronous trading, that can affect very short measurement 
intervals, and the misspecification problem that can affect longer-term intervals. 
Furthermore Mucklow (1994), in an examination of the impact of market 
microstructure factors upon intraday event studies, found that provided the 
appropriate statistical measures were used the selection of the measurement interval 
did not ultimately impact upon the general applicability of the conclusions drawn. The 
time period from the end of the closing call market one day to the end of the opening 
call market following morning is treated as a single interval and labelled the 
‘overnight’ interval. This is done on the basis that no trading can occur over this 
period and hence the close to open return represents a potential reaction or re-
appraisal of information by the market over that period. 
 
Figure 3.2: Return Measurement Intervals for the Trading Hours Subsamples 
Where A is defined as the announcement time and A+10 is the end of the trading halt following the 
earnings announcement. 
  
The event day is treated as three distinct unequal length periods. The first 
measurement period on the event day is labelled the ‘pre’ measurement interval and 
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consists of the time from the first trade during normal trading of the day to the 
commencement of the trading halt. This interval can be thought of as measuring the 
impact of any private information that reaches the market prior to the official 
announcement being released by the ASX. The next measurement period on the event 
day is the ‘halt’ interval. This interval represents the time in which trading in the stock 
is suspended by the ASX to allow the market time to assess the impact of the 
information release and thus minimise the impact of any overreaction. Therefore this 
interval extends from the commencement of the trading halt (shortly before the time 
of the announcement) to the single price auction at the end of the pre-opening phase 
(the end of the trading halt). The third measurement period on the event day is 
labelled the ‘post’ interval. This interval is measured from the end of the trading halt 
through to the last trade during normal trading that day. This interval represents the 
period of adjustment that follows the announcement. Any delayed reaction to the 
earnings announcement (beyond the trading halt) will be captured during this interval. 
If an announcement occurs within the last ten minutes of normal trading there will be 
no ‘post’ announcement measurement interval. 
 
Each of these return intervals is measured relative to each announcement and hence 
the length of each of the event day intervals varies depending upon the time of the day 
in which the earnings announcement was made. The same procedure is used for the 
midpoint subsample to ensure consistency except that the midpoint of the bid-ask 
spread is used instead of the executed trade price at the beginning and end of each 
interval. 
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the calculation of the return intervals for the two overnight 
subsamples. It follows the same procedure outlined for the trading hours’ subsamples 
with half-hour intervals being calculated for the pre- and post-announcement days. 
The difference comes with the treatment of the event day, T=0. The event day is 
defined as the overnight period during which the announcement was made. For 
announcements made after the close the first opportunity the market has to react to the 
information contained within the announcement is the opening call market the next 
day. Likewise, for announcements made prior to the commencement of trading at 
10:00 investor’s first opportunity to respond is the opening call market that day.  
 
Figure 3.3: Return Measurement Intervals for the Overnight Subsamples 
 
The control period returns are calculated using the exact same procedure for the ten 
weeks prior and subsequent to the three-day event window, with the unequal event 
day measurement intervals for the control period being treated identically to the event 
day. This ensures that the noise effects of intraday data are appropriately controlled 
for in the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
148 
 
Returns over each interval are calculated using the logarithmic return metric equation 
3.1. 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑛 = 𝐼𝑛 �𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 �   (3.1) 
 
Where 
Ri,n  = the log return for stock i over the interval n (t-1 to t) 
Pi,t  = the price of stock i at time t (the end of the measurement interval) 
Di,t  = the dividend paid on stock i during time period t (if any) 
Pi,t-1  = the price of stock i at time t-1 (the beginning of the measurement interval) 
 
Muckow (1994) argued that logarithmic returns eliminate the bias induced in a return 
metric by the bid-ask spread and price discreteness. As this is a serious concern when 
using intraday data, logarithmic returns are used in this study. This raw return model 
is used as the calculation for each time interval rather than mean-adjusted or market 
adjusted models because Mucklow (1994) finds that for periods of less than sixty 
minutes the use of unadjusted (raw) returns resulted in well specified statistical tests. 
Likewise, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) found in event study research that even the 
simplest model, the constant mean return model, often yields similar results to other 
more sophisticated models. MacKinlay (1997) states that this lack of sensitivity to the 
model can be attributed to the fact that the variance of abnormal return is frequently 
not reduced much by choosing a more sophisticated model. 
 
Another problem frequently encountered in intraday event study research is 
noncontinuous trading. This occurs where the stock does not trade in a given 
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measurement interval. Trades at discrete time intervals are not a problem if the 
equilibrium prices do not change between trades. In this case the price at any point in 
time is simply the last trade price. If however the equilibrium prices do change during 
the period in which no trading occurs then there are price adjustment delays. For 
example if stock i trades a price Pit in time period t and then does not trade again until 
period t+4 then the return for interval t to t+1 is not clearly evident. This problem is 
overcome by using a quasiaccrual method of measuring the interval returns. This 
method allocates the return evenly over the period’s t+1 to t+n. Using such an 
approach implicitly assumes the equilibrium prices change uniformly over the 
nontrading period. This is the technique that has been employed in this study. 
 
To determine the speed of the market’s reaction to the information contained within 
the earnings announcement two statistical tests are used to determine if the returns 
calculated for each of the event window period are significantly different from those 
of the corresponding control period. Significant differences imply a period of price 
adjustment in that measurement interval compared to ‘normal’ conditions for that 
security. Paired sample T-test scores and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Z scores are used 
to detect significant differences between the event window returns and control period 
returns, assuming normal and non-normal distributions respectively. Examining the 
number of intervals relative to the time of the announcement that price adjustments 
are taking place enables a test of the hypothesis (H3,1) that there are differences in the 
speed of reaction between the two subsamples. 
 
To examine whether managers strategically time the release of earnings reports the 
announcements were partitioned into two subsamples; (i) those announcements which 
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are released after the close of trading and/or on Friday, and (ii) those announcements 
that are released prior to or during trading on Monday through Thursday. The 
earnings surprise was then determined for each subsample. The earnings surprise was 
calculated using equation 3.2. 
 
𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡   (3.2) 
 
Where 
ESi,t  = Earnings surprise for stock i in year t 
EPSi,t  = Actual earnings per share for stock i in year t 
AFi,t  = Consensus analyst forecast of the expected EPS for stock i in year t 
 
Those measurement intervals that were found to be significantly different from their 
corresponding control period were regressed against the size of the earnings surprise 
in order to determine if that difference represented a reaction to the information 
content or simply a response to other market factors. The regression model is given in 
equation 3.3. 
 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀  (3.3) 
 
Where 
Ri,t = the return calculated for stock i in the significant event time interval t 
α = the constant component of the return 
β = the coefficient of the earnings surprise variable 
ESi,t = the earnings surprise variable for stock i in year t 
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The t-statistics and corresponding p-values for the coefficient of the earnings surprise 
variable are reported for the regressions. This tests the third hypothesis that predicts 
that the abnormal stock returns around corporate earnings announcements are 
positively related to the degree of earnings surprise contained within the 
announcement. 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
 
The average percentage returns for the overnight trade interval subsample are shown 
in Table 3.2. As expected the ‘overnight’ interval return of approximately 0.302 per 
cent is shown to be highly significant using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test (at the 5 per cent confidence level) although the T-test for the same 
interval is not statistically significant. This reflects the first opportunity the market has 
to trade upon the earnings announcement after it is released. This result is consistent 
with previous intraday research which suggests the market reacts quickly to the 
release of new information in the overnight period (Patell and Wolfson 1984; Lee 
1992; Greene and Watts 1996; Lee and Park 2000).  
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Table 3.2 
Trade Returns for the Overnight Subsample 
This table details the intraday trade interval returns accompanying annual earnings announcements. a Measurement intervals are defined as 30 minute intervals relative to the announcement day 
t=0. The overnight interval is the period from the close of trading at 16:12 until the open the following morning at approximately 10:10. All of the announcements within this subsample fall 
within that period. bSignificance levels: * significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
    Announcement Subsample   Control Subsample 
 __________________________ __________________________ 
Measurement Intervala Number of  Average  Number of Average  Paired-samples T-scoreb Mann-Whitney 
 Observations Return (%) Observations Return (%)  Z-scoreb 
T-1 10:00-10:30 228  0.0388 4560  -0.0069  0.363 -1.006 
 10:30-11:00 228  -0.0164 4560  -0.0113 -2.519** -0.247 
 11:00-11:30 228  0.0662 4560  0.0000  1.346 -0.044 
 11:30-12:00 228  0.0308 4560  0.2154 -0.323 -0.440 
 12:00-12:30 228  -0.0392 4560  -0.0151 -0.716 -1.048 
 12:30-1:00 228  -0.0616 4560  -0.0023 -1.289 -0.125 
 1:00-1:30 228  -0.0108 4560  -0.0187 -0.179 -0.197  
 1:30-2:00 228  -0.0013 4560  0.0051 -0.363 -0.349  
 2:00-2:30 228  -0.0236 4560  0.0160  0.020 -0.826 
 2:30-3:00 228  0.0063 4560  -0.0387  0.214 -0.668 
 3:00-3:30 228  0.0085 4560  0.0073 -0.222 -1.382 
 3:30-4:00 228  0.0162 4560  0.0243  0.350 -0.106 
T=0 Overnight  228  0.3023 4560  0.0945  1.042 -1.957** 
T+1 10:00-10:30 228  -0.0189 4560  0.0175 -0.360 -0.091 
 10:30-11:00 228  -0.0492 4560  -0.0107 -0.506 -0.020  
 11:00-11:30 228  -0.0252 4560  -0.0236 -0.024 -0.711 
 11:30-12:00 228  -0.0646 4560  -0.0120 -0.962 -0.694 
 12:00-12:30 228  0.0255 4560  -0.0084  0.674 -1.726 
 12:30-1:00 228  0.0314 4560  -0.0011  0.829 -0.455 
 1:00-1:30 228  -0.0638 4560  -0.0134 -1.506 -0.084 
 1:30-2:00 228  0.0270 4560  0.0092  0.535 -0.756 
 2:00-2:30 228  -0.0238 4560  -0.0100 -0.224 -0.024 
 2:30-3:00 228  -0.0107 4560  -0.0137  0.061 -0.056 
 3:00-3:30 228  0.0971 4560  0.0146 -1.599 -1.728 
 3:30-4:00 228 -0.0178 4560 0.0012 -0.249 -1.632  
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The ‘10:30-11:00’ interval on day T-1 is also found to be significant using the t-test 
(at the 5 per cent confidence level) but not under the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test. This result does not appear to be consistent with any likely 
implications of the overnight earnings announcement since there is little reason to 
believe that information leakage would occur during that specific time interval. No 
other measurement interval returns on the day prior to the announcement or the day 
following it are shown to be significantly different from those of the control period 
using either statistical test. 
  
Table 3.3 provides the average percentage returns for the trading hours’ interval 
subsample. The ‘halt’ interval return of approximately -0.154 per cent is shown to be 
significant at the 5 per cent confidence level using both the parametric and non-
parametric tests. This interval corresponds to the ‘overnight’ interval in the overnight 
subsample in that it reflects the first opportunity the market has to disseminate and 
trade upon new information. Other intervals to exhibit significance differences 
between the event window returns and the control period returns were the ‘2:30-3:00’ 
interval on day T-1 (at the 5 per cent confidence level for both tests), the ‘3:00-3:30’ 
interval on day T-1 (at the 5 per cent confidence level for the t-test and the 10 per cent 
confidence level for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric test), the ‘overnight 
(0 to +1)’ period following the announcement (at the 5 per cent confidence level for 
the t-test and the 10 per cent confidence level for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test), and the ’10:00-10:30’ interval on day T+1 (at the 5 per cent 
confidence level for both tests).  The ’11:00-11:30’ interval on day T+1 was also 
significant using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric test (at the 10 per cent 
confidence level) but not using the t-test.  
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Table 3.3 
Trade Returns for the Trading Hours’ Subsample 
This table details the intraday trade interval returns accompanying annual earnings announcements. a Measurement intervals are defined as 30 minute intervals relative to the announcement 
day t=0. The overnight interval is the period from the close of trading at 4pm until the open the following morning at approximately 10am. The ‘pre’ period is the interval 
from open to the announcement time. The ‘halt’ period is the interval from the announcement time until the first trade after the halt. The ‘post’ period is the interval from the 
first trade after the halt until the close. bSignificance levels: * significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 Announcement Subsample  Control Subsample 
 _________________________       __________________________ 
Measurement Intervala Number of  Average Number of Average Paired-samples T-scoreb Mann-Whitney 
 Observations Return (%) Observations Return (%)  Z-scoreb 
T-1 10:00-10:30 54  0.1255 1080  -0.0503  1.350 -1.050 
 10:30-11:00 54  -0.0452 1080  0.0271 -0.673 -0.754 
 11:00-11:30 54  -0.0391 1080  -0.0241  0.318 -0.458 
 11:30-12:00 54  0.0261 1080  -0.0041  0.415 -1.035 
 12:00-12:30 54  -0.0318 1080  -0.0024 -0.393 -0.044 
 12:30-1:00 54  -0.0020 1080  0.0161 -0.374 -0.178 
 1:00-1:30 54  -0.0230 1080  0.0069 -0.447 -0.961 
 1:30-2:00 54  -0.0094 1080  0.0239 -0.590 -0.015 
 2:00-2:30 54  0.0529 1080  -0.0361  1.281 -1.065 
 2:30-3:00 54  0.2149 1080  0.0396  2.354** -2.233** 
 3:00-3:30 54  -0.1792 1080  -0.0059 -2.305** -1.627*** 
 3:30-4:00 54  0.1102 1080  0.0577  1.429 -1.375 
T=0 Overnight (-1 to 0) 54  0.2787 1080  -0.0191  0.919 -0.665 
 Pre 54   -0.0991 1080  0.0076 -0.554 -0.074 
 Halt 54   -0.1540 1080  0.0270 -1.724**  -2.277** 
 Post 51   -0.5289 1020  -0.0532 -0.660 -0.838 
 Overnight (0 to +1) 54  0.7242 1080  0.1569  1.779** -1.848*** 
T+1 10:00-10:30 54   -0.3660 1080  -0.0166 -1.680** -2.011** 
 10:30-11:00 54   -0.1616 1080  0.0072 -1.069 -1.493 
 11:00-11:30 54   -0.1538 1080  0.0075 -1.234 -1.789*** 
 11:30-12:00 54  0.0198 1080  0.0334 -0.172 -0.177 
 12:00-12:30 54   -0.1557 1080  0.0013 -1.541 -0.932 
 12:30-1:00 54   -0.0038 1080  -0.0125  0.132 -0.562 
 1:00-1:30 54   -0.0579 1080  0.0245 -1.328 -1.212 
 1:30-2:00 54  0.0416 1080  -0.0126  0.855 -1.672 
 2:00-2:30 54   -0.0349 1080  -0.0273 -0.129 -0.207 
 2:30-3:00 54  0.2025 1080  -0.0016  1.251 -1.168 
 3:00-3:30 54   -0.1429 1080  -0.0034 -1.459 -1.050 
 3:30-4:00 54 0.0337 1080 -0.0382  0.639 -0.355 
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Patell and Wolfson (1984) found a similar result in their research for the periods after 
the announcement although they did not divide their sample upon the basis of whether 
the announcement occurred during or after trading. Francis et al. (1992) also found 
evidence of reactions to announcements made during normal trading hours extending 
into the overnight period on the announcement date. They argued that the overnight 
period is the first opportunity for news to be disseminated to those traders who are 
unable to execute intraday trading strategies and hence the ‘overnight’ (0 to +1) and 
‘10:00-10:30’ on day T+1 interval returns reflect their reactions to the information 
release. More recent work by Greene and Watts (1996) found that the opening price 
on the NYSE fully impounds the value of the information in the stock price for 
overnight announcements but for announcements made during trading the response is 
spread evenly over the several trades after the information release. 
 
As with the overnight subsample period, there is evidence of significant differences 
between the returns of the observation sample and the control sample prior to the 
release of the information. In this case though, these intervals are close to the end of 
trading (and therefore perhaps represent the activities of informed traders acting on 
information leakage). No other sample interval returns over the examination period 
show any significant difference from their corresponding control period returns. It is 
also interesting to note that the immediate ‘post’ announcement returns are not 
significantly different from the control period returns, which indicates that the 
immediate adjustment to the information content in the earnings announcement is 
taking place quickly during the halt period rather than spilling into the trades after the 
single call price is determined at the end of the trading halt. It should be noted that the 
number of observations in the sample and control period changes due to the fact that 
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three announcements were made shortly before the market closed and hence no ‘post’ 
interval is recorded for those announcements. 
 
These results appear to confirm the expectations of the first hypothesis. The evidence 
of significant differences between the returns in periods other than the immediate post 
announcement interval for announcements made during normal trading hours is 
different from the reaction pattern observed for announcements made outside of 
normal trading hours. This does not allow a rejection of the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference between the speed of price adjustment for corporate earnings 
announcements made during normal trading hours and those made outside of normal 
trading hours. To confirm the robustness of these results the midpoint of the bid-ask 
spread returns are also examined.  
 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 provide the average percentage returns for the overnight and 
trading hours’ subsample using the midpoint of the bid-ask spread rather than 
executed trade prices. The results for the overnight subsample presented in Table 3.4 
illustrate the same results as those for the executed trades’ subsample. The ‘overnight’ 
measurement interval return of 0.3884 per cent is shown to be significant at the 5 per 
cent level for both the parametric and non-parametric tests. Unlike the executed trade 
returns subsample, the ‘10:30-11:00’ interval on day T-1 is no longer significant. No 
other measurement interval returns are significantly different from their corresponding 
control period return, which is consistent with the notion that the market is able to 
impound the value of the new information for overnight announcements in the 
opening call market the following day.  
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Table 3.4 
Midpoint BAS Returns for the Overnight Subsample 
This table details the intraday midpoint of the bid-ask spread interval returns accompanying annual earnings announcements. a Measurement intervals are defined as 30 minute intervals relative 
to the announcement day t=0. The overnight interval is the period from the close of trading at 16:12 until the open the following morning at approximately 10:10. All of the announcements 
within this subsample fall within that period. bSignificance levels: * significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 Announcement Subsample Control Subsample 
 __________________________ __________________________ 
Measurement Intervala Number of  Average  Number of Average  Paired-samples T-scoreb Mann-Whitney 
 Observations Return (%) Observations Return (%)  Z-scoreb 
T-1 10:00-10:30 228  0.0245 4560  -0.0147  0.288 -0.947 
 10:30-11:00 228  -0.0288 4560  -0.0321 -0.351 -0.161 
 11:00-11:30 228  0.0503 4560  0.0144  0.442 -0.624 
 11:30-12:00 228  0.0121 4560  0.0932 -0.245 -0.847 
 12:00-12:30 228  0.0755 4560  -0.0628 -0.812 -1.214 
 12:30-1:00 228  -0.0583 4560  -0.0892 -0.466 -0.954 
 1:00-1:30 228  0.0201 4560  -0.0368 -0.315 -0.397  
 1:30-2:00 228  -0.0144 4560  0.0187 -0.387 -0.355  
 2:00-2:30 228  -0.0268 4560  0.0584  0.149 -0.843 
 2:30-3:00 228  0.0364 4560  0.0477  0.018 -0.129 
 3:00-3:30 228  0.0095 4560  0.0155 -0.122 -0.982 
 3:30-4:00 228  0.0188 4560  0.0342  0.263 -0.111 
T=0 Overnight  228  0.3884 4560  0.0749  1.754** -2.142** 
T+1 10:00-10:30 228  -0.0247 4560  0.0189 -0.361 -0.154 
 10:30-11:00 228  -0.0384 4560  0.0010 -0.906 -0.140  
 11:00-11:30 228  -0.0133 4560  -0.0457 -0.129 -0.845 
 11:30-12:00 228  -0.0786 4560  -0.0348 -0.356 -0.484 
 12:00-12:30 228  0.0189 4560  -0.0243  0.875 -1.124 
 12:30-1:00 228  0.0723 4560  -0.0624  0.330 -0.671 
 1:00-1:30 228  -0.0327 4560  -0.0404 -0.846 -0.610 
 1:30-2:00 228  0.0328 4560  0.0987  0.444 -0.720 
 2:00-2:30 228  -0.0657 4560  -0.0670 -0.020 -0.034 
 2:30-3:00 228  -0.0414 4560  -0.0636  0.969 -0.403 
 3:00-3:30 228  0.0776 4560  0.0988 -1.551 -0.864 
 3:30-4:00 228 -0.0154 4560 0.0511 -0.097 -0.679  
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Table 3.5 
Midpoint BAS Returns for the Trading Hours’ Subsample 
This table details the midpoint of the bid-ask spread interval returns accompanying annual earnings announcements. a Measurement intervals are defined as 30 minute intervals relative to the 
announcement day t=0. The overnight interval is the period from the close of trading at 4pm until the open the following morning at approximately 10am. The ‘pre’ period is the interval from 
open to the announcement time. The ‘halt’ period is the interval from the announcement time until the first trade after the halt. The ‘post’ period is the interval from the first trade after the halt 
until the close. bSignificance levels: * significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 Announcement Subsample Control Subsample 
 __________________________ __________________________ 
Measurement Intervala Number of  Average Number of Average Paired-samples T-scoreb Mann-Whitney 
 Observations Return (%) Observations Return (%)  Z-scoreb 
T-1 10:00-10:30 54  0.1552 1080  -0.0901  1.198 -1.116 
 10:30-11:00 54  -0.0822 1080  0.0229 -0.279 -0.639 
 11:00-11:30 54  -0.0057 1080  -0.0117  0.752 -0.764 
 11:30-12:00 54  0.0174 1080  -0.0555  0.242 -1.144 
 12:00-12:30 54  -0.0134 1080  -0.0315 -0.756 -0.816 
 12:30-1:00 54  -0.0715 1080  0.0801 -0.162 -0.187 
 1:00-1:30 54  -0.0667 1080  0.0437 -0.382 -0.949 
 1:30-2:00 54   -0.0815 1080  0.0903 -0.434 -0.957 
 2:00-2:30 54  0.0844 1080  -0.0240  1.050 -1.061 
 2:30-3:00 54  0.1815 1080  0.0806  1.932** -2.184** 
 3:00-3:30 54  -0.1476 1080  -0.0084 -2.289** -1.998** 
 3:30-4:00 54  0.1174 1080  0.0893  1.120 -1.283 
T=0 Overnight (-1 to 0) 54  0.1105 1080  -0.0194  0.777 -0.412 
 Pre 54   -0.0435 1080  0.0162 -0.587 -0.380 
 Halt 54   -0.1779 1080  0.0403 -1.883**  -2.123** 
 Post 51   -0.3022 1020  -0.0797 -0.864 -0.836 
 Overnight (0 to +1) 54  0.6651 1080  0.1964  1.987** -1.939*** 
T+1 10:00-10:30 54   -0.2789 1080  -0.0397 -1.680** -2.011** 
 10:30-11:00 54   -0.1340 1080  0.0040 -1.379 -1.206 
 11:00-11:30 54   -0.0895 1080  0.0497 -0.937 -0.915 
 11:30-12:00 54  0.0022 1080  0.0016 -0.034 -0.218 
 12:00-12:30 54   -0.1304 1080  0.0109 -1.149 -0.912 
 12:30-1:00 54    0.0500 1080  0.0016  0.464 -0.715 
 1:00-1:30 54   -0.0810 1080  0.0999 -1.363 -1.300 
 1:30-2:00 54  0.0407 1080  -0.0694  0.817 -1.665 
 2:00-2:30 54   -0.0253 1080  -0.0116 -0.295 -0.222 
 2:30-3:00 54  0.1294 1080  -0.0427  1.146 -1.298 
 3:00-3:30 54   -0.0909 1080  -0.0623 -0.946 -0.963 
 3:30-4:00 54 0.0219 1080 -0.0546  0.907 -0.770 
159 
 
Table 3.5 presents the percentage returns for the trading hours’ subsample using the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread. The results from this table are generally consistent 
with those for the executed trades’ subsample. The ‘halt’ interval percentage return of 
-0.1779 per cent is shown to be significantly different from its corresponding control 
period return for both the parametric and non-parametric tests (at the 5 per cent 
confidence level for both tests). As with the executed trade subsample, the other 
intervals to exhibit significance differences between the event window returns and the 
control period returns were the ‘2:30-3:00’ interval on day T-1 (at the 5 per cent 
confidence level for both tests), the ‘3:00-3:30’ interval on day T-1 (at the 5 per cent 
confidence level for both tests), the ‘overnight (0 to +1)’ period following the 
announcement (at the 5 per cent confidence level for the T-test and the 10 per cent 
confidence level for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric test), and the 
’10:00-10:30’ interval on day T+1 (at the 5 per cent confidence level for both tests). 
 
The most significant difference between the two subsamples is the weak significance 
found in the ‘11:00-11:30’ interval using executed trade returns is not significant at all 
using midpoint quote. Otherwise both return measurement techniques yield almost 
identical results suggesting that bid-ask bounce does not significantly affect the 
results when dealing with frequently traded companies such as those in the ASX 100 
index. 
 
Overall the results for the overnight subsample suggest that the price impact of the 
announcement is impounded within the opening call market but for announcements 
made during normal trading hours the price reaction appears to extend beyond the 
immediate period after the announcement to encompass both the overnight period 
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(that is the opening call market) and the commencement of trading the following day. 
Likewise, there are significant returns late in the trading session on the day prior to 
the announcement, possibly caused by investors speculating on the outcome of the 
announcement.  
 
Previous research has suggested that managers have an incentive to strategically time 
information announcements. Patell and Wolfson (1982) found evidence that managers 
are more likely to release bad news after the close of trading whilst good news is more 
likely to be released during trading. Damodaran (1989) found evidence that Friday 
announcements are more likely to contain bad news. In each case this represents an 
attempt by the firm’s manager to reduce the adverse price consequences that stem 
from poor earnings announcements. Thus, the second hypothesis investigated in this 
chapter predicts that announcements made after the close of trading and/or on Fridays 
are more likely to contain negative earnings surprises than announcements made 
before the market opens or during normal trading hours on Monday through 
Thursday. 
 
Table 3.6 presents the results of partitioning the announcements into two subsamples; 
(i) those that are made after the close and/or on Fridays, and (ii) those that are made 
before or during normal trading on Monday to Thursday. The mean earnings surprise 
for the two subsamples was almost identical. For announcements made after the close 
and/or Friday the reported EPS was 2.843 per cent below the consensus analysts 
forecast. For announcements made before the market opens or during normal trading 
hours the reported EPS was 2.877 per cent below the consensus analysts forecast. The 
median result for after close and/or Friday announcements was slightly lower 
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compared to the median result for the before the market opens or during normal 
trading hours announcements, -0.66 per cent and -0.094 per cent respectively. 
However, neither of these results was significant using either parametric or 
nonparametric tests. 
 
Table 3.6 
Strategic Timing of Earnings Announcements 
This table examines the hypothesis that announcements made after the close of trading and/or 
Friday are more likely to contain negative earnings surprises than announcements made at 
other times. The announcement sample was partitioned into two groups: (i) those 
announcements that were released after the market ceased trading and/or on Fridays, and (ii) 
those announcements that were released before or during trading on Monday through 
Thursday. Earnings surprise is measured as the reported EPS minus the consensus forecast 
EPS scaled by the consensus forecast EPS. T-Test and Mann-Whitney scores are reported for 
the test that the mean earnings surprise is negatively larger for after close and/or Friday 
earnings announcements. Significance levels: * significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 
level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 After close and/or 
Friday announcements 
Monday-Thursday 
announcements 
Number of Announcements 50 232 
Mean (Median) Earnings Surprise -0.02843 
(-0.00666) 
-0.02877 
(-0.00094) 
Standard Deviation 0.18253 0.09985 
T-Test F-Score 0.013 - 
Mann-Whitney Z-Score -0.625 - 
 
 
This means for this sample of announcements made on the ASX there does not appear 
to be any evidence of strategic timing. Announcements made after the close of trading 
and/or on Friday contain no more ‘bad’ news than announcements released before the 
market opens or during normal trading. Therefore, the null hypothesis of there being 
an equal likelihood of ‘bad’ news being released before the market opens or during 
normal trading on Monday to Thursday as there is after the market closes and/or on 
Friday cannot be rejected.  
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In order to investigate whether the significant returns identified previously are related 
to the informational content of the earnings announcement, the earnings surprise is 
regressed against each of those measurement interval returns. This should confirm 
whether those significantly different returns reflect the investor’s revaluation of the 
stock price in light of the revealed information content of the EPS announcement or if 
they are a reflection of speculative or noise trading. For the two trading hours’ 
subsamples the significant intervals were ‘2:30-3:00’ and ‘3:00-3:30’ on day T-1, 
‘halt’, ‘overnight (0 to +1)’ on the day of the announcement and ‘10:00-10:30’ and 
’11:00-11:30’ on day T+1. For the two overnight subsamples the only significant 
interval was the overnight period containing the announcement time. 
 
The results for the regressions on the trade generated returns subsample are presented 
in Table 3.7. Panel A of Table 3.7 contains the value of the coefficient of earnings 
surprise for the overnight subsample. The coefficient is positive indicating ‘good’ 
news results in an upward price revision and ‘bad’ news results in a ‘downward’ price 
revision. As we would expect the t-statistic and p-values for both the ‘overnight’ 
measurement interval are significant at the 1 per cent level. The R-squared of the 
regression is 22.5 per cent with the adjusted R-squared value of 19.70 per cent. This 
result implies that the market reaction identified earlier is the outcome of the market 
re-evaluation of the intrinsic value of the stock based upon the new information 
contained in the earnings announcement. This is consistent with our expectations of 
the third hypothesis which predicts that the abnormal stock returns around corporate 
earnings announcements are positively related to the degree of earnings surprise 
contained within the announcement. 
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Table 3.7 
Trade Price Returns Regressions 
Results of the ordinary least squares regression of the magnitude of the earnings surprise against the statistically significant returns around the announcement period – trade 
generated returns subsample. aMeasurement intervals are defined as 30 minute intervals relative to announcement day t=0. The overnight interval is the period from the close 
of trading at 4pm until the open the following morning at approximately 10am. The ‘pre’ period interval is from open to the announcement time. The ‘halt’ period is the 
interval from the announcement time until the first trade after the halt. The ‘post’ period is the interval from the first trade after the halt until the close. bT-statistic of the test 
of the null hypothesis of the coefficient is equal to zero against the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient is greater than zero. Corresponding P-values are also given. cR-
squared and adjusted R-squared values of the proportion of variability in the respective interval return explained by the earnings surprise variable. 
 
Panel A: Overnight announcement subsample returns 
 
Measurement Intervalsa        Earnings Surprise Coefficient T-statistic (P-value)b Constant T-statistic (P-value)b R-Sqc R-Sq (Adj)c 
 
T=0 Overnight   0.325  3.533 (0.001)    0.005 1.406 (0.163) 22.5% 19.7% 
 
Panel B: Trading hours’ announcement subsample returns 
 
Measurement Intervalsa        Earnings Surprise Coefficient T-statistic (P-value)b Constant T-statistic (P-value)b R-Sqc R-Sq (Adj)c 
T-1 2:30-3:00   0.224   1.214 (0.235)   0.002  3.087 (0.005)   5.0%    1.6%  
 3:00-3:30   0.250   1.364 (0.183)  -0.002  2.508 (0.018)   6.2%    2.9%  
T=0  Halt   0.338   3.693 (0.001)   0.003  1.046 (0.217) 32.7%  27.8% 
 Overnight (0 to +1)   0.018   0.435 (0.667)   0.007  2.244 (0.033) 5.0%   2.9% 
T+1 10:00-10:30   0.096   0.495 (0.625)  -0.004 -1.983 (0.058) 4.2%   3.0% 
 11:00-11:30  -0.084  -0.421 (0.678)  -0.002 -1.208 (0.238) 7.7%   3.3%  
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Table 3.8 
Midpoint BAS Returns Regressions 
Results of the ordinary least squares regression of the magnitude of the earnings surprise against the statistically significant returns around the announcement period – 
midpoint generated returns subsample aMeasurement intervals are defined as 30 minute intervals relative to announcement day t=0. The overnight interval is the period from 
the close of trading at 4pm until the open the following morning at approximately 10am. The ‘pre’ period interval is from open to the announcement time. The ‘halt’ period is 
the interval from the announcement time until the first trade after the halt. The ‘post’ period is the interval from the first trade after the halt until the close. bT-statistic of the 
test of the null hypothesis of the coefficient is equal to zero against the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient is greater than zero. Corresponding P-values are also given. 
cR-squared and adjusted R-squared values of the proportion of variability in the respective interval return explained by the earnings surprise variable. 
 
Panel A: Overnight announcement sample returns 
 
Measurement Intervalsa        Earnings Surprise Coefficient T-statistic (P-value)b Constant T-statistic (P-value)b R-Sqc R-Sq (Adj)c 
 
T=0 Overnight   0.399  3.488 (0.001)    0.003 1.245 (0.201) 21.4% 18.6% 
 
Panel B: Trading hours announcement sample returns 
 
Measurement Intervalsa        Earnings Surprise Coefficient T-statistic (P-value)b Constant T-statistic (P-value)b R-Sqc R-Sq (Adj)c 
T-1 2:30-3:00   0.184   1.307 (0.414)  -0.001  3.364 (0.005)   2.0%    1.6%  
 3:00-3:30   0.158   1.471 (0.132)   0.005  1.495 (0.220)   5.4%    2.8%  
T=0  Halt   0.436   3.937 (0.001)   0.003  1.112 (0.156) 29.5%  25.4% 
 Overnight (0 to +1)   0.111   0.947 (0.714)   0.004  1.847 (0.056) 4.2%   3.1% 
T+1 10:00-10:30   0.085   0.593 (0.647)  -0.003 -1.943 (0.059) 3.0%   2.1% 
 11:00-11:30  -0.064  -0.682 (0.415)  -0.001 -1.299 (0.148) 4.1%   3.4%  
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Panel B of Table 3.7 contains the results for the trading hours’ subsample. For the 
trading hours’ subsample the ‘halt’ measurement interval coefficient is positive and is 
significant at the 1 per cent level and with an adjusted R-squared of approximately 28 
per cent. Those intervals in the ‘during’ trading hours subsample that were previously 
found to have significantly different returns over the observation period from the 
control period; the ‘2:30-3:00’ and ‘3:00-3:30’ on day T-1, the ‘overnight’ (0 to +1), 
and the ‘10:00-10:30’ and the ‘11:00-11:30’ on day T+1; were not found to be related 
to the size of the earnings surprise. This suggests that the significant returns observed 
earlier were not a function of the information content of the earnings announcement. 
 
Table 3.8 contains the output of the regressions for the midpoint of the bid-ask spread 
generated subsamples. Panel A of Table 3.8 provides the results for the regression on 
the significant measurement interval, ‘overnight’ for the overnight subsample. As 
predicted the coefficient of earning surprise is positive (0.399) and significant at the 1 
per cent level. The R-squared values of the regression are between 19% and 21% and 
hence are of acceptable levels. This result is consistent with the values obtained for 
the trade generated returns data set contained in Table 3.7 Panel A and hence supports 
the tested hypothesis. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.8 provides the outcomes for the regressions of the trading hours 
subsample returns. Again the ‘halt’ period return exhibits a positive coefficient with a 
very high level of significance when regressed against the earnings surprise variable 
(0.001 p-value). This result is consistent with the findings of the executed trades’ 
subsample. Also no other measurement intervals are shown to have any significant 
relation to the size of the earnings surprise, which is also consistent with the executed 
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trades’ subsample shown in Table 3.7 Panel B. This provides further evidence that the 
differences in returns between the event period and the control period are not the 
related to the information content contained in the earnings announcement which is 
consistent with the premise of capital market efficiency. 
 
Overall, these results enable a rejection of the third null hypothesis that the abnormal 
stock returns around corporate earnings announcements are unrelated related to the 
degree of earnings surprise contained within the announcement. For both subsamples 
(trading hours and overnight) and for both return measurement techniques (executed 
trade returns and mid-point of the BAS) the measurement interval immediately after 
the earnings announcement exhibits abnormal return activity that is significantly 
positively related to the degree of earnings surprise contained within the 
announcement. No other measurement periods exhibit significant results. 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
These results have a number of important implications for our understanding of the 
way in which security prices impound the information content of corporate earnings 
announcements. When examining the returns for various measurement intervals 
around earnings announcements, this study found evidence of abnormally large 
returns, relative to the control period, for a number of intervals before and after the 
announcement time. This is consistent with a number of previous studies. Patell and 
Wolfson (1984) found evidence of abnormal returns in the overnight period and the 
first 30 minutes of trading on the following trading day after earnings announcements. 
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Francis et al. (1992) found evidence that abnormal returns for announcements made 
during normal trading hours extended into the overnight period after the 
announcement. They also found evidence that the abnormal returns following 
overnight announcements extended beyond the market opening the following day. 
The findings of this study appear to confirm these results. These findings were robust 
to executed trade price and midpoint of the bid-ask spread measures of returns.  
 
However, when the measurement intervals are regressed against a proxy for the 
unexpected component of information in the announcement it was revealed that only 
the interval immediately after the release was found to be significant.  
This was the case regardless of whether the announcement was made before, during, 
or after normal trading hours. This result demonstrates that, in terms of return 
measures, in an open electronic central limit order book (CLOB) with exchange 
enforced trading halts is able to rapidly impound the information content of corporate 
earnings announcements. This supports the notion of capital market efficiency. 
 
Furthermore, there was no evidence of strategic timing by firm managers. This is 
consistent with recent academic research on strategic timing (Doyle and Magilke 
2009; Truong 2010). An examination of the unexpected component of earnings for 
announcements made after the close of trading and/or on Fridays found they exhibited 
a strikingly similar mean earnings surprise to those announcements made before or 
during normal trading on Mondays to Thursdays. This could be a function of the 
speed of response findings which imply a rapid price adjustment regardless of release 
time. This would reduce the incentive to engage in strategic timing. In addition, 
exchange enforced trading halts following the release of a market sensitive 
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announcements would negate the need to create a ‘natural halt’ by delaying the 
release until after the close of trading. 
169 
 
Chapter 4: Algorithmic Trading around Corporate 
Earnings Announcements  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The second essay of this thesis empirically examines the trading activities of 
algorithmic traders around corporate earnings announcements. With exchanges 
investing considerable resources into improving market access arrangements and 
reducing system latency there is considerable interest amongst policy makers about 
what impact algorithmic trading has on equity markets. Existing research has focused 
upon exploring the general trading activities of algorithmic traders (Prix et al. 2007; 
Brogaard 2010), the impact algorithmic traders (or high frequency traders) have had 
upon market quality (Brogaard 2010; Hendershott and Riordan 2011; Hendershott et 
al. 2011; Hasbrouck and Saar 2011), or the impact of technology on algorithmic 
trading (Hendershott and Moulton 2010; Riordan and Storkenmaier 2011). However, 
our understanding of how algorithmic traders behave around corporate information 
releases is limited due to the scarcity of scholarly literature in this area. The second 
essay of this dissertation will fill some of that knowledge gap. Using data from the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) this chapter investigates this issue by 
examining the patterns of message traffic, as a proxy for algorithmic trading, around 
the release of annual earnings announcements. 
 
The findings of this chapter are presented in accordance with the documented 
hypotheses derived in Section 2.6.2. Specifically the chapter investigates four main 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H4,1) predicts that algorithmic traders utilise their 
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speed advantage over other market participants and therefore there is an increase in 
the amount of algorithmic trading activity immediately after the release of corporate 
earnings announcements. The second hypothesis (H4,2) predicts that algorithmic 
traders are informed investors and therefore their trading activity will increase in the 
pre-announcement period as they act upon their informational advantage before 
returning to normal levels in the post-announcement period. The third hypothesis 
(H4,3) predicts that algorithmic traders are discretionary liquidity (uninformed) 
investors and therefore their trading activity will decrease prior to the announcement 
and remain below normal levels until the information asymmetry is resolved. The 
final hypothesis (H4,4) predicts that the introduction of co-location has caused changes 
in the observed trading patterns of algorithmic traders around corporate earnings 
announcements. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
institutional detail of the introduction of co-location by the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX). Section 4.3 describes the dataset and provides summary statistics of 
the sampled data. Section 4.4 outlines the research design. Section 4.5 presents the 
empirical results and a summary of the primary findings. Finally section 4.6 provides 
a concluding summary of the chapter. 
 
4.2 Institutional Detail 
 
The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) provides a number of mechanisms to 
facilitate algorithmic trading by its clients. The introduction of Automated Order 
Processing (AOP) rules in 1997 provided the framework for Participants to offer 
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Direct Market Access (DMA) to their clients. DMA gives clients the ability to 
connect directly147 with the limit order book. Whilst most DMA clients are not 
engaged in algorithmic trading, DMA is seen as a prerequisite for algorithmic trading 
(Karagozoglu 2011). In December 2008 the ASX commenced offering co-location 
services to its Market Participants to facilitate DMA and algorithmic trading. Co-
location enabled Market Participants to place their trading equipment and assigned 
ITS Gateway machines within the same physical data centre as the ASX ITS primary 
matching engine. This arrangement was designed to enable high speed market data 
and trade execution at ‘near zero’ network latency.148 To facilitate the speedy roll-out 
of the facility the service was initially only available to Participants on a limited, first 
come first serve basis. The service was subsequently expanded with the completion of 
the Australian Liquidity Centre (ALC) facility in November 2011 as part of the 
introduction of ASX Trade.149
 
 
The ASX does not require Participants to pre-specify whether they will be algorithmic 
trading themselves or whether their clients will be algorithmic trading. In fact, a 
Participant may not know whether its clients are engaged in algorithmic trading since 
the client is not required to disclose the reason behind any individual decision to 
initiate an order on the ASX. ASX does not require Participants to identify specific 
algorithms that are in use. However, ASX can, either directly or indirectly, obtain this 
information if necessary. ASX Market Surveillance (ASXMS) can ask a Participant 
for details of trading to assist in investigation and enforcement activity. Additionally, 
the ASX or ASXMS can determine with a reasonable degree of certainty via analysis 
                                                 
147 The ASX requires that Participants maintain adequate filters to detect trades that may breach the law 
or trading rules. 
148 “New Co-location Hosting Service for ASX Participants”, ASX Media Release, 3 July 2008. 
149 “ASX Australian Liquidity Centre”, ASX, 2011. 
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of trade data, which orders are generated by an algorithm (ASX Review 2010). 
External market participants are unlikely to have access to this information and are 
limited to making inferences about algorithmic trading via patterns in trading activity 
or message traffic. 
 
4.3 Data 
 
The initial sample used in the study consisted of the final earnings announcements for 
the 200 stocks in the S&P/ASX 200 index for the financial years 2007/2008 and 
2008/2009. The S&P/ASX 200 index comprises 200 of the largest Australian 
companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), weighted in the index 
according to each company’s market capitalisation. The date and time of the annual 
earnings announcement was taken from the SIRCA Australian Company 
Announcements (ACA) database containing details of the earnings announcement for 
each of the respective companies. These statements are issued by the ASX Company 
Announcements Office (CAO) through the Integrated Trading System (ITS) and 
provide subscribers with all company announcements lodged with the ASX. The 
detail of the release of these announcements was provided in the previous chapter. As 
with the previous essay, to avoid any possible problems caused by inaccuracies in the 
recorded time of the information announcement all announcement times were cross-
referenced with those reported by the Thompson Reuters I/B/E/S database. Any 
discrepancies between these two times are further investigated to pinpoint the exact 
announcement time. The inability to resolve the conflict between these two sources 
for 34 announcements in the sample resulted in their elimination from the study.  
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Given that any algorithmic trading, in particular high frequency trading, decision may 
rely on the speed of response to the announcement any announcements that were 
made prior to the commencement of normal trading or after the close of normal 
trading were eliminated from the sample. That meant only announcements made 
between 10:10 am and 16:00pm EST/DST were included in the sample. This left a 
sample of 110 earnings announcements during the sample period, of which 52 were 
before co-location was introduced and 58 were after. 
 
Table 4.1 Panel A provides a breakdown of the announcement sample by clock time 
categorised into half-hour intervals throughout the day. Announcements are made 
each half-hour interval during the trading day, with a high concentration in the two 
intervals immediately after the opening call market. Panel B shows the sample 
announcements partitioned into two subsamples relative to the introduction of co-
location by the ASX in late 2008. The two partitions consist of approximately half the 
sample each. Many companies are common to both subsamples due to the fact that 
they release their corporate earnings announcements at approximately the same day 
and time each year. Panel C shows the breakdown of firms in the sample by market 
capitalisation. The average firm market capitalisation in the sample is $4,148.88 
million whilst the median figure is $1,301.88 million. The figures are slightly higher 
for the pre co-location subsample but these differences are not significant. 
 
Order flow data used in the study was sourced from the SIRCA Australian Equities 
Tick History order book database. This database contains all order entries, 
modifications, cancellations, executed trades, and traded volume for supported 
instruments time-stamped to the nearest millisecond.   
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Table 4.1 
Announcement Sample Composition 
 
This table provides summary statistics of the announcement sample. Panel A provides details 
of the number of announcements in the sample released during half-hour intervals throughout 
the trading day. Panel B provides details of the number of announcements prior to and 
subsequent to the introduction by the ASX of co-location hosting. Panel C provides details of 
the market capitalisations of the firms on the announcement sample. 
 
Panel A: Sample announcement by clock time 
Time of Release (EST/EDT) Number of Earnings Announcements 
10:10-10:29 29 
10:30-10:59 22 
11:00-11:29 5 
11:30-11:59 5 
12:00-12:29 12 
12:30-12:59 9 
13:00-13:29 4 
13:30-13:59 5 
14:00-14:29 4 
14:30-14:59 4 
15:00-15:29 2 
15:30-16:00 9 
Total Sample Announcements 110 
 
 
Panel B: Sample announcement partitioned around ASX co-location hosting 
Time of Release (EST/EDT) Pre Co-location 
Announcements  
Post Co-location 
Announcements 
10:10-10:29 12 17 
10:30-10:59 10 12 
11:00-11:29 2 3 
11:30-11:59 0 5 
12:00-12:29 9 3 
12:30-12:59 4 5 
13:00-13:29 2 2 
13:30-13:59 3 1 
14:00-14:29 2 2 
14:30-14:59 2 2 
15:00-15:29 1 1 
15:30-16:00 5 4 
Total Announcements 52 58 
 
 
Panel C: Announcement firm market capitalisations 
 
Mean  
($m) 
Median  
($m) 
Maximum  
($m) 
Minimum  
($m) 
All sample 4,148.88 1,301.88 42,356.68 77.46 
Pre Co-location 4,392.88 1,378.14 42,356.68 77.46 
Post Co-location 3,943.41 1,259.68 34,932.77 92.43 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
-0.308 
(0.759)    
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Consensus analyst forecast EPS and actual EPS, number of reporting analysts, and 
enterprise value data for each firm in the sample was sourced from the Thompson 
Reuters I/B/E/S database. As with the study in the previous chapter, the equally 
weighted aggregate of these forecasts was used as a proxy for the market expectations 
of the firm’s EPS and hence the difference between this aggregate forecast and the 
actual earnings announcement is taken to reflect the unanticipated component 
(earnings surprise) of the earnings announcement. Market capitalisation data for each 
company in the sample at the time of the announcement was sourced from the 
Morningstar DatAnalysis database.  
 
 
4.4 Research Design 
 
Many of the existing studies on algorithmic trading (or high frequency trading) have 
focused upon markets in which this type of trading activity can be explicitly 
identified, such as the Deutsche Böerse Xetra trading system (Prix et al. 2007; 
Hendershott and Riordan 2011; Riordan and Storkenmaier 2011), or have used data 
on the trading activities of the AT/HFT firms themselves (Brogaard 2010). However, 
Hendershott et al. (2011) demonstrated that for a market in which algorithmic trading 
activity is not explicitly identified, the rate of electronic message traffic can serve as 
an effective proxy. They argued that this is the method most commonly used by 
market participants, exchanges and other market venues. The reason for using the rate 
of electronic message traffic as a proxy is that algorithmic trading activity has been 
demonstrated to exhibit high frequency of order submission, amendments and 
deletions. For example, Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) provided an example of a security 
for which, during a 78 second interval on 2 October 2007, orders to sell 100 shares 
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were submitted (and quickly cancelled) 142 times. They also reported that during 
much of this period there was no activity other than these messages. 
 
Therefore, the rate message traffic has been used as a proxy for algorithmic trading in 
this study to identify the patterns in algorithmic trading activities around corporate 
earnings announcements. In the case of the ASX, electronic message traffic consists 
of order submissions, deletions, amendments and executed trades that are submitted 
via the ITS trading system. The amount of message traffic in each measurement 
interval is identified using equation 4.1. 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = ∑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡  (4.1) 
 
Where: 
MTi,t     = Raw message traffic for security i in measurement interval t 
Enteri,t     = New orders submitted for security i in measurement interval t 
Deletei,t     = Existing orders deleted for security i in measurement interval t 
Amendi,t  = Existing orders amended for security i in measurement interval t 
Tradei,t     = Executed trades for security i in measurement interval t 
 
This metric captures all new limit (Enter) and market (Trade) orders submitted, 
together with all deletions (Delete) and amendments (Amend) of exiting orders for 
each sample security in the measurement intervals around the announcement date.   
 
For the purposes of examining the rate of electronic message traffic, the trading days 
surrounding the corporate earnings announcements were broken up into a number of 
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measurement intervals. Message traffic was calculated for a series of approximately 
half-hour intervals commencing twelve trading hours (around two trading days) prior 
to the time of the information release and continuing for twenty five trading hours 
(around four trading days) after the announcement. Half-hour intervals were chosen as 
they represent the most common measurement intervals used in previous intraday 
event studies (Patell and Wolfson 1984; Lee 1992; Francis et al. 1996; Lee and Park 
2000). The sample was carefully screened to ensure that no other market sensitive 
announcements were made by the sample firms during this period. No such 
announcements were found. Figure 4.1 illustrates how the half-hour intervals were 
constructed around the announcement time. 
 
Figure 4.1 Message Traffic Measurement Intervals around 
Corporate Earnings Announcements 
 
Where A is defined as the announcement time and +/- indicates how many half-hour periods after or 
prior to the announcement the interval occurs. 
 
On the day of the announcement the half-hour intervals were centred on the exact 
time of the information release. This meant that if an announcement occurred at, for 
example, 13:10 EST/DST then interval ‘A+1’ extended from 13:10 to 13:40 
EST/DST, interval ‘A+2’ extended from 13:40 to 14:10 EST/DST, interval ‘A-1’ 
extended from 12:40 to 13:10 EST/EDT, and so on. Due to the amount of volume that 
is traded during those times, the opening and closing call markets are included in the 
half-hour measurement intervals where they occur. Hence the measurement intervals 
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run from 10:00 to 16:12 EST/EDT each trading day. Where a potential interval has 
less than 30 minutes, which may occur in the first and last interval of the 
announcement day the following procedure was used; (i) if the remaining portion was 
10 minutes or less then it was merged into the previous/succeeding interval, or (ii) if 
the remaining portion was 11 minutes or longer than is was treated as a separate 
(shorter) interval. For days other than the day of the announcement, the measurement 
intervals were calculated for each half-hour commencing at 10:00 EST/EDT 
(including the opening call market) and extending through to end of the closing call 
market at 16:12 EST/EDT.  
 
To isolate the effect of the earnings release from other intraday effects a control 
sample was also constructed. For each security in the announcement sample a 
randomly selected date was chosen one to three weeks prior to the information release 
date. On this randomly selected date a proxy ‘announcement time’ was established at 
exactly the same time as the firm’s actual announcement date. Then measurement 
intervals were constructed in precisely the same manner as described for the event 
window. This control window was carefully screened for any market sensitive 
announcements and where such announcements were found a different period was 
selected. This process was repeated until an announcement free period was 
determined. This control sample was then used to determine ‘normal’ levels of 
message traffic exogenous to the corporate earnings announcement. 
 
To compensate for the slight differences between measurement periods caused by 
uneven intervals, the raw message traffic metric was standardised by the length of 
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each individual measurement interval to get a measure of message traffic per minute. 
This metric is calculated using equation 4.2. 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡  (4.2) 
  
Where: 
MTMi,t    = Message traffic per minute for security i in measurement interval t 
MTi,t     = Raw message traffic for security i in measurement interval t 
Timet     = The length of time in minutes of measurement interval t 
 
Two methods were then used to determine the statistical significance of any abnormal 
message traffic per minute (MTM) during the event window measurement intervals. 
Firstly, an independent sample T-test and a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon U test was used 
to detect any significant differences between the MTM in each event window 
measurement interval from its corresponding control measurement interval, assuming 
normal and non-normal distributions respectively. Secondly, a single sample t-test 
was used to determine if the change in abnormal message traffic per minute (defined 
as the event window MTM minus the corresponding control period MTM) from one 
measurement interval to the next measurement interval around the announcement was 
significantly different from zero. Determining which measurement intervals exhibit 
significantly different levels of message traffic per minute enables an investigation of 
which of the three hypotheses (H4,1; H4,2; H4,3) outlined at in section 4.1 seems mostly 
likely to describe the behaviour of algorithmic traders around corporate earnings 
announcements. 
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However, to establish causality of any detected abnormal trading activity, and to 
determine whether the introduction of co-location by the ASX has had any impact on 
any detected trading patterns, a pooled regression model is constructed. The 
specification of the regression model is given in equation 4.3. 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑀𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  (4.3) 
 
Where AbMTM is the abnormal message traffic per minute for security i in interval t, 
ES is the unexpected component (earnings surprise) of the earnings announcement for 
firm i. Given the relationship between earnings surprise and abnormal returns around 
corporate earnings announcements established in the previous chapter, it is possible 
that any increase in message traffic is attributable to an increase in general trading 
activity directly linked to the new information rather than algorithmic trading. This 
variable controls for that possibility. Earnings surprise is measured as the difference 
between the actual EPS figure announced and the most recent consensus analyst 
forecast of the expected EPS for the firm standardised by the security price. Analysts 
is a measure of the number of analysts providing forecasts of the expected EPS for 
firm i. Previous research as revealed that analyst recommendations reveal information 
to the market and hence a greater number of analysts following the firm is likely to 
reduce the degree of information asymmetry surrounding the announcement (Lloyd 
Davies and Canes 1978; Bjerring et al. 1983; Beneish 1991; Brown and Kim 1991; 
Stickel 1995; Womack 1996; Kim et al. 1997; Asquith et al. 2005; and Green 2006). 
This helps distinguish whether any abnormal trading activity by algorithmic traders is 
informed or uninformed. LogEnt is the log of the enterprise value at the time of the 
announcement for firm i. Larger firms would be expected to exhibit higher levels of 
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message traffic by virtue of having a larger number of securities on offer in the 
marketplace and higher levels of media attention of their earnings announcements. 
This variable is a control for the effects of firm size upon message traffic. LogVolume 
is the log of the aggregate number of firm i shares traded in measurement interval t. 
Higher volume of traded securities in a measurement interval may result in higher 
levels of electronic message traffic without there being an increase in the amount of 
algorithmic trading. This variable controls for this effect. 
 
Time is a dummy variable set to one if the announcement in made between 10:00 and 
10:30 EST/EDT or zero otherwise. Due to a large portion of the announcements in the 
sample being released just after the opening call market this dummy variable tests 
whether any observed change in message traffic around the time of the announcement 
is a function of the transition from the opening call market to normal trading in the 
interval immediately prior to the release. Colocation is a dummy variable that is set to 
one if the announcement is released prior to the introduction of co-location in 
December 2008 and zero is the announcement is made after that time. This dummy 
variable is designed to test the hypotheses (H4,4) that predicts that the introduction of 
co-location has caused changes in the observed trading patterns of algorithmic traders 
around corporate earnings announcements. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the rate of message traffic per minute for each of the half-hour 
intervals surrounding the announcement release commencing twenty four periods 
before the announcement and extending through to fifty periods after the 
announcement. 
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Figure 4.2 
Rate of Message Traffic per Minute for the Event Window (Full Announcement Sample) 
This figure shows the rate of message traffic per minute for each of the half-hour measurement intervals commencing 24 periods before the earnings announcement 
(A-24) and extending through to 50 periods after the release of the announcement (A+50). 
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Figure 4.3 
Rate of Message Traffic per Minute for the Control Period (Full Announcement Sample) 
This figure shows the rate of message traffic per minute for each of the half-hour measurement intervals commencing 24 periods before the control ‘earnings 
announcement’ (A-24) and extending through to 50 periods after the time of the control ‘announcement’ (A+50). 
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For the event window, message traffic averaged 32.55 messages per minute with a 
peak of 43.78 messages per minute in the half-hour interval immediately after the 
release of the corporate earnings announcement. Message traffic levels appear to be 
elevated for much of the post-announcement period with a gradual decline towards 
levels consistent with the pre-announcement period near the end of the event window. 
There is little evidence of elevated traffic levels prior to the information release which 
does not imply support for the second hypothesis (H4,2) that predicts algorithmic 
traders are informed investors and therefore their trading activity will increase in the 
pre-announcement period as they act upon their informational advantage before 
returning to normal levels in the post-announcement period. Nor does there appear to 
be any evidence in support of the third hypothesis (H4,3) which predicts algorithmic 
traders are discretionary liquidity (uninformed) investors and therefore their trading 
activity will decrease commencing prior to the announcement and remain below 
normal levels until the information asymmetry is resolved. Rather the elevated 
message traffic per minute immediately after the announcement is more consistent 
with the prediction of the first hypothesis (H4,1) that algorithmic traders utilise their a 
speed advantage over other market participants and therefore there is an increase in 
the amount of algorithmic trading activity immediately after the release of corporate 
earnings announcements. 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the rate of message traffic per minute in each half hour 
measurement interval for the control window. During the control period, message 
traffic averaged 27.62 messages per minute which is 37 per cent below the interval 
average for the event window. This is suggestive of a difference relative to the event 
window intervals. Both figures illustrate patterns of peaks and troughs roughly 
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consistent with the timing of the opening and closing call markets (periods of elevated 
trading volume) relative to the large grouping of announcements in the sample made 
between 10:10 and 11:00 EST/EDT.  
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the level of abnormal message traffic around the corporate 
earnings announcements for the full sample. For each measurement interval the 
message traffic during the control window (as illustrated in Figure 4.3) is subtracted 
from the message traffic during the event window (as illustrated in Figure 4.2) to 
obtain an illustration of the pattern of abnormal (or excess) message traffic per minute 
during each of the measurement intervals surrounding the announcement. This figure 
clearly illustrates the abnormally elevated message traffic in the interval immediately 
after the time of the earnings release. Message traffic increases by 14.25 messages per 
minute during this half-hour period. 
 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate the pattern of message traffic per minute for the pre and 
post co-location subsamples. For the pre co-location subsample message traffic 
averaged 21.1 messages per minute during the event window. This was very similar to 
the 21.8 messages per minute average for the corresponding control period (not 
shown). However, in the half-hour interval immediately after the announcement, 
message traffic peaked at 31.28 messages per minute. For the post co-location sample 
there is evidence of an overall elevation in message traffic, with an average of 40.8 
messages per minute during the event window (compared to 32.08 messages per 
minute during the control period). Again, message traffic peaks in the interval 
immediately after the announcement (54.13 messages per minute). 
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Figure 4.4 
Rate of Abnormal Message Traffic per Minute for the Event Window (Full Announcement Sample) 
This figure shows the rate of message traffic per minute for each of the half-hour measurement intervals commencing 24 periods before the earnings announcement 
(A-24) and extending through to 50 periods after the release of the announcement (A+50) minus the rate of message traffic for the corresponding control period 
interval. 
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Figure 4.5 
Rate of Message Traffic per Minute for the Event Window (Pre Co-location Announcement Sample) 
This figure shows the rate of message traffic per minute for each of the half-hour measurement intervals commencing 24 periods before the earnings announcement 
(A-24) and extending through to 50 periods after the release of the announcement (A+50). 
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Figure 4.6 
Rate of Message Traffic per Minute for the Event Window (Post Co-location Announcement Sample) 
This figure shows the rate of message traffic per minute for each of the half-hour measurement intervals commencing 24 periods before the earnings announcement 
(A-24) and extending through to 50 periods after the release of the announcement (A+50). 
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These findings provide support for the fourth hypothesis (H4,4) that predicts that the 
introduction of the co-location facility by the ASX would magnify the effects of any 
observed patterns in algorithmic trading activities around corporate earnings 
announcements.  
 
To examine whether the patterns of elevated message traffic observed in Figure 4.2 
through to Figure 4.6 represent significant changes from normal levels of message 
traffic per minute several statistical tests were undertaken. Firstly, the differences 
between the means for each of the event periods and the corresponding control period 
measurement intervals were tested for significance using an independent sample t-test 
and a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon U test. The results for intervals A-24 through to 
A+24 are presented in Table 4.2.150
                                                 
150 No intervals outside of this range were found to be significant and are omitted in the interests of 
table clarity. 
 As expected, the measurement interval 
immediately after the announcement with 43.781 messages per minute is found to be 
significant at the 5 per cent level using the t-test and the 10 per cent level using the 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon U test. Furthermore, the message traffic per minute in the 
second interval after the announcement (commencing 30 minutes after the earnings 
release and extending to 60 minutes after the earnings announcement) was also found 
to be significantly elevated when compared with its corresponding control period 
(significant at the 10 per cent level using both statistical tests). There is also weak 
evidence of significantly elevated message traffic levels in interval A+8 (significant at 
the 10 per cent level using the Mann-Whiney-Wilcoxon test but insignificant using 
the t-test) and in interval A+20 (significant at the 10 per cent level using the t-test and 
the 5 per cent level using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). There is no evidence of 
any elevated levels of message traffic before the announcement. 
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Table 4.2 
Difference between the Message Traffic per Minute during the Event 
Period and the Corresponding Control Period 
 
This table details the mean message traffic per minute (MTM) for the measurement intervals during the 
event period and the corresponding control period. a Measurement intervals are defined as the number 
of half-hourly periods before (-) or after (+) the announcement time (A). b Significance levels: * 
significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Measurement 
Intervala 
MTM during the 
Event Period 
MTM during the 
Control Period 
Independent Sample 
T-scoreb 
Mann-Whitney Z 
Scoreb 
A -24 30.706 29.006 0.272 -0.065 
A -23 30.398 26.327 0.684 -0.312 
A -22 27.445 25.443 0.458 -0.081 
A -21 28.333 24.076 0.869 -0.330 
A -20 26.534 24.943 0.340 -0.087 
A -19 26.180 26.388 -0.045  -0.340 
A -18 27.837 25.659 0.472 -0.457 
A -17 32.194 26.512 1.156 -0.541 
A -16 30.926 26.161 0.967 -0.306 
A -15 31.581 27.620 0.777 -0.444 
A -14 33.463 28.868 0.901 -0.495 
A -13 33.769 30.068 0.710 -0.026 
A -12 32.306 27.869 0.830 -0.606 
A -11 28.517 24.826 0.748 -0.626 
A -10 26.946 23.154 0.838 -1.093 
A -9 26.237 24.041 0.489 -0.401 
A -8 26.795 22.122 1.179 -1.039 
A -7 26.746 22.436 1.204 -0.720 
A -6 26.997 24.773 0.567 -0.341 
A -5 28.250 26.218 0.483 -0.499 
A -4 30.097 27.697 0.515 -0.483 
A -3 32.897 28.095 0.975 -0.371 
A -2 32.457 29.120 0.673 -0.012 
A -1 35.401 29.156 1.123 -0.148 
A +1 43.781 29.535     2.238**       -1.760*** 
A +2 39.259 27.770       1.844***        -1.573*** 
A +3 34.068 27.174 1.276 -0.984 
A +4 33.264 25.547 1.467 -1.145 
A +5 29.442 26.121 0.703 -0.673 
A +6 29.521 25.989 0.757 -0.662 
A +7 30.456 26.083 0.987 -0.366 
A +8 34.389 27.705 1.277        -1.664*** 
A +9 33.667 29.674 0.788 -1.141 
A +10 34.743 31.563 0.564 -0.883 
A +11 35.982 32.508 0.628 -1.269 
A +12 43.643 33.751 1.402 -1.333 
A +13 38.009 32.018 0.920 -0.431 
A +14 38.637 27.394 1.554 -1.058 
A +15 35.661 25.867 1.482 -1.079 
A +16 31.493 23.362 1.655 -0.859 
A +17 32.184 24.593 1.432 -0.646 
A +18 30.012 25.440 0.944 -0.869 
A +19 29.560 24.436 1.218 -0.913 
A +20 32.367 23.827       1.746***      -1.972** 
A +21 33.539 27.487 1.138 -1.616 
A +22 36.727 28.532 1.327 -1.412 
A +23 35.724 28.771 1.201 -1.649 
A +24 36.831 31.686 0.845 -1.364 
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To confirm the robustness of these results a second test was undertaken. A single 
sample t-test was utilised to test whether the change in abnormal message traffic per 
minute (message traffic per minute in the event period minus the message traffic per 
minute in the corresponding control period) in each measurement interval from the 
previous measurement interval was significantly different from zero. The results for 
intervals A-23 through to A+24 are presented in Table 4.3. 
 
The evidence from Table 4.3 supports the previous findings. The increase of 7.999 
messages per minute in the interval immediately following the release of the earnings 
announcement from the proceeding interval is significantly different from the 
corresponding change in the control period (significant at the 1 per cent level). This 
elevated message traffic declines slightly in the following interval with an abnormal 
decline of 2.757 messages per minute although this result is not significant (consistent 
with the higher difference in MTM in interval A+2 shown in Table 4.2). There is a 
significant decline of 4.594 messages per minute between intervals A+2 and A+3 (5 
per cent confidence level) and of 4.396 messages per minute between intervals A+4 
and A+5 (1 per cent confidence level). This suggests that it takes approximately 2.5 
hours for message traffic to return to a more ‘normal’ level following the release of 
the corporate earnings announcement.  
 
There is also evidence significant changes in the abnormal message traffic levels 
between intervals A+11 and A+12 (1 per cent level), intervals A+13 and A+14 (5 per 
cent level) and intervals A+19 and A+20 (10 per cent level). No intervals prior to the 
release of the earnings report show signs of significant changes in the level of 
abnormal message traffic per minute. 
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Table 4.3 
Change in the Abnormal Message Traffic per Minute during the 
Event Period 
 
This table details the change in abnormal message traffic per minute (AbMTM) between each measurement 
interval and the previous measurement interval. Single sample T-test examines whether the change in abnormal 
message traffic per minute in each interval is significantly different from zero. a Measurement intervals are defined 
as the number of half-hourly periods before (-) or after (+) the announcement time (A). b Significance levels: * 
significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Measurement Intervala Change in AbMTM from 
previous interval 
Single Sample T-scoreb 
 A -23 2.741   1.353 
 A -22 -2.061  -0.788 
 A -21 2.235   1.365 
 A -20 -2.700  -1.383 
 A -19 -2.290  -1.172 
 A -18 2.271   0.987 
 A -17 3.007   1.480 
 A -16 -1.099  -0.628 
 A -15 -0.812  -0.378 
 A -14 0.097   0.062 
 A -13 0.349   0.200 
 A -12 0.223   0.107 
 A -11 -0.746  -0.407 
 A -10 0.101   0.077 
 A -9 -1.595  -1.226 
 A -8 2.476   1.129 
 A -7 -0.363  -0.333 
 A -6 -2.086  -1.145 
 A -5 -0.192  -0.103 
 A -4 0.368   0.251 
 A -3 2.401   1.292 
 A -2 -1.464  -0.952 
 A -1 2.908   1.263 
 A +1 7.999      2.733* 
 A +2 -2.757  -1.095 
 A +3 -4.594       -2.144** 
 A +4 0.823   0.519 
 A +5 -4.396     -2.801* 
 A +6 0.017   0.013 
 A +7 0.849   0.502 
 A +8 2.303   1.133 
 A +9 -2.730  -1.131 
 A +10 -0.824  -0.463 
 A +11 -0.293   0.149 
 A +12 6.412      2.692* 
 A +13 -3.770  -1.349 
 A +14 5.184        2.251** 
 A +15 -1.425  -0.825 
 A +16 -1.582  -0.825 
 A +17 -0.609  -0.333 
 A +18 -2.942  -1.180 
 A +19 0.494   0.298 
 A +20 3.385          1.961*** 
 A +21 -2.537  -1.124 
 A +22 2.305   1.181 
 A +23 -1.281  -0.581 
 A +24 -1.834  -1.119 
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These results allow us to reject two of the previously outlined hypotheses. Both 
parametric and nonparametric tests of the differences between the message traffic per 
minute during the periods surrounding the earnings announcement, and the 
corresponding control periods, find no evidence of significantly elevated message 
traffic prior to the time of the release of the earnings announcement. Likewise, there is 
no evidence of any significant change in abnormal message traffic in any of the 
intervals leading up to the announcement release. Therefore, hypothesis (H4,2) can be 
formally rejected. Algorithmic traders do not increase their trading activity in the 
lead-up to an earnings release. Such activity, if present, would have indicated that 
algorithmic traders were more informed than other market participants. 
 
There is also no evidence of a decline in algorithmic trading around corporate 
earnings announcements. The tests of differences between message traffic per minute 
during the event window measurement intervals and corresponding control period 
intervals demonstrate that message traffic per minute is significantly elevated 
immediately after the earnings release. There is no evidence of a decline in 
algorithmic trading prior to the information release consistent with the predictions of 
the third hypothesis (H4,3). The test of change in abnormal message traffic per minute 
between measurement intervals around the release also preciptated a significant 
increase in message traffic in the period immediately after the information release. 
Thus, the third hypothesis is also rejected. 
 
Instead these results provide strong support for the first hypothesis (H4,1) which 
predicts that algorithmic traders utilise their speed advantage over other market 
participants and will therefore increase their trading activity immediately after the 
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earnings release. The message traffic per minute is significantly elevated in the half-
hour interval immediately after the announcement with the change test indicating the 
process of returning to normal message traffic levels commences in the second half-
hour interval after the announcements and accelerates in the third and fifth half-hour 
intervals after the announcement. After the fifth measurement interval (approximately 
2.5 hours) the message traffic levels remain largely consistent with the corresponding 
control period after this time. These results were statistically significant. 
 
To further investigate the relationship between message traffic in the half-hour 
immediately following the corporate earnings release, the information contained 
within the earnings announcement, and the impact of the introduction of co-location 
services by the ASX, a series of OLS regression models are examined. The results of 
these regressions are reported in Table 4.4. Any elevation in message traffic following 
the release of a corporate earnings announcement might simply be the result of non-
algorithmic traders increasing their trading activity in response to the information 
content of the announcement. If that were the case then one would expect the 
coefficient of the earnings surprise variable to be significantly positive. However, the 
coefficient for earnings surprise was not found to be statistically significant. This 
result confirms that elevated message traffic is not a function of the earnings surprise 
and is thus more likely to be the result of an increase in algorithmic trading activity. 
The results also indicate firm size (as proxied by enterprise value), traded volume, and 
reduced information asymmetry (as proxied by the number of analysts reporting on 
the security) play a role in influencing the amount of message traffic following a 
corporate earnings announcement but the significantly positive intercept (1 per cent 
level) confirms that these factors do not explain the rate of message traffic. 
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Table 4.4 
Announcement Interval Message Traffic Regressions 
 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates related to the level of message traffic per minute during the half-hour interval measurement immediately after the release of the 
corporate earnings announcement on a series of independent control variables. Independent control variables used are; Earnings surprise [ES], number of analysts [Analysts], log of 
enterprise value [LogEnt], time dummy [Time], co-location dummy [Colocation], and log of volume stock traded [LogVolume]. Standardised beta coefficients are reported expected for 
the intercept which is unstandardised. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in brackets. Significance levels: * significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** 
significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Intercept 
(t-statistic) 
ES 
(t-statistic) 
Analysts 
(t-statistic) 
LogEnt 
(t-statistic) 
Time 
(t-statistic) 
Co-location 
(t-statistic) 
LogVolume 
(t-statistic) 
F-
Value 
Prob>F Adj R-
squared 
44.809 
(8.395)* 
0.101 
(1.026) 
     1.053 0.307 0.001 
-11.495 
(-1.18) 
 0.531 
(6.388)* 
    40.787 <0.0001 0.275 
-149.795 
(-6.681)* 
  0.655 
(8.793)* 
   77.309 <0.0001 0.423 
39.887 
(6.526)* 
   0.121 
(1.239) 
  1.536 0.218 0.005 
31.277 
(4.077)* 
    0.211 
(2.203)** 
 4.855 0.03 0.035 
-115.808 
(-3.185)* 
     0.398 
(4.428)* 
19.606 <0.0001 0.151 
-198.864 
(-6.512)* 
 
0.036 
(0.508) 
0.193 
(2.297)** 
0.524 
(6.204)* 
0.028 
(0.39) 
0.175 
(2.371)** 
0.139 
(1.787)** 
19.322 <0.0001 0.519 
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The coefficient of the time dummy variable was found to be insignificant. The time 
dummy variable was set to one if the announcement was made between 10:10 and 
10:30 EST/EDT or zero otherwise. Due to the fact that many of the announcements in 
the full sample were made in the half-hour period immediately after the opening call 
market, any significant change in message traffic levels might have been a function of 
measurement interval time rather than earnings release.151
 
 However, the insignificant 
result indicates that message traffic activity was not a function of opening call market. 
The coefficient for co-location was found to be positive and significant. As predicted 
the introduction of the co-location facility by the ASX has had a significantly positive 
impact upon the amount of message traffic in the interval immediately after the 
information release. Previous research found that reduced system latency resulted in 
an increase in algorithmic trading activity (Hendershott and Moulton 2010; 
Hendershott et al. 2011; Riordan and Storkenmaier 2011). The positive coefficient for 
co-location confirms the findings previously identified in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 that 
algorithmic trading is higher in the interval immediately after the earnings release for 
announcements made after the introduction of co-location compared to those made 
prior to its introduction. This result is consistent with those previous findings and 
confirms the fourth hypothesis (H4,4).  
 
As a further test of robustness of these results, the analysis was repeated using 
deletions per minute rather than message traffic per minute. Many previous studies 
have identified algorithmic trading activity as exhibiting high frequencies of order 
submissions and subsequent deletions (Prix et al. 2007; Brogaard 2010; Hendershott 
                                                 
151 26.36 per cent of the announcements in the sample were released between 10:10 and 10:30 
EST/EDT. 
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et al. 2011; Hasbrouck and Saar 2011). Hence, evidence of elevated deletions per 
minute should corroborate the previous findings on patterns of message traffic 
activity. 
 
The results for deletions per minute during the event period, and the corresponding 
control period, for measurement intervals A-24 to A+24 are present in Table 4.5. The 
results for deletions per minute are largely consistent with the results for message 
traffic per minute reported in Table 4.2. There is an elevation in deletions per minute 
in the period immediately preceding the announcement (significant using the t-test but 
not the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon U test) which does not appear in the full message 
traffic sample. There is a considerable increase in deletions to 5.688 deleted orders per 
minute (compared to 3.772 deleted orders per minute in corresponding control period) 
in the interval immediately after the earnings release. Deletions per minute are also 
elevated above normal levels in the second interval after the earnings announcement 
(5.147 deletions per minute compared to 3.617 deletions in the corresponding control 
period). There is some weak evidence of significantly elevated deletions in several of 
the other post-announcement intervals using the parametric test but these findings are 
not supported by the non-parametric test. Overall, these results mirror the findings for 
message traffic per minute.  
 
The results for the regressions of deletions per minute during the half-hour interval 
immediately following the earnings release against the same independent control 
variables used for the message traffic data are presented in Table 4.6. These results 
also support the findings for the message traffic data.  
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Table 4.5 
Difference between the Deletions per Minute during the Event Period 
and the Corresponding Control Period 
 
This table details the mean deletions per minute (DM) for the measurement intervals during the event 
period and the corresponding control period. a Measurement intervals are defined as the number of half-
hourly periods before (-) or after (+) the announcement time (A). b Significance levels: * significant at 
the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Measurement 
Intervala 
DM during the  
Event Period 
DM during the 
Control Period 
Independent Sample 
T-scoreb 
Mann-Whitney Z 
Scoreb 
A -24 4.033 3.834 0.258 -0.199 
A -23 4.134 3.286 1.190 -0.220 
A -22 3.746 3.275 0.841 -0.217 
A -21 3.899 3.334 0.834 -0.137 
A -20 3.510 3.426 0.138 -0.516 
A -19 3.440 3.804 -0.569  -0.275 
A -18 3.679 3.481 0.331 -0.145 
A -17 4.131 3.534 0.952 -0.475 
A -16 3.875 3.534 0.511 -0.009 
A -15 3.923 3.450 0.758 -0.723 
A -14 4.136 3.683 1.078 -0.439 
A -13 4.649 4.042 0.872 -0.006 
A -12 4.274 3.655 0.935 -0.396 
A -11 3.850 3.381 0.744 -0.434 
A -10 3.625 2.947 1.259 -0.694 
A -9 3.542 3.125 0.731 -0.059 
A -8 3.741 2.927 1.454 -0.603 
A -7 3.589 3.177 0.808 -0.608 
A -6 3.675 3.485 0.347   0.000 
A -5 3.710 3.767 -0.099 -0.300 
A -4 4.036 3.740 0.497 -0.100 
A -3 4.624 3.790 1.096 -0.054 
A -2 4.244 3.836 0.673 -0.297 
A -1 4.927 3.776       1.705*** -0.480 
A +1 5.688 3.772   2.442*   -2.430* 
A +2 5.147 3.617     1.979**        -1.634*** 
A +3 4.475 3.783 0.978 -0.591 
A +4 4.457 3.391 1.581 -0.824 
A +5 3.932 3.579 0.594 -0.399 
A +6 3.981 3.468 0.824 -0.231 
A +7 4.083 3.538 0.886 -0.030 
A +8 4.635 3.703 1.341 -1.140 
A +9 4.364 4.185 0.275 -0.500 
A +10 4.241 4.135 0.151 -0.357 
A +11 4.430 4.097 0.500 -1.006 
A +12 5.466 4.311 1.388 -0.834 
A +13 4.744 4.150 0.809 -0.352 
A +14 4.905 3.420       1.947*** -1.198 
A +15 4.546 3.229       1.761*** -0.856 
A +16 4.129 2.953       1.944*** -0.995 
A +17 4.269 3.290 1.548 -0.663 
A +18 3.989 3.400 0.911 -0.625 
A +19 4.085 3.368 1.232 -0.546 
A +20 4.404 3.081     2.013** -1.616 
A +21 4.353 3.558 1.324 -1.264 
A +22 4.669 3.696 1.338 -0.799 
A +23 4.433 3.612 1.236 -1.359 
A +24 4.694 4.145 0.772 -1.173 
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Table 4.6 
Announcement Interval Deleted Orders Regressions 
 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates related to the level of deleted orders per minute during the half-hour interval measurement immediately after the release of the 
corporate earnings announcement on a series of independent control variables. Independent control variables used are; Earnings surprise [ES], number of analysts [Analysts], log of 
enterprise value [LogEnt], time dummy [Time], co-location dummy [Colocation], and log of volume stock traded [LogVolume]. Standardised beta coefficients are reported expected for 
the intercept which is unstandardised. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in brackets. Significance levels: * significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** 
significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Intercept 
(t-statistic) 
ES 
(t-statistic) 
Analysts 
(t-statistic) 
LogEnt 
(t-statistic) 
Time 
(t-statistic) 
Co-location 
(t-statistic) 
LogVolume 
(t-statistic) 
F-
Value 
Prob>F Adj R-
squared 
5.807 
(8.665)* 
0.071 
(0.718) 
     0.515 0.475 0.005 
-0.731 
(-0.583) 
 0.492 
(5.764)* 
    33.229 <0.0001 0.235 
-14.253 
(-4.552)* 
  0.539 
(6.488)* 
   42.095 <0.0001 0.283 
5.426 
(7.051)* 
   0.065 
(0.661) 
  0.437 0.510 0.004 
4.069 
(4.242)* 
    0.218 
(2.281)** 
 5.202 0.025 0.038 
-7.953 
(-1.664)*** 
     0.272 
(2.880)* 
8.295 0.005 0.065 
-16.707 
(-3.778)* 
 
-0.001 
(-0.017) 
0.225 
(2.316)** 
0.429 
(4.399)* 
-0.001 
(-0.016) 
0.193 
(2.265)** 
0.040 
(0.446) 
10.437 <0.0001 0.357 
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The number of analysts and firm value were found to be a significant influence on the 
rate of deleted orders but, as with message traffic results, the intercept value is 
remains highly significant (at the 1 per cent level). Also the colocation dummy 
variable is once again significant in explaining differences in the rate of deleted 
orders. These results confirm the robustness of the previous findings that algorithmic 
trading activity increases in the period immediately after the release of corporate 
earnings announcements. 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
The evidence presented in this study has a number of important implications for our 
understanding of the trading behaviour of algorithmic traders around information 
shocks. Existing research has focused on the general trading activities of algorithmic 
traders and their impact on market quality. This study focused on how algorithmic 
traders respond around annual corporate earnings announcements and what effect the 
introduction of a co-location service had upon this observed behaviour. 
 
There was strong evidence, at least for this sample, that algorithmic traders increase 
their trading activity around corporate earnings announcements with a significant 
spike in activity immediately after the information release. After the first thirty 
minutes following the release this heightened activity begins to decline before 
returning to more normal levels around two and half hours after the announcement. 
This finding was robust to controls for other factors potentially influencing message 
traffic per minute (the proxy for algorithmic trading) such as the information content 
of the announcement, the expected degree of information asymmetry about the firm, 
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the size of the announcing firm, the time of the announcement and the volume of 
securities traded. Likewise, the results were robust to using deleted orders per minute 
as an alternative measure of algorithmic trading.  
 
These findings were consistent with the hypothesis that algorithmic traders utilise 
their speed advantage over other market participants and will increase their trading 
activity after corporate earnings announcements to utilise that advantage.  
Furthermore, the strong evidence of an increase in algorithmic trading following the 
introduction of the co-location facility by the ASX, especially in the immediate post-
announcement period, also supports this hypothesis. Reduced system latency has 
resulted in higher levels of algorithmic trading in response to corporate earnings 
announcements, after controlling for exogenous factors, which provides evidence of 
how increasing the speed of the trading system creates opportunities for trading 
algorithms to exploit. 
 
There was no evidence of algorithmic traders possessing private information that 
could be exploited in the immediate pre-announcement period. Algorithmic trading in 
the twelve trading hours prior to the information release remained insignificantly 
different from that during a normal non-announcement period. In addition, there was 
no evidence that algorithmic traders behave in the manner predicted for discretionary 
liquidity traders. There is no evidence of algorithmic traders withdrawing from the 
market in the lead-up to the announcement and then remaining inactive until the 
information asymmetry has been resolved. On the contrary, algorithmic trading 
activity was found to significantly increase immediately after the information release. 
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Overall, these results point to algorithmic traders playing an active role in the price 
adjustment process on the ASX following the release of new information contained in 
corporate earnings announcements. 
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Chapter 5: Venture Capitalists and the Initial Public 
Offering Process 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The third essay of this thesis empirically examines the role of venture capitalists (VC) 
in the initial public offering process. As the existing literature detailed in Chapter 2 
demonstrated, venture capital backing can play a substantial role in how other market 
participants perceive a potential new offering. The certification/monitoring model 
suggests that the presence of a venture capitalist on the register of a new offering can 
serve to certify the quality of the issue to other market participants. This may reduce 
the need to underprice the offer and implies improved post-IPO performance relative 
to non-VC-backed offerings. However, if promising new ventures are more reliant on 
alternative forms of finance, due to the prohibitive requirements of the venture 
capitalists, then those firms which have received venture capital financing will be of 
below average quality. In addition the need to establish a track record of success may 
encourage newer venture capital firms to rush their portfolio companies to market 
prematurely. If this is the case, then the adverse selection/grandstanding model holds 
that the presence of a venture capitalist on the registry conveys a negative signal about 
the quality of the offering to the market. This would necessitate a greater need to 
underprice the offering and implies a lower post-IPO performance relative to non-VC-
backed IPOs. 
 
Existing literature has produced mixed results about which of these effects dominates. 
Furthermore, the majority of previous studies have examined the effects of VC 
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participation in the IPO process in the United States and Europe. Very limited amount 
of research has been undertaken into the role of venture capitalists in markets that do 
not have such a mature VC industry. Using data of VC-backed and non-VC-backed 
IPOs in the Australian market, this study investigates the implications of venture 
capital participation in a developing venture capital market. 
 
The findings of this chapter are presented in accordance with the documented 
hypotheses derived in Section 2.6.3. Specifically the chapter investigates three main 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H5,1) predicts that venture capital-backed IPOs 
exhibit better IPO performance and better post-IPO operating and market performance 
(although with the difference declining over time) than non venture capital-backed 
IPOs. The second hypothesis (H5,2) predicts that venture capital-backed IPOs exhibit 
worse IPO performance and worse post-IPO operating and market performance (with 
an increasing difference over time) than non venture capital-backed IPOs. The third 
hypothesis (H5,3) predicts that IPOs backed by more experienced venture capital firms 
exhibited better IPO performance and better post-IPO operating and market 
performance than those backed by less experienced venture capital firms. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the 
institutional detail of the Australian venture capital market and its contrasts with the 
more commonly studied US venture capital market. Section 5.3 describes the dataset 
and provides summary statistics of the sampled data. Section 5.4 outlines the research 
design. Section 5.5 presents the empirical results and a summary of the primary 
findings. Finally section 5.6 provides a concluding summary of the chapter. 
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5.2 Institutional Detail 
 
The Australian venture capital industry differs from the more frequently examined 
markets, such as the United States, in terms of scale, investment focus and the skill 
sets of the venture capital managers. The Australian venture capital industry is 
relatively young compared to the United States and Europe. Whilst some venture 
capital existed in a very embryonic form from 1970 onwards, the industry in its 
current form did not begin to emerge until 1984. In this year the Commonwealth 
Government initiated the Management Investment Companies (MIC) Program to 
encourage venture capital investment in Australia. The Australian Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association (AVCAL) state that the market did not grow significantly 
until the 1990's, when Pooled Development Funds (PDF's) were introduced to replace 
the MIC scheme (AVCAL 2009). Even with such expansion the Australian VC market 
remains very small compared to its more mature peers overseas. Australian venture 
capitalists held around AUD 2 billion in funds under management in 2009, compared 
to the USD 179.4 billion under management by US venture capitalists in the same 
year (AVCAL 2009/NVCA 2010). This implies the Australian industry is equivalent 
of around one per cent of size of the US venture capital industry.152
 
  
The Australian VC industry also exhibits a different investment focus from the US 
venture capital industry. Traditional venture capital investments in the US have been 
directed towards high technology sectors such as health, biotechnology, 
communications and information technology (Sahlman 1990; Bygrave and Timmons 
                                                 
152 Calculated using the average December 2009 exchange rate of 0.902931US dollars to 1 Australian 
dollar. 
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1992; Gompers and Lerner 2000a). OECD figures report that almost 90 per cent of 
US venture capital investment activity occurs in these sectors whereas in Australia 
this figure is only around 20 per cent of investment activity (OECD 2007). Regan and 
Tunny (2009) suggested that the lack of a large venture-capital financed, high 
technology sector was possibly a function of the scale and geographical dispersion of 
economic activity in Australia. They noted in the US there was a concentration of 
high-tech industries and venture capital activity in a small number of regional clusters, 
such as Silicon Valley and Boston, whereas no such concentration exists in Australia. 
 
Australian venture capitalists also possess very different qualifications and 
background experience from their US counterparts. Cornelius (2005) found evidence 
that in Australia 64 per cent of venture capitalists came to the industry from 
backgrounds in financial management and consulting. Only 23 per cent of venture 
capitalists possessed relevant industry experience. In the US however, 54 per cent of 
venture capitalists came from a background in industry, whereas only 40 per cent 
came from financial management and consulting backgrounds. Furthermore, the study 
found evidence of an increasing gap between the skill sets of venture capitalists in 
Australia and the US. Between 1987 and 2002 there was an increase in the number of 
venture capitalists in Australia coming from financial management and consulting 
backgrounds (from 32 per cent to 64 per cent) whereas in the US the opposite 
occurred (percentage of venture capitalists with relevant industry experience went 
from 36 per cent to 54 per cent). Cornelius argued that this lack of relevant industry 
experience was a contributing factor behind the higher concentration on later stage 
investments in Australia relative to the US. 
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These systematic differences between the US and Australian venture capital markets 
suggest the findings of previous literature, which predominantly studies the US, might 
not be relevant in Australia. Therefore, the Australian venture capital market requires 
further investigation to determine if these institutional differences translate into 
performance differences. 
 
5.3 Data 
 
The initial sample consisted of 590 IPOs on the ASX between 1999 and 2005 
compiled using the Connect 4 database. Of these, 52 offerings were found to have 
venture capital backing. The venture capital-backed IPO's were identified via an 
inspection of the prospectus of each company in the initial sample. If this process 
indicated that a venture capitalist was either a director or shareholder in the company, 
then that company was designated as VC-backed. Venture capitalists were identified 
using a combination of the register of members maintained by the Australian Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (AVCAL), the Venture Economics 
VentureXpert Web database and other publicly available information. Multiple 
sources were used in order to confirm the correct identification of the venture 
capitalists.  
 
Each venture-capital-backed offering was then matched with a non-venture capital-
backed company in the same industry, approximately the same size and with a listing 
date as close to that of the VC-backed company as possible. This matching technique 
was consistent with that used in previous studies of matched samples (Megginson and 
Weiss 1991; Jain and Kini 1995; Wang et al. 2003; Chiang and Lo 2007).   
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Table 5.1 
Initial Public Offering Sample Composition 
 
This table provides summary statistics of the matched IPO sample for the period 1999 to 2005. Panel A 
provides details of the number (percentage) of VC-backed and non-VC-backed offerings in the sample 
classified by their GICS industry classification. Panel B provides details of the number (percentage) of 
VC-backed and non-VC-backed offerings categorised according to listing year during the sample 
period. 
 
 
Panel A: Sample classified by industry 
 
 
GICS Industry Classification 
Sample Composition 
VC-backed  
IPOs 
Non-VC-backed 
IPOs 
Commercial Services & Supplies 2 (3.85%) 2 (3.85%) 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 2 (3.85%) 1 (1.92%) 
Consumer Services 2 (3.85%) 2 (3.85%) 
Energy 2 (3.85%) 2 (3.85%) 
Food Beverage & Tobacco 2 (3.85%) 2 (3.85%) 
Health Care Equipment & Services 6 (11.54%) 6 (11.54%) 
Information Technology 1 (1.92%) 0 (0.00%) 
Media 2 (3.85%) 2 (3.85%) 
Metals & Mining 6 (11.54%) 7 (13.46%) 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 6 (11.54%) 6 (11.54%) 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology & Life Sciences 4 (7.69%) 4 (7.69%) 
Retailing 2 (3.85%) 2 (3.85%) 
Software & Services 9 (17.31%) 12 (23.08%) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 1 (1.92%) 1 (1.92%) 
Telecommunication Services 1 (1.92%) 1 (1.92%) 
Transportation 1 (1.92%) 1 (1.92%) 
Utilities 1 (1.92%) 1 (1.92%) 
GICS Code Not Applicable 2 (3.85%) 0 (0.00%) 
Totals 52 (100%) 52 (100.00%) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sample classified by offering year 
 
 
Offering year 
Sample Composition 
VC-backed IPOs Non-VC-backed IPOs 
1999 7 (13.46%) 8 (15.38%) 
2000 16 (30.77%) 15 (28.85%) 
2001 2 (3.85%) 4 (7.69%) 
2002 7 (13.46%) 5 (9.62%) 
2003 3 (5.77%) 3 (5.77%) 
2004 15 (28.85%) 16 (30.77%) 
2005 2 (3.85%) 0 (0.00%) 
Totals 52 (100.00%) 52 (100.00%) 
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Table 5.1 contains the summary statistics of the matched sample of VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed initial public offerings. Table 5.1 Panel A details the industry 
classification of each of the companies in the announcement sample. Unlike the 
OECD 2007 figures, the venture capital backed subsample is concentrated in the 
traditional sectors of health, biotechnology and software and IT services. Table 5.2 
Panel B details the announcement sample classified according to listing year. The VC-
backed subsample is highly concentrated in the calendar years 2000 and 2004. This is 
consistent with the previous literature which found that venture capitalists often time 
their offerings for ‘hot’ periods in the IPO market (Bygrave and Timmons 1992; 
Lerner 1994b). 
 
The details of each IPO were sourced from the Connect 4 database, whilst information 
on venture capitalist ownership levels and board seats was manually collected from 
each company's prospectus. Share prices adjusted for dividends and accounting 
measures were sourced from the Aspect Huntley FinAnalysis database. Market index 
data was sourced from the SIRCA Australian Equities Tick History database. 
Information about the venture capital firms was sourced from the companies 
themselves (usually via the information contained on the company’s website). 
 
5.4 Research Design 
 
This study examines the difference between VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs in 
terms of three performance measures; IPO performance, operating performance after 
the IPO and the market performance after the IPO. Similar to the technique of Wang 
et al. (2003), the certification/monitoring model is tested by examining the IPO 
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pricing, size, underpricing, cost and quality of the underwriters and auditors. The 
adverse selection/grandstanding model is tested by examining company age, operating 
and financial performance as at the IPO year. In order to determine if the 
certification/monitoring model or the adverse selection/grandstanding model best 
explains the VC’s influence on the IPO process, the post-IPO operating and market 
performance is also examined.  
 
IPO pricing is measured using the P/E ratio and book/market ratio. The P/E ratio is 
defined as the ratio of offering price to earnings per share before the IPO. The 
book/market ratio is defined as the ratio of net tangible asset per share to the offering 
price. Wang et al (2003) argue that these two ratios measure the value of the IPO at 
the offering price. Offering size is measured by the value of the shares on offer to the 
public in the IPO. 
 
IPO underpricing is defined as the closing price on the first day of trading minus the 
offering price divided by the offering price. IPO cost is measured using the ratio of 
net proceeds. The ratio of net proceeds is defined as the net proceeds (excluding all 
floatation costs in the IPO process) received by the issuing company divided by the 
total IPO proceeds. IPO underpricing is a complex phenomenon with many potential 
influences on the degree of underpricing exhibited. To test the causality of venture 
capital participation on the observed IPO underpricing, an OLS regression model with 
various independent control variables is used. This model is consistent with those 
used in previous studies (Barry et al. 1990; Lin 1996; Hamao et al. 2000; Wong and 
Wong 2008).  The regression model is given in equation 5.1. 
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𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐵 𝑀⁄ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟   (5.1) 
 
Where, underpricing is defined as the closing price on the first day of trading minus 
the offering price divided by the offering price. VC is a dummy variable set to one if 
the IPO is backed by a venture capitalist or zero otherwise. LogProc is the log of the 
proceeds of the IPO (offering size in terms of the amount of capital raised in the IPO. 
LogMkt is the log of the market capitalisation of the firm on the first day of listing. 
These two variables control for any size effect in the level of underpricing. B/M Ratio 
is the book to market ratio (the ratio of net tangible asset per share to the offering 
price). This variable is a proxy for the future growth prospects for the firm. LogUnder 
is the log of the underwriter’s market share and is used as a proxy for underwriter 
quality. Age is the age of the firm measured from the time of incorporation to the 
listing date. Year is a dummy variable set to one if the listing date is between 1999 
and 2000 or zero otherwise. The Dot.com bubble of the mid 90s to late 2000 was 
known to have had a distorting effect upon underpricing in IPOs. This variable 
controls for this effect. 
 
Auditor quality is measured using the approach taken by previous researchers 
(Feltham et al 1991; Megginson and Weiss 1991; Wang et al 2003). The Big Five 
accounting firms (Arthur Anderson, PwC, Ernst and Young, Deliotte Touche 
Tohmatsu, KPMG)153
                                                 
153 The collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002 meant that the Big Five became the Big Four in the latter 
part of the study. 
 are differentiated from their smaller competitors. The Big Five 
are coded 1 and the smaller accounting firms are coded 0. Underwriter quality is 
defined as the share of IPO deals underwritten by that firm. This is calculated as the 
212 
 
sum of IPO proceeds underwritten by that firm during the sample period 1999 to 2005 
for that firm divided by the total proceeds of all IPOs during this period. Previous 
research supporting the certification model has found a positive relationship between 
auditor and underwriter quality and the backing of venture capitalists (Megginson and 
Weiss 1991; Lin 1996; Wang et al. 2003). Venture capitalists are likely to have 
experience at bringing companies to market in the past and will typically have built up 
relationships with auditors, underwriters and institutional shareholders. Furthermore, 
because venture capitalists have their own reputational capital at stake they have an 
incentive to reveal information truthfully about the new issue. This should enable VC-
backed IPOs to attract higher quality auditors and underwriters since it lowers the cost 
of due diligence for these firms. 
 
Company age is defined as the time span between the year of incorporation of the 
company itself or its predecessor (for those companies that were restructured prior to 
going public) and the IPO year. If the company age is shorter for VC-backed 
companies than for non-VC-backed companies, this would support the grandstanding 
model, since this model suggests that younger venture capitalists have an incentive to 
bring companies to the market early in order to establish a track record of success. 
However, shorter age can also indicate evidence of the monitoring benefits of venture 
capital participation as firms supported by a VC may reach the stage of requiring 
access to public funds more quickly than those without such backing. 
 
The operating and financial performance of the company as at the IPO year is 
measured using debt ratio, return on assets (ROA) in the year before the IPO and 
return on equity (ROE) in the year before the IPO. Debt ratio is defined as the 
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percentage of total debt to total assets in the last financial year before the IPO (Year -
1). ROA is measured as earnings before interest divided by total assets less outside 
equity interests in the financial year prior to the IPO (Year -1). Likewise, ROE is 
measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by shareholders equity 
less outside equity interests in the financial year prior to the IPO (Year -1). The 
certification/monitoring model predicts that VC-backed offerings will have less need 
to demonstrate stronger operating performance prior to the offering since the presence 
of the venture capitalists already attests to the quality of the issue. The adverse 
selection model, however, predicts that firms with venture capital support will be the 
‘lemons’ and hence have an incentive to window dress operating performance in the 
year prior to the offering. 
 
Operating performance after the IPO is examined using ROA and ROE in the 
financial year of the IPO (Year 0) and the two financial years following the IPO 
(Year’s 1 and 2). The change in ROA is also measured to examine improvements or 
declines in operating performance in the years following the IPO. Change in ROA is 
calculated as the ROA in the measurement year minus the ROA in the previous year 
divided by the ROA in the previous year. 
 
The market performance after the IPO is measured using a series of buy and hold 
excess returns at intervals of three months, six months, one year, two years and three 
years after the IPO listing date consistent with previous studies (Brav and Gompers 
1997; Hamao et al 2000; Wang et al 2003; de Silva Rosa 2003; Wong and Wong 
2008). The raw buy and hold stock return in a given period is measured as the closing 
price (adjusted for dividends) for that period following the IPO minus the first day 
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closing price divided by the first day closing price. Raw returns on the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index (AOAI) are also calculated over each of the holding periods to 
account for general market movements during these periods. AOAI returns are 
calculated using the same method as that for the IPO stock returns. Excess returns are 
then calculated using equation 5.2. 
 
𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑂𝐴𝐼𝑡   (5.2) 
 
Where: 
ERi,t = The excess return on stock i over holding period t 
Ri,t = The return on stock i (adjusted for dividends) over holding period t 
AOAIt = The return on the AOAI index over holding period t  
 
To further test the differences between the market performance of VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed IPOs wealth relatives, similar to those used by Brav and Gompers 
(1997) and Hamao et al (2000), were also calculated. This variable measures the 
relative change in wealth for VC-backed IPOs and their matched non-VC-backed 
equivalent. The wealth relative for each matched pair of firms was then aggregated for 
the same holding periods relative to the IPO date as the excess returns (that is 
intervals of three months, six months, one year, two years and three years). A wealth 
relative of greater than one indicates that the VC-backed firms have outperformed 
their non-VC-backed peers over that holding period. A value less than one indicates 
underperformance by VC-backed firms relative to their non-VC-backed equivalents. 
One-sample T-tests were then used to determine if the aggregate wealth relative for 
each holding period was significantly different from one.  
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Each wealth relative was calculated using equation 5.3. 
 
𝑊𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = ∑ �1+𝑉𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡��1+𝑁𝑉𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡�𝑛𝑓=1    (5.3) 
 
Where: 
WRf,t = Wealth relative for f sample firms over holding period t 
VCERi,t = Excess return on VC-backed firm i over holding period t 
NVCERi,t = Excess return on matched non-VC-backed firm i over holding period t 
 
5.5  Empirical Results 
 
The differences between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms using measures of 
IPO performance, post-IPO operating performance and post-IPO market performance 
are reported in this section. The certification role of VCs is examined by studying IPO 
size, underpricing, cost and quality of underwriters and auditors. The grandstanding 
theory of VC behaviour is tested by examining company age, operating and financial 
performance as at the IPO year. Furthermore, by examining the post-IPO operating 
and market performance differences between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms it 
is possible to ascertain whether the certification/monitoring model or adverse 
selection/grandstanding model is more dominant in describing the role of VCs in the 
IPO process. The empirical results are divided into subsections based on the type of 
measures examined. Section 5.5.1 reports the results of IPO performance measures. 
Section 5.5.2 reports the findings on post-IPO operating performance. Section 5.5.3 
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details the post-IPO market performance findings. Finally, section 5.5.4 reports the 
findings on the differences between performances subdivided according to the age (as 
a proxy for experience) of the VC firm.   
 
5.5.1 IPO performance 
 
The results for the IPO performance measures are given in Table 5.2. VC-backed 
companies have a lower median book/market ratio (significant at the 5% level) 
indicating they are able to bring the offering to the market at a higher price per dollar 
of net tangible assets than non-VC-backed companies. This result is consistent with 
the certification model and the findings of previous research such as Jain and Kini 
(1995) and Wang et al (2003). However, the P/E ratios for both VC and non-VC-
backed companies are negative, with the median ratio for the VC-backed companies a 
larger negative, although the difference is not significant. The measure for size, 
offering proceeds, shows both a larger mean and median for VC-backed companies 
compared to non-VC-backed companies although the difference is insignificant.  
 
The results for underpricing show that VC-backed companies exhibit a lower median 
underpricing than non-VC-backed companies, although the difference is not 
statistically significant. VC-backed IPOs are able to attract higher quality underwriters 
as measured using underwriter market share (significant at the 5 per cent level using 
the t-test and 1 per cent level using the non-parametric test). This result is consistent 
with previous literature (Megginson and Weiss 1991; Lin 1996; Wang et al. 2003). 
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Table 5.2 
IPO Performance Measures 
 
This table presents the IPO performance measures for VC-backed and non-VC-backed matched IPO subsamples listing between 1999 and 2005 on the ASX. Mean (median) results are 
reported for each variable. Independent sample t-statistics and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Z score are reported for each variable.  Significance levels: * significant at the 0.01 level; ** 
significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 VC-Backed IPOs mean 
(median) 
Non-VC-Backed IPOs mean 
(median) 
t-statistic 
(Z score) 
Sample Size 
(VC/Non-VC) 
P/E ratio -62.26 
(-7.56) 
161.10 
(-7.22) 
-1.133 
(-0.815) 
51/52 
Book/market ratio 0.43 
(0.26) 
0.40 
(0.34) 
0.176 
(-2.179**) 
52/52 
Offering proceeds (AUD million) 55.69 
(11.75) 
37.03 
(8.00) 
0.531 
(-1.35) 
52/52 
Underpricing 25.08% 
(4.35%) 
16.94% 
(8.50%) 
0.673 
(-0.231) 
52/52 
Ratio of net proceeds 87.67% 
(88.82%) 
88.60% 
(89.40%) 
-0.828 
(-0.163) 
52/52 
Underwriter quality 7.28% 
(1.08%) 
3.11% 
(0.311%) 
2.150** 
(-2.663)* 
52/52 
Auditor quality 0.67 
(1.00) 
0.57 
(1.00) 
1.206 
(-1.204) 
52/52 
Company age (year) 5.67 
(4.00) 
8.82 
(5.50) 
-1.672*** 
(-1.693***) 
52/52 
Debt ratio 27.65% 
(12.10%) 
26.11% 
(13.50%) 
0.200 
(-0.124) 
52/52 
ROA (Year -1) -6.87% 
(-0.52%) 
-8.42% 
(-0.99%) 
0.199 
(-0.273) 
52/52 
ROE (Year -1) -7.61% 
(-0.77%) 
28.81% 
(-0.87%) 
0.183 
(-0.910) 
52/52 
  
218 
 
Although the certification model also predicts that presence of a VC should increase 
the net proceeds from the IPO since their participation should lower the risks for other 
parties involved in the process such as the underwriter. The results however, indicate 
that the costs are not lower for VC-backed companies than non-VC-backed 
companies, although the differences are not significant. This result is not consistent 
with the findings of Megginson and Weiss (1991) who found that the participation of 
a VC in the IPO process acts to lower the cost of the issue. These results are, however, 
in line with the findings of Wang et al (2003). The measure of auditor quality shows a 
higher mean for VC-backed companies than non-VC-backed companies although the 
median is the same for both and therefore the results were not significant.  
 
The measure of company age shows that venture capitalists are able to bring their 
companies to the market more quickly with an average duration of 5.67 years (median 
of 4 years) from the time of incorporation to the date of listing whereas non-VC 
backed companies had an average duration of 8.82 years (median of 5.5 years) before 
listing. This result (which is significant at the 10 per cent level) could be interpreted 
as either support for the certification/monitoring model by illustrating the 
effectiveness of the monitoring role of the venture capitalist in assisting the rapid 
development of their portfolio companies (enabling them to bring the companies to 
the market earlier), or it could indicate support for the grandstanding model by 
illustrating the venture capitalists prematurely bring their companies to the market. 
However, the measures of operating and market performance at the time of the IPO 
[debt ratio, ROA (Year -1) and ROE (Year -1)] for VC-backed companies all exhibit 
lower median values than those for non-VC-backed which in not consistent with the 
predictions of the adverse selection/grandstanding model.  
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The results for the cross sectional analysis of IPO underpricing is reported in Table 
5.3. The coefficient for the VC dummy variable is significant but was not found to be 
significant. Instead offer size, firm size and whether the IPO took place during the 
Dot.com period plays a more important role in determining the level of underpricing. 
This result stands in contrast to the findings of Barry et al. (1990), Hamao et al. 
(2000), Francis and Hasan (2001) but is consistent with the findings of Franze (2003) 
and Wong and Wong (2008). Also unlike previous findings underwriter quality (as 
proxied by market share) was not found to significantly influence the level of 
underpricing (although the coefficient was negative which is consistent with previous 
findings). These results imply that in the Australian market, company specific factors 
and general market conditions play a more important role in determine the degree of 
underpricing than third party certification. 
 
Overall the results of the IPO performance measures indicate some support for the 
certification/monitoring model in terms of pricing, size although this does not 
translate into a lower IPO issuing cost. The results of the measures of company age, 
operating and financial performance do not appear to support the adverse 
selection/grandstanding model. 
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Table 5.3 
IPO Underpricing Regression Results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates related to the level of IPO underpricing on a series of independent control variables. Independent control variables used are; VC 
dummy [VC], Log of offer proceeds [LogProc], log of market capitalisation [LogMkt], book to market ratio [B/M Ratio], log of underwriter market share [LogUnder], firm age [Age] 
and year dummy [Year]. Standardised beta coefficients are reported expected for the intercept which is unstandardised. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in brackets.  Significance 
levels: * significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Intercept 
(t-statistic) 
VC 
(t-statistic) 
LogProc 
(t-statistic) 
LogMkt 
(t-statistic) 
B/M Ratio 
(t-statistic) 
LogUnder 
(t-statistic) 
Age 
(t-statistic) 
Year 
(t-statistic) 
F-
Value 
Prob>F Adj R2 
1.169 
(13.675)* 
0.067 
(0.673) 
      0.453 0.502 0.004 
0.423 
(0.743) 
 0.861 
(2.945)** 
     20.487 <0.0001 0.212 
0.740 
(1.081) 
  -0.063 
(2.635)** 
    33.403 <0.0001 0.148 
1.224 
(18.883)* 
   -0.059 
(0.599) 
   0.359 0.550 0.006 
1.173 
(6.559)* 
    -0.019 
(-0.181) 
  0.033 0.857 0.000 
1.293 
(12.848)* 
     -0.102 
(-1.032) 
 1.065 0.304 0.001 
0.526 
(0.476) 
      0.3154 
(2.871)** 
22.469 <0.001 0.148 
0.656 
(0.489) 
 
0.144 
(1.283) 
0.582 
(2.168)** 
-0.560 
(2.197)** 
-0.098 
(-0.945) 
-0.073 
(-0.565) 
-0.071 
(-0.610) 
0.237 
(2.231)** 
48.574 <0.001 0.193 
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Table 5.4 
Post-IPO Operating Performance Measures 
 
This table presents the post-IPO operating performance measures for VC-backed and non-VC-backed matched IPO subsamples listing between 1999 and 2005 on the ASX. Mean 
(median) results are reported for each variable. Independent sample t-statistics and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Z score are reported for each variable.  Significance levels: * significant at 
the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 VC-Backed IPOs mean 
(median) (%) 
Non-VC-Backed IPOs mean 
(median) (%) 
t-statistic 
(Z score) 
Sample Size 
(VC/Non-VC) 
ROA (Year 0) -19.78 
(-7.37) 
-10.83 
(-7.40) 
-1.273 
(-0.478) 
52/52 
ROA (Year 1) 42.24 
(-21.13) 
-26.98 
(-13.91) 
-1.216 
(-0.783) 
49/51 
ROA (Year 2) -33.43 
(-16.08) 
-32.69 
(-14.83) 
-0.064 
(-0.440) 
46/50 
ROE (Year 0) -23.09 
(-8.09) 
-12.94 
(-11.07) 
-0.659 
(-0.338) 
52/52 
ROE (Year 1) -37.15 
(-23.88) 
-42.52 
(-18.94) 
-0.207 
(-0.031) 
49.51 
ROE (Year 2) -32.23 
(-14.45) 
-51.96 
(-17.91) 
0.667 
(-0.121) 
46/50 
Change in ROE in Year 0 -15.47 
(-7.08) 
-41.75 
(-9.34) 
0.844 
(-0.631) 
52/52 
Change in ROE in Year 1 -12.18 
(-6.56) 
-30.05 
(-4.96) 
0.529 
(-0.197) 
49.51 
Change in ROE in Year 2 7.88 
(-0.65) 
-8.26 
(-2.03) 
0.414 
(-0.825) 
46/50 
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5.5.2 Operating Performance after the IPO 
 
The results for the operating performance after the IPO measures are given in Table 
5.4. These measures examine the operating performance of the VC-backed and non-
VC-backed companies in the financial year of the listing date (Year 0) and the two 
financial years after the listing date (Years 1 and 2). The size of the sample declines 
over time as some of the companies were eliminated from the sample group due to 
takeovers or corporate failures. 
 
The results in Table 5.4 show that both VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies 
exhibit negative ROA and ROE in the year of, and the years immediately following, 
the listing date. This is true for both the mean and median values. The results for the 
ROA measure demonstrate lower average and median values for the VC-backed 
companies than for the non-VC-backed companies in all of the periods measured 
which is consistent with the adverse selection/grandstanding model although the 
differences are small and not statistically significant. However, the change in ROE 
variable exhibits a slower decline for VC-backed companies than for the non-VC-
backed companies in Year 0 and Year 2 although a larger decline in Year 1. This 
result is more in line with the predictions of the certification/monitoring model but 
again the differences are not statistically significant. 
 
Overall, the results of the operational performance measures do not provide clear 
evidence of support for either of the prediction models. There is some very weak 
support for adverse selection/grandstanding model but also some weak support for the 
certification/monitoring model. These results contrast with those of Wang et al (2003) 
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who found results consistent with the adverse selection/grandstanding and those of 
Jain and Kini (1995) who found results consistent with the certification/monitoring 
model. 
  
5.5.3 Market performance after the IPO 
 
The results for the market performance measures after the IPO are given in Table 5.5. 
Panel A details the mean (median) holding period excess returns over measurement 
intervals of three months, six months, one year, two years and three years from the 
listing date. Panel B details the wealth relatives for holding periods of three months, 
six months, one year, two years and three years from the listing date. As with the 
operational performance after the IPO measures the sample size of the market 
performance measures declines as the time from the listing date increases due to 
takeovers and corporate failures. 
 
The mean and median buy and hold excess returns for the VC-backed companies are 
higher (although in the six month, one year, two years and three years periods the 
median values are negative) in all measurements periods (except for the three-month 
VC-backed mean excess return which is slightly lower). The mean returns on the VC-
backed companies are positive in each holding period measured whereas the mean 
returns on the non-VC backed companies become negative after the first six months 
(the median returns on both VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies are negative 
over each of the measurement intervals). Whilst most of these values are not 
statistically significant the three year excess return are significant (at the 10 per cent 
level).   
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Table 5.5 
Post-IPO Market Performance Measures 
 
This table presents the post-IPO market performance measures for VC-backed and non-VC-backed matched IPO subsamples listing between 1999 and 2005 on the ASX. Mean 
(median) results are reported for each variable. Independent sample t-statistics and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Z score are reported for each variable.  Significance levels: * 
significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Panel A: Holdings period returns from IPO date 
 
 VC-Backed IPOs mean 
(median) (%) 
Non-VC-Backed IPOs mean 
(median) (%) 
t-statistic 
(Z score) 
Sample Size 
(VC/Non-VC) 
Three month holding period 14.91 
(0.19) 
15.87 
(-5.00) 
-0.077 
(-0.390) 
52/52 
Six month holding period 13.64 
(-11.17) 
6.91 
(-16.85) 
0.325 
(-0.611) 
48/52 
One year holding period 4.27 
(-19.52) 
-4.26 
(-28.87) 
0.420 
(-0.718) 
48/52 
Two year holding period 25.50 
(-43.82) 
-9.34 
(-47.90) 
0.978 
(-0.867) 
46/51 
Three year holding period 25.25 
(-57.58) 
-45.46 
(-70.42) 
       1.820*** 
      (-1.752***) 
43/49 
 
Panel B: Wealth relatives from IPO date 
 
 Wealth Relative t-statistic Sample Size 
Three month holding period 
 
1.178       1.789*** 52 
Six month holding period 
 
1.562   2.695* 48 
One year holding period 
 
2.201     2.233** 48 
Two year holding period 
 
1.482 0.806 46 
Three year holding period 1.779 0.964 43 
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When examining the post-IPO market performance using the wealth relative measure 
there is evidence of a significant outperformance by VC-backed IPOs against their 
matched non-VC-backed counterparts. The wealth relative for all holding periods 
measured is greater than one indicating that VC-backed IPOs outperform non-VC-
backed IPOs. The level of outperformance peaks at the one year holding interval 
before declining in later periods. For the three, six and twelve month holding periods 
these results are statistically significant (at the 10 per cent, 1 per cent and 5 per cent 
levels respectively). 
 
These results demonstrate that VC-backed companies outperform non-VC-backed 
companies after allowing for broad market movements for at least three years 
following the listing date. Additionally the VC-backed companies continue to 
outperform even after the mandatory 2-year escrow period has passed.
154
 
 These results are consistent with the predictions of the certification/monitoring 
model and are also consistent with the findings of Brav and Gompers (1997) who 
found better long term market performance of VC-backed IPOs over non-VC-backed 
IPOs. 
5.5.4 Differences between performance by VC age 
 
The results for the IPO performance, operational performance after the IPO, and 
market performance after the IPO, generally support the certification/monitoring 
model although there was some weak support for the adverse selection/grandstanding 
model using the operational performance metrics. In this section the performance 
                                                 
154 11 March 2002 the mandatory 2-year escrow agreement was removed for VC funds but not for the 
founders or other promoters of the offering. Approximately 62% of the sample is subject to this 
restriction with the remainder listing after that date.  
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differences between IPO companies backed by older VC firms and those supported by 
younger VC firms are examined to determine if there is any stronger evidence of 
differences consistent with the predictions of the grandstanding model or if support 
for the certification/monitoring model is uniform across VC firms regardless of 
experience. The time between the incorporation of the VC firm and the listing date for 
each VC-backed IPO is used classify VC age. VC age is then used as a proxy for the 
experience and prestige of the venture capital firm. The results are shown in Table 
5.6. 
 
Table 5.6 
Summary Statistics of Age of VC firms 
This table shows the mean and median age (and standard deviation) of VC firms in the IPO sample. VC 
Age is defined as the number of years between the incorporation of the VC firm and the VC-backed 
IPO listing date. 
 Mean  
(Yrs) 
Median  
(Yrs) 
Standard Deviation 
(Yrs) 
Sample Size 
VC Age 8.39 7.00 5.28 52 
 
 
Similar to Gompers (1996) and Wang et al (2003), VC-backed IPOs are partitioned 
into two subsamples; those backed by more experienced (older) VC firms and those 
backed by less experienced (younger) VC firms. Using the median age of seven years 
as the boundary a VC firm is classified as ‘old’ if it’s age is older than seven years 
and ‘young’ if it’s age is seven years or younger. This boundary is consistent with that 
used by Gompers (1996) of six years and Wang et al (2003) of eight years. The 
differences between IPO offering proceeds, underpricing, underwriter and auditor 
quality, company age, ROA (Years 1 and 2), change in ROA (Years 1 and 2), together 
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with the three month, six month, one year, two year and three years excess returns are 
examined for the two subsamples. The results are presented in Table 5.7. 
 
The results show that older venture capitalists are able to bring companies to the 
market at much higher values, with the average offering proceeds of older VC-backed 
IPOs equal to AUD 105.53 million (AUD 13.50 million median) versus an average 
offering proceeds of younger VC-backed IPOs equal to a much lower AUD 12.97 
million (AUD 9.00 million median). These differences are significant at the 15 per 
cent level.  
 
The underpricing measure demonstrates lower average underpricing for the older VC-
backed IPOs than the younger VC-backed IPOs with the median results showing 
overpricing for the younger VC-backed IPOs (older VC-backed IPOs exhibit evidence 
of median underpricing). These results are significant at the 10 per cent level. This 
suggests that younger venture capitalist firms are less adept at pricing the offer, with 
their portfolio companies brought to the market either significantly undervalued or, 
more commonly, overvalued. This is consistent with the predictions of the adverse 
selection/grandstanding model with younger VC’s rushing the companies to market at 
valuations inconsistent with the market consensus, whereas older VC’s are waiting for 
more favourable conditions to bring their companies to the market resulting in lower 
underpricing and more ‘accurate’ pricing. It is also worth noting that the company age 
variable shows the mean age (but not the median) is lower for younger VC-backed 
companies than for older VC-backed companies (although these results were not 
statistically significant) which is also consistent with the grandstanding model. 
228 
 
Table 5.7 
VC Age Subsamples Performance Measures 
 
This table presents the IPO performance, post-IPO operating performance and post-IPO market performance measures for old and young VC-backed IPOs listing between 1999 and 
2005 on the ASX. VC-backed IPOs are classified as ‘old’ if the VC age variable is greater than seven years and ‘young’ if the VC age variable is seven years or less. Mean (median) 
results are reported for each variable. Independent sample t-statistics and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Z score are reported for each variable.  Significance levels: * significant at the 0.01 
level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.10 level; **** significant at the 0.15 level. 
 
 Old VC-Backed IPOs mean 
(median) 
Young VC-Backed IPOs mean 
(median) 
t-statistic 
(Z score) 
Sample Size 
(VC/Non-VC) 
Offering proceeds (AUD million) 105.53 
(13.50) 
12.97 
(9.00) 
           1.495**** 
          (-1.506)**** 
24/28 
Underpricing 21.81% 
(8.50%) 
27.89% 
(-4.09%) 
  -0.273 
        (-1.845***) 
24/28 
Underwriter quality 10.24% 
(1.24%) 
4.50% 
(0.88%) 
         1.716*** 
(-1.07) 
24/28 
Auditor quality 0.83 
(1.00) 
0.54 
(1.00) 
       2.412** 
      (-2.258**) 
24/28 
Company age (year) 6.50 
(3.50) 
4.96 
(4.50) 
   0.889 
  (-0.364) 
24/28 
ROA (Year 1) -18.79% 
(4.47%) 
-62.89% 
(-29.66%) 
       2.355** 
    (-2.224)* 
23/26 
ROA (Year 2) -27.81% 
(-8.43%) 
-38.16% 
(-35.78%) 
        -1.925*** 
           (-1.444****) 
21/25 
Change in ROA in Year 1 -3.16% 
(-0.80%) 
-34.48% 
(-11.42%) 
        2.789** 
     (-2.875*) 
23/26 
Change in ROA in Year 2 -6.32% 
(0.40%) 
27.55% 
(4.33%) 
         -1.942*** 
         (-1.731***) 
21/25 
Three month holding period 19.52% 
(4.52%) 
10.96% 
(-10.30%) 
    0.488 
   (-0.753) 
24/28 
Six month holding period -2.30% 
(-14.62%) 
29.58% 
(-8.32%) 
   -1.005 
   (-0.515) 
24/24 
One year holding period -17.56% 
(-24.48%) 
26.09% 
(-3.59%) 
         -1.694*** 
   (-0.907) 
24/24 
Two year holding period -14.86% 
(-39.01%) 
65.87% 
(-51.11%) 
           -1.481**** 
   (-0.165) 
23/23 
Three year holding period 34.86% 
(-32.27%) 
15.18% 
(-60.72%) 
    0.283 
   (-0.486) 
22/21 
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Underwriter quality is significantly higher for older VC-backed IPOs than younger 
VC backed IPOs (at the 10 per cent level). The underwriter for older VC-backed IPOs 
typically has a 10.24 per cent market share whereas for younger VC-Backed IPOs this 
figure is 4.50 per cent. Auditor quality shows a significantly (at the 5 per cent level) 
higher mean result for older VC-backed IPO’s than younger VC-backed IPO’s. This 
result is consistent with the predictions of the certification/monitoring model in that 
portfolio companies of older VC firms are able to leverage the greater expertise and 
contacts of their more experienced investors than is the case for the portfolio 
companies of younger VC firms. The mean auditor quality score of the younger VC-
backed IPO’s of 0.54 is very similar to the value of 0.57 given for non-VC-backed 
IPO’s in Table 5.2. 
 
The post-IPO operating measures of ROA and change in ROA are entirely consistent 
with the predictions of the grandstanding model. The results (which are all statistically 
significant) indicated lower ROA for younger VC-backed IPO’s in both Year 1 and 
Year 2 after the listing year. However, the change in ROA improves more quickly for 
younger VC-backed IPO’s, such that by Year 2 the change has become significantly 
positive. These results confirm that younger VC-backed companies are coming to the 
market before they are ready (hence the lower ROA values) but that they improve 
more quickly than the older VC-backed IPO’s in the years following their listing as 
they reach the same level of development as their older VC-backed peers were closer 
to the date of their public offering. The post-IPO market measures show mixed results 
with higher buy and hold period returns in the three-month interval and three-year 
interval for older VC-backed IPOs but higher buy and hold returns for younger VC-
backed IPO’s in the other measurement intervals. Those results that are statistically 
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significant, the one- and two-year excess returns are not consistent with the adverse 
selection/grandstanding model which would predict a lower market performance after 
the IPO. 
 
Overall, there is evidence that older venture capital firms, through their experience, 
are able to bring their companies to the market more quickly, at higher valuations and 
with more consistent offering pricing than younger venture capitalist firms. Older VC-
backed IPOs also benefit from higher operating performance in the years immediately 
after the listing. The evidence on younger venture capital firms, however, is more 
consistent with the adverse selection/grandstanding model. Younger VC-backed 
IPO’s exhibit lower valuations, tended towards the extremes in pricing with either 
larger underpricing or common overpricing. They also tended to have lower post-IPO 
operating performance and lower post-IPO market performance but with some 
evidence that these performance differences diminished over time subsequent to the 
public offering. These results confirm the hypothesis (H5.3) that IPOs backed by more 
experienced VC firms exhibit better IPO performance and better post-IPO operating 
and market performance. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
This study has examined the certification/monitoring model and the adverse 
selection/grandstanding model using IPO pricing measures and post-IPO operating 
and market performance measures and has found some significant results. There was 
some evidence that VC-backed IPO’s were brought to the market at higher valuations, 
more quickly, and with lower median underpricing (although with no corresponding 
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reduction in the issuing costs) than those without the backing of a venture capitalist. 
This confirms the prediction of the certification/monitoring model and is in contrast to 
the previous findings of da Silva Rosa et al (2003), who were unable to find any 
evidence of support for the certification model using IPO pricing measures in 
Australia. This may be the result of differences in the research method or it could 
reflect a greater ‘maturing’ of the Australian market since the earlier study. Also 
despite the structure and scale differences between the Australian and US venture 
capital market, these results confirm many of the findings of previous US focused 
studies.   
 
The post-IPO operating performance measures for all VC-backed IPO’s were 
somewhat mixed with weak evidence for both models but the post-IPO market 
performance measures showed evidence of support for the certification/monitoring 
model with consistently stronger post-IPO performance for the VC-backed companies 
compared to non-VC-backed companies (although both groups exhibited negative 
returns in each of the measurements intervals). This difference was particularly 
pronounced when using wealth relative measures of post-IPO. When benchmarked 
against their matched non-VC-backed peers, the VC-backed IPOs significantly 
outperformed over all of the holding periods examined.  
 
When the sample was subdivided into older VC-backed IPO’s and younger VC-
backed IPO’s a much clearer picture of the effects of VC participation emerges. There 
is evidence of support for the certification/monitoring model in older VC firms and 
evidence of support for the adverse selection/grandstanding model in younger VC 
firms. This supports the third hypothesis (H5,3) that predicts that IPOs backed by more 
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experienced venture capital firms exhibited better IPO performance and better post-
IPO operating and market performance than those backed by less experienced venture 
capital firms. Thus, we would conclude that the experience of the venture capital firm 
plays a crucial role in determining whether potential investors consider the backing of 
a VC as beneficial or not to a listing company. 
 
Overall, this study found strong, but not conclusive, support for hypothesis one (H5,1) 
which predicts that venture capital-backed IPOs exhibit better IPO performance and 
better post-IPO operating and market performance (although with the difference 
declining over time) than non venture capital-backed IPOs. This suggests that the 
certification/monitoring model dominates in the Australian market.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
The issues examined within this dissertation are a fundamental part of the functioning 
of secondary markets and the broader integrity of the financial system. The fair 
valuation of equity securities is dependent upon information about the nature of future 
cash flows and inherent risks contained within the security. Thus, the speed by which 
the information contained in corporate earnings announcements is incorporated into 
prices, the behaviour of algorithmic traders around such announcements, or the 
insights that venture capitalist backing of newly listing companies has for third party 
investors, all serve an important function in influencing the efficiency of the equity 
market.  
 
The volume of existing literature in Chapter 2 demonstrated the enormous importance 
that scholars have placed on understanding how these aspects of market efficiency 
and trading behaviour influence the price formation process. And yet the discordant 
nature of that research also demonstrated that much more work remains to be done 
before we have a comprehensive understanding of these phenomena. The three essays 
of this dissertation represent another step along the path towards that understanding. 
 
The first essay of this dissertation examined the intraday speed of adjustment of stock 
returns to the information contained in preliminary final earnings announcements by 
companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). The mechanisms operating 
on the ASX are quite different to those operating on the markets that most previous 
literature has examined. In particular, the existence of automatic exchange enforced 
trading halts contrasts with the US equity markets that are more frequently studied in 
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existing research. The study found that informationally driven abnormal returns are 
limited to the pre-open phase immediately after the release of the announcement 
consistent with the expectations of the efficient markets hypothesis. This occurred 
regardless of whether the announcement was released during or outside of trading 
hours. Furthermore there was little evidence of strategic timing of announcements by 
managers, perhaps as a consequence of the efficient price adjustment process 
observed. This stands in stark contrast to the previous findings of Patell and Wolfson 
(1984), Francis et al. (1992), Greene and Watts (1996) and Lee and Park (2000).  
 
This suggests that the exchange enforced trading halts on ASX serve their intended 
purpose of allowing investors time to consider the implications of the information 
contained in the announcement prior to commencing trading. This finding has 
important policy implications for other exchanges around the world that do not 
enforce trading halts at the time of corporate earnings announcements.  
 
The second essay of the dissertation examined the trading behaviour of algorithmic 
traders around corporate information releases during normal trading hours. The study 
found evidence that algorithmic traders significantly increased their trading activity in 
the period immediately after the information release. This abnormal trading activity 
was largely confined to the first half-hour interval after the announcement and was 
unrelated to the degree of surprise contained within the announcement itself. It 
appears as though algorithmic traders are responding to opportunities created by their 
speed advantage rather than any information advantage. The evidence that the 
introduction of co-location has had a significantly positive impact upon the level of 
algorithmic trading supports this argument.  
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This is an important finding. There has been a great deal of concern amongst 
regulators, and the wider financial community, about the implications of the rise in 
algorithmic trading on market integrity. These results show that, whilst algorithmic 
trading activity increases around corporate earnings announcements, the increase is 
not information driven and thus does not imply that algorithmic traders possess an 
informational advantage over other market participants. This suggests that higher 
levels of algorithmic trading does not in itself call into question the informational 
integrity of the exchange. 
 
The third essay of this dissertation examined the role of venture capitalists in the 
initial public offering process. Using a matched sample of VC-backed and non-VC-
backed IPOs on the Australian market, this study found evidence to support the 
certifying role of venture capitalists. There was evidence that VC-backed IPO’s were 
brought to the market higher valuations, more quickly, and with lower median 
underpricing (although with no corresponding reduction in the issuing costs) than 
those without the backing of a venture capitalist. Furthermore VC-backed firms 
exhibited evidence of better post-IPO market performance than non-VC-backed firms. 
There was also some evidence of improved post-IPO operating performance for VC-
backed IPOs. This confirms the prediction of the certification/monitoring model and 
is in contrast to the previous findings of da Silva Rosa et al (2003), who were unable 
to find any evidence of support for the certification model using IPO pricing measures 
in Australia. Furthermore, when the VC-backed firms were partitioned according to 
the age of the VC firm there emerged strong evidence that older VC firms are able to 
certify the quality of the offering to third party investors whereas younger VC firms 
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are more likely to suffer the consequences of adverse selection or to grandstand their 
portfolio companies.  
 
These results confirm that despite the structural differences between the Australian 
venture capital market and its more frequently studied US counterpart, venture 
capitalists behave in a very similar manner. This has important consequences for both 
the venture capital industry and the wider financial community. These findings 
confirm to potential investors in venture capital funds, such as superannuation funds, 
that experienced venture capitalists in Australia are able to add value to their portfolio 
companies through their involvement and that value is recognised by other 
participants in the equity market when those companies are taken public. This benefit 
however does not accrue to less experienced venture capitalists. Furthermore, these 
results confirm for investors in the IPO market that the presence of an experienced 
venture capitalist on the registry of a new offering will, on average, led to lower IPO 
underpricing and improved post-IPO operating and market performance. In essence 
the presence of a venture capitalist on the registry reduces the information asymmetry 
surrounding a new offering. 
 
The issues investigated in this dissertation are complex. No single piece of research 
could claim to have discovered the ‘truth’ about these topics. Nevertheless, the 
findings of these essays enhance our understanding of these critical aspects of 
financial market behaviour. 
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